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The problem of consciousness is related to some of the oldest questions of philosophy: what does the world consist of? Who am I? It relates to the mind-body problem: what is the relationship between the physical and the mental?
Despite the fact that we are learning more and more about the functioning of the brain, consciousness remains a mystery. In the past, they used the term 'élan vital' to explain how non-living things could be made alive. Nowadays this concept is no longer used, since we know that biological processes are responsible for this. Some scientists believe that the same will also happen with the term consciousness. Once we understand how brain processes create a sense of consciousness, then we might not need to use this term anymore.
Consciousness requires some sort of dualism: objectivity vs. subjectivity, inner vs. outer, mind vs. body...
For example: Take a pencil in your hand and look at it. You see the pencil from your own unique perspective, which you cannot share with others. The pencil is part of the outside world, your experience with the pencil is part of your inner world.
The way philosophers view the consciousness problem can generally be divided into monist theories, which suggest that there are one kind of things in the world, and dualist theories, which suggest that there are two kinds of things. Some theories state that the mental world is fundamental and some theories state that the physical world is fundamental.
Monistic theories assume that the world consists of only one kind of matter (body or mind). Some monistic theories state that everything consists of the mind, according to these theories we only have ideas and perceptions of a pencil. We do not know if a pencil really exists. People who assume this are called mentalists or idealists. Berkeley supported this principle. The disadvantage of this perspective is that we can never know for certain whether objects with fixed characteristics exist.
Materialists are also monists. They believe that there is only matter. An example for this is the identity theory, which states that mental experiences are the same as physical experiences. Another example is functionalism, which assumes that mental experiences are the same as functional experiences.
Epiphenomenalism assumes that physical processes cause mental events, but that mental events have no effect on physical events. Huxley was a supporter of this idea. He did not deny that consciousness or subjective experiences existed, but stated that they have no (causal) connection with physical processes. He used the concept of 'conscious automata' to indicate that people and animals with their mental experiences have no influence over their bodies. Behaviorism is based on this idea. A criticism of epiphenomenalism is that if the consciousness has no effect at all, we would never be able to speak about it.
Neutral monism claims that the world consists of different sensory perceptions. The world consists of only matter, but it is neither physical nor mental. The mind is not reduced to matter, but matter itself exists. It is assumed that there is an interplay between the mind and the brain.
By contrast, pan psychism states that all material things in the universe have (primitive) consciousness or mental qualities. This can be interpreted in two ways:
that everything in the universe has consciousness,
that everything is of a mental nature, whether this is conscious or unconscious.
Dualistic theories state that the world consists of two things (body and mind). The most famous dualist is René Descartes. He believed that both mind and body both exist and that they interact through the pituitary gland. He tried to base his ideas on certain knowledge. He stated that in principle everything could be unreal (for example the fact that you are sitting on a chair). The only thing he knew for sure is that he was thinking and therefore he was certain that he existed.
The theory of Descartes is a form of substance-dualism, which is the opposite of characteristic dualism. Characteristic dualism states that the same thing (for example a person) can be described by means of mental terms or physical terms, but that one description can not be reduced to the other. For example, if you have pain, this can be described in mental or physical terms. Substance dualism deals with the question of how the body and mind interact, while it involves two different substances. The mind would therefore affect the body, but also vice versa.
The problem of substance-dualism is how the mind interacts with the body when the two are made of different substances. Physical events and their processing by the brain are the reason for gathering experiences in the world (thoughts, images, decisions, etc.). In the other direction, thoughts and feelings must be able to influence physical matter.
However, almost all scientists today agree that the idea of dualism can not be true. For example, Ryle is a big opponent of dualism. He states that the mind is not an entity that performs or causes things.
Today, therefore, there are only a handful of dualists. Examples are Popper and Eccles, who drew up the modern theory of dualistic interactionism. According to this theory, synapses in the brain can be influenced by mental and emotional aspects. So who you are has influence (and control) on how your brain works. However, it is not clear how this happens. The more recent theory of Libet also remains without substantiation. According to this theory, subjective experiences and free will are driven by a 'mental field of consciousness' that does not use neural routes and connections. It seems that all variants of dualism get stuck in mystery and therefore can not be explained scientifically.
The term "psychology" already appeared in the 18th century to describe the philosophy of mental life, but it was towards the end of the 19th century when psychology was seen as a science. At that time, different approaches existed to study the mind. Some psychologists were interested in bodily processes, while other psychologists were more interested in subjective experiences of people. There was, however, no great distinction between these two visions.
William James stated that psychology should be concerned with, among other things, cognitions, desires, reasoning and mistakes. These are all concepts that have to do with consciousness. James, who worked from a monistic approach, had nothing to do with dualism and stated that consciousness can be manipulated by damaging the brain or by using alcohol. He therefore argued that psychology should also deal with the brain. He thought the research into consciousness was important and came with 'the flow of consciousness'. He uses this notion to describe that thoughts, ideas, images and feelings, as it were, always 'flow' through our minds. Because of his emphasis on consciousness, he thought it important that mental events be investigated. He based his ideas about consciousness on research results about attention, memory and observations.
Psychophysics deals with the relationship between concrete stimuli and individual experiences. Weber and Fechner, for example, were concerned with the relationship between sound pressure and perceiving loudness (the Weber-Fechner Act) and Helmholtz measured for the first time the speed of conduction between nerve cells ('velocity of thought'). These theories emphasized that what happens in the nervous system is unconscious and that our conscious experiences are dependent on the subconscious.
Freud stated that we are led by the subconscious. According to his theory, this subconscious consists of three parts:
'Id': the biological desires and needs,
'Ego': all kinds of defense mechanisms
'Superego': suppresses all unacceptable desires and needs that, according to Freud, would be expressed in dreams.
During the end of the 20th century, the subconscious of Freud was replaced by the cognitive subconscious. This subconscious is capable of manifesting all kinds of different forms of learning, thinking and memory without consciousness. This is sometimes called the "new subconscious."
Phenomenology emphasizes subjective experience. For example, Husserl stated that we can only know how things in the world are when we use conscious experiences. For this, no use should be made of scientific approaches. This he also called 'phenomenological reduction' or 'epoché'.
Husserl embroided on the work of Brentano. He stated that every subjective experience is about references and that conscious experiences are about objects or events. Brentano also called this 'intentionality'.
Wundt was a supporter of introspectionism: wanting to describe his own inner experiences in a reliable and precise way. He stated that there are two 'physical elements':
objective elements or sensations such as tones, heat or light and
subjective elements or feelings.
Every conscious experience would depend on an interplay of both objective and subjective elements.
Phenomenology and introspectionism are concerned with individual, inner experiences. However, they contain one problem. If a person claims to observe a private experience that is different from someone else's experience, how could you choose between these two experiences? Here behaviorism offers an answer.
Watson argued that psychology should not concern itself with the existence or non-existence of consciousness and therefore saw psychology as a natural science. The goal should be to predict and influence behavior. An advantage of this approach is that behavior became increasingly measurable.
Watson was influenced by Pavlov and his work on reflexes and classical conditioning. Pavlov investigated how repetition increases the chance of occurrence of certain behaviors. He stated that almost everything we do is taught that way.
Skinner mainly focused on operant conditioning. He taught rats and pigeons a certain behavior by punishing or rewarding them for their actions. Skinner believed that the perfect society could be created with operant conditioning. He also believed that psychology should not engage in research into consciousness. This ensured that the psychology of that time became a very limited branch of science.
Around 1960, behaviorism began to lose ground to cognitive psychology. This branch of psychology deals with information processing and internal representations. In 1970 people began to talk more about consciousness, especially because there was interest in hypnosis and sleep processes.
According to Dennett, consciousness is a mystery: something that people do not know (yet) how to think about it. In fact, there is a sort of mysterious gap between physical processes and conscious experiences.
Chalmers states that the ambiguities about consciousness can be divided into:
the easy problems and
the hard problem.
