Summary of the Case Law: Miranda v. Arizona (Comparative Criminal Law 2016/2017).

Police interrogation and a breach of the right not to incriminate oneself. 

Miranda v. Arizona

Introduction

This case was brought before the US Supreme Court and it is about the Miranda Rights. This case is about police interrogation in the United States. In this case the statements of the defence were obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court deals with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. The Miranda rights consist of the right to remain silent, everything you say can and will be used against you in the court of law, the right to an attorney, if you can’t afford an attorney you will get one. (page 12 & 13).

Facts

The Mexican defendant Ernesto Miranda was questioned while in custody and he was cut off from the outside world. There was given no warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process (page 19). The police took him to a special interrogation room where they secured a confession (par. 25). The defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies.

Two hours later the police emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and ‘’with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.’’ At trial before the jury, the written confession was admitted to the evidence and Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. .

Decision

The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination (p. 4). These safeguards mean that the prosecutor is devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it. The person must be warned that  he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda was no in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in another manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in-clause stating that he had full knowledge of his legal rights does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.

In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver  these rights be assumed on a silent record. In accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Courts should be reversed.