Summary Case Law: Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins

Summary of Case Law: Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins (Comparative Criminal Law, 2016/2017)

About police interrogation and waiver. 

Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins

Introduction

The Berghuis Warden v. Thompkins case is about interrogation by the police and the right to remain silent (the Fifth Amendment). The case is about implicit waiver. Implicit waiver is possible when a suspect does not invoke his right to remain silent.

Facts

Thompkins was arrested for a shooting in Michigan. He was informed his rights by the police officers. At no point did Thompkins say that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police or that he wanted an attorney. He was largely silent during the 3-hour interrogation, but near the end, he answered ‘yes’ when asked if he prayed to god to forgive him for the shooting. He moved to suppress his statements, claiming that he had invoked his right to remain silent, that he had not waived that right, and that his inculpatory statements were involuntary. Thompkins was charged with first-degree murder and other charges. The jury found Thompkins guilty and he was sentenced to life in prison.

Thompkins appealed two times: First at the State Court of Appeals, and after that the Federal District Court. The Federal District Court denied his request, reasoning that he did not invoke his right to remain silent and was not coerced into making statements during the interrogation, and that it was not unreasonable, for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty, for the State Court of Appeals to determine that he had waived his right to remain silent.

According to the Court, Thompkins waived his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to the police. He didn’t invoke his right to remain silent. A waiver must be the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception and made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.

Such a waiver may be implied through a defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver. If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver. Thompkins waived his right; he knew what he gave up when he spoke. His course of conduct indicating waiver was present by his statement about God.  The interrogation was not coercive.

After giving the Miranda warning, the police may interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived Miranda rights. The police were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkin’s Miranda rights before interrogating him.

Mr. Thompkin goes to appeal against this decision.

Decision

According to the Court, Thompkins signed the form to demonstrate that he understood his rights. After that, officers began the interrogation. At no point during this interrogation, Thompkins stated that he wanted to invoke his right to remain silent, he did not want to talk to the police or wanted an attorney. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that a waiver of the right to remain silent need not be express, as it can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Thompkins’s persistent silence for nearly three hours in response to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of the story offered a clear and unequivocal message to the officers: He did not wish to waive his rights. The waiver had to be unambiguously. This avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to officers. Did Thompkins waive his rights when he made a statement? Thompkins did not state that he wanted to remain silent. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right.

Even absent the accused’s invocation of the right to remain silent, the accused’s statement during a custodial interrogation is admissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when making the statement. The waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was a product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception, and made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. An implicit waiver of the right to remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence. A waiver may be implied through the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.

The Police has to make sure the defendant understands his rights. When he does so, the police has no need to rewarn the suspect. Interrogation must cease when the suspect invocates his waiver.

Conclusion

Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent during the police interrogation. Understanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent by making a statement to the police. The police, moreover, were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkins’s right to remain silent before interrogating him. The decision of the Court was reasonable.