The problem is: how can physical processes in the brain cause subjective experiences? Chalmers divided this hard problem into easy problems: problems that are susceptible to standard methods of cognitive science and could be solved, for example by involving computer or neural mechanisms.
The biggest hard problem is experience: how does it feel to be an organism or to be in a certain condition? How do brain processes lead to subjective experiences?
Nagel states that consciousness is a subjectivity. He asked, 'what is it like to be a bat?'.When we say that an organism has consciousness, it means that it feels in a specific way to be that organism.
Block calls the question 'what is it like to be...?' an expression of phenomenality (or P consciousness). He distinguishes this from 'access consciousness' (A-consciousness). According to him access-consciousness is about the ability to reason and also to guide speech and actions. So this is a distinction in two kinds of consciousness. To study phenomenality means to listen to what people report about conscious experiences.
Qualia are private qualities, the way someone experiences something. A quale is what something is like.The term is used to emphasize quality so as not to talk about physical characteristics or descriptions, but about the experience itself. Conscious experiences consist of qualia and the problem of consciousness can be reformulated in terms of how the qualia are related to the physical world or how objective brains produce subjective qualia.
While Dennett believes we have conscious experiences and judgments about our experiences, he does think that special, individual, inner, subjective feelings do not exist. He therefore states that we should not think in terms of qualia at all. According to him, conscious experiences do exist, but qualia does not.
How do we know if qualia really exist? This is difficult to determine because it concerns experiences and not measurable matters. We can, however, conduct thought experiments. Are qualia something other than the brain itself? Do qualia have added value? To answer these kinds of questions, we use a thought experiment of Mary.
Mary lives in the distant future and has all the knowledge about color perception and the visual processes that are used for this. She knows exactly that certain wavelengths of light on the retina cause the experience of blue, red or other colors. However, Mary grew up all her life in a closed room where she could watch a black and white television. So she has never seen colors herself, while she knows a lot about colors. What happens if she can leaves the room one day?
Two different reactions are possible for this question:
Some scientists state that Mary will be surprised. One of these scientists is Jackson. According to him, Mary will learn something new, namely what red is like. Chalmers also states that no amount of knowledge about the color red could explain how this color really is.
Other scientists argue that Mary will not be surprised , because she already has all the knowledge about color. Dennett states that if Mary is released and sees a blue banana, she will know that this is not possible. After all, she knows everything about colors and so therefore also about what colors look like. She also knows that blue looks different than yellow.
In short: if you believe that Mary will be surprised when she is released, then you believe that consciousness, subjective experiences or qualia have added value in addition to factual knowledge about the world. If you think that they will not be surprised, then you believe that having all the knowledge about the world says everything and therefore says how it feels to experience something.
Another thought experiment is the zombie's experiment. A zombie is someone who looks exactly the same as you, but has no consciousness. The question is: is such a zombie possible?
There are two different reactions to this question:
Yes, such a zombie is possible. This reaction is based on conscious inessentialism, the idea that consciousness is a kind of optional bonus. For example, Moody suggests that zombies are people who use things like thinking, imagining, dreaming, believing and understanding, but do not understand these terms as we do. They will therefore never devote themselves to concepts such as consciousness or dreams.
No, such a zombie is not possible. An example of someone who could give such a reaction is Dennett, because of the concept of a zimbo. A zimbo is a complex zombie who can guide his own activities and has internal (but unconscious) situations. If you asked a zimbo about his dreams or feelings, he could answer thesequestions in a way that we could understand. That is why it may seem to us as if he, like us, has a consciousness. The zimbo would think he has a consciousness, while he does not. Dennett stated that this is also the case with people. We would all be zombies. We think onlythat we have a consciousness.
As mentioned earlier, Chalmers stated that ambiguities about consciousness can be divided into easy and hard questions. So Chalmers' question relates to Nagel’s question about subjectivity: what is it like be a...? Scientists have reacted in different ways to Chalmers' idea that there is a hard question when we talk about consciousness. The responses can be divided into four categories:
the hard problem is insoluble
the hard problem can be solved,
it is essential to first solve the easy questions, and
there is no hard problem at all.
