IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 1:  Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience

Science: to be based on what we can see, hear and touch rather than on personal opinions or speculative imaginings.

• If observation of the world is carried out in a careful, unprejudiced way then the facts established in this way will constitute a secure, objective basis for science.
• If, further, the reasoning that takes us from this factual basis to the laws and theories that constitute scientific knowledge is sound, then the resulting knowledge can itself be taken to be securely established and objective.

Empiricism and positivism share the common view that scientific knowledge should in some way be derived from the facts arrived at by observation:

• The British empiricists of the seventeenth and

IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 3: Experiment

Facts:

• What is needed in science is not just facts but relevant facts
• If there are facts that constitute the basis for science, then those facts come in the form of experimental results rather than observable facts.
• If experimental results constitute the facts on which science is based, then they are certainly not straightforwardly given via the senses. They have to be worked for, and their establishment involves considerable know-how and practical trial and error as well as exploitation of the available technology.

Historical example: Hertz and Thomson

• Hertz concluded that cathode rays are not beams of charged particles. He reached this conclusion in part because the rays did not seem to be deflected when they were subjected to an electric field perpendicular to their direction

IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 5: Introducing falsificationism 

Falsificationism: An alternative to inductionism. The idea that scientific theories are falsifiable.

Falsificationists:

• Freely admit that observation is guided by and presupposes theory
• They also abandon any claim implying that theories can be established as true or probably true in the light of observational evidence
• Believe theories are guesses freely created by the human intellect in an attempt to overcome problems encountered by previous theories to give an adequate account of some aspects of the world or universe
• No problems about the charactisation and justification of induction arises for the falsificationists because, according to them, science does not involve induction.
• Falsificationists demand that scientific hypotheses be falsifiable

In support of falsificationism:

IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 7: The limitations of falsificationism

However securely based on observation or experiment a factual claim might be, the falsificationist’s position makes it impossible to rule out the possibility that advances in scientific knowledge might reveal inadequacies in that claim. Consequently, straightforward, conclusive falsifications of theories by observation are not achievable.

If a theory is to be experimentally tested, then more will be involved than those statements that constitute the theory under test

• The theory will need to be augmented by auxiliary assumptions, such as laws and theories governing the use of any instruments used
• In order to deduce some prediction, it will be necessary to add initial conditions such as a description of the experimental set-up
• In more complicated theories, if the prediction is false, we don’t know which premise was false

IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 9: Theories as structures II: Research Programs

Introducing Lakatos:

• Although an avid supporter of Popper’s approach to science, Lakatos came to realise some of the difficulties that faced Popper’s falsificationism
• Like Kuhn, Lakatos saw the merit in portraying scientific activity as taking place in a framework, and coined the phrase ‘research program’ to name what were, in a sense, Lakatos’s alternatives to Kuhn’s paradigms.

Lakatos’ research programs:

• To have a reliable measure of the progress of science, Lakatos suggested that some parts of science, laws and principles, are more basic than others
• Some laws are so fundamental that they come close to being the defining feature of a science. As such, they are not to be blamed for any apparent failure. Rather, the blame is to be placed on the less fundamental components.
• Scientists

IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 11: Methodical changes in method

Against universal method:

• We can sustain Feyerabend’s case against method, as long as we get rid of the idea that the notion of method is to be thrown out
• Feyerabend: there is no universal, ahistorical method of science that contains standards that all sciences should live up to if they are to be worthy of the title ‘science’
  • Universal: the proposed method is applicable to all sciences
  • Ahistorical: here means that the method has a timeless character
• Chalmers: We could also say that there are methods and standards in science, but that they can vary from science to science, and can, within a science, be changed
• Worrall: if Chalmers wants to defend a change in scientific method in a way that avoids extreme relativism, then he should show