James stated that we can never know exactly what consciousness is. Nagel also stated that the issue is unsolvable. McGinn spoke about the 'yawning conceptual divide'. He meant that no matter how long you look at the brain (and into neurons and synapses), you will never be able to perceive consciousness. He stated that in this area we are 'cognitively closed'. This means that even if we want to know where consciousness comes from, we would never be able to find out, because ‘our intelligence is wrongly designed to understand consciousness’. Pinker agreed with this.
Some people find that the difficult problem can be solved, but only if we use a new frame of reference to understand the universe. Chalmers states that we must use dualism for this. We should, according to him, look for both the physical aspect and the experiential aspect for every form of information. So we could only understand consciousness if we develop a new theory about how we look at information.
Clarke states that the mind can not be located. He starts from quantum physics. According to him, the mind is the key to the universe. The mind would take a place; even before space and time. Chalmers and Clarke both assume dualism and their ideas are close to panpsychism. We previously encountered the mental field of consciousness of Libet. According to him, the existence of this is necessary because the structure and functioning of nerve cells can never explain a conscious, subjective experience. The mathematician Penrose points out that consciousness is dependent on non-algorithmic processes.
Chalmers states that the easy problems are about the connection between attention, memory and consciousness. Crick and Koch designed a theory about how particles are interconnected in the brain to form a perceptual whole of an object. Chalmers, however, wonders to what extent integration of particles equals a conscious visual experience. Crick and Koch argue that the hard problem of qualia - how the redness of red could arise from the actions of the brain - can not be solved directly. Better we can try to find neural correlates of consciousness, hoping to shed more light on the qualia.
O'Hara and Scutt mention three reasons to ignore the hard problem
We know how to deal with the easy problems and that is why we should focus on those problems.
They think that solving the easy problems will change our ideas about the hard problem.
Solving the hard problem is only necessary if we are able to recognize it, but for now the problem is not well enough understood.
Churchland goes even further and states that the problem is misunderstood. We would not be able to predict in advance which problems are hard and which problems are easy. How can we already know in advance that explaining subjectivity is more difficult than solving the easy problems? In addition, she wonders whether the hard problems are well defined enough to separate them from the easy problems. Dennett states that distinguishing between easy and hard problems is not smart in advance. There will always be unanswered questions. We now know, for example, how conception, birth and growth work, but we do not know how life itself works. You could also see that as a hard problem, but that only makes things more complicated. It is therefore better not to think in terms of easy and hard problems.
For many centuries there have been variants of the idea that the mind consists of different parts. Already with the ancient Egyptians and in ancient Hindu texts we find the assumption that the mind is subdivided into parts. Plato stated that the soul consists of three parts: reason, the 'spirit' and appetite. Above all, it occupied a central position in psychoanalytic theories of the early twentieth century. However, the more we discover about the functioning of the brain, the more unlikely the idea of the divided mind becomes.
Another subdivision is the occurrence of two types of processing. This is what the 'dual-process' theories are about. Many of these theories state that one process is automatic, effortless and non-flexible, while the other is much slower, more controlled and flexible. You can effortlessly shift this subdivision over the distinction between unconscious and conscious. In daily life we feel that we do many things unconsciously. When we do things consciously, we feel that our consciousness really has control over it. If that is indeed the case, how does the mind do that?
Imagine someone throws a ball at you. Before the ball arrives you start to grab it. So you seem to be aware of the ball that comes to you, but also of what you have to do to catch the ball. So the sequence seems to be:
you perceive something consciously and
you perform an action on the basis of the conscious experience.
This is actually very strange, since physical information about the outside world (the ball) enters your brain and as a result you get a conscious experience. This conscious experience then ensures that you perform an action in one way or another.
Descartes assumed a dualistic approach, but this is not a solution to the problem. Philosopher Kim argued that unconscious thoughts and actions may arise from a conscious thought, but that does not necessarily mean that this is decisive. The question must be whether consciousness has a causal force. Hodgson stated that feelings, no matter how intense, can never play a causal role in physical processes. According to him, feelings are only extras. This is in line with the idea of Huxley's idea of a conscious automata. We assume that our subjective feelings and conscious choices cause our actions. If you examine the brain, however, there seems to be no room for this. Information comes through the senses and is then further processed by various parts of the brain. This then ensures the actions of the individual.
Conscious perception is not necessary for all movements. Visual-motor control and conscious perception are separate from each other. Accurate movements can also be made on stimuli that are not so consciously experienced. Paulignan et al., for example, showed that consciousness may be too late to play a causal role within an action. Castiello et al. showed in their research that neural activity has to process an important amount of time before it can bring about a conscious experience. The problem with the above experiments, however, is that the moment of awareness can not be precisely measured. Milner and Goodale state that there is a difference between two visual systems:
visual perception and
visual-motor control.
These categories are related to the ventral and the dorsal route. The ventral route is also called the "what" route and the dorsal route is also called the "where" route.
Milner and Goodale propose to make a distinction based on fundamentally different tasks performed by the brain. According to them, these categories are:
rapid visual-motor control and
less urgent visual perception.
They call these processes: 'vision-for-action' and 'vision-for-perception'.
According to Milner and Goodale, visual motor control is more dominant than visual perception in tasks performed by the brain. This would allow the action to become aware of this.
There is no doubt about the statement that we seem to do certain actions consciously, certain actions appear to be unconscious and others sometimes conscious and sometimes unconscious. We can generally divide actions into five categories:
actions that are always unconscious,
actions that are normally unconscious but can be controlled consciously,
actions that are initially conscious but with time become less and less conscious
actions that can be carried out both consciously and unconsciously, and
actions that always have to be carried out consciously.
You can not let your hair grow consciously; your hair grows on its own. You also have no influence on reflexes.
Some actions (which are normally performed unconsciously) can be influenced by conscious control. This can be done by giving feedback about the consequences of the actions. This is also called biofeedback. Imagine: you see on a screen how quickly or slowly your heart beats. You can learn how to influence the speed at which your heart beats by consciously dealing with it. For example, you can breathe deeply or exhale to calm down and let your heart beat more slowly. You can exercise conscious control over something that normally happens unconsciously (the beating of your heart).
Learning something new will require conscious thinking in the beginning, but with time it will be more and more automatic. Think for example of driving or cycling.
Once a skill is mastered, it can be done both consciously and unconsciously. For example, making tea can be done in either way.
If you try to remember a name or a telephone number, you use your consciousness. If you have to make a difficult moral decision, that does not happen automatically. In that case the use of consciousness is necessary.
Some theories attribute a clear causal role to consciousness, according to them, consciousness causes brain events. The most obvious of such theories is dualism. Two centuries after Descartes, Carpenter described another form of interactionism. In one direction, physiological activity produces a sensational consciousness, while in the other direction sensations, emotions and ideas liberate the nerve-force which the appropriate part of the brain is changed.
The only modern, dualist theory is the theory of Popper and Eccles. They call their theory 'dualist interactionism'. In their theory they mainly use the term 'self-conscious mind'. They argued that this is an independent entity and that this is the highest level of brain activity. They mainly focused on the specific areas of the brain ('liaison areas') that occupy themselves with, among other things, language. These brain areas use different types of input. There is a constant two-way traffic between the mind and the brain. The self-conscious mind reads, as it were, the neural events in the brain and integrates them so that there is one experience. In addition, the self-conscious mind itself also causes brain activity in large parts of the brain.
The mental field of consciousness described by Libet also works in two directions. It causes brain cell activity to lead to a subjective experience, and in the other way it causes sensations, emotions and so on to cause neural activity. A critical point is how this interaction takes place. Eccles states that mental events consist of 'psychons' and that each psychon interacts with a dendron in the brain. He thus answers the question of where the interaction between the mind and the brain takes place, but it remains unclear how this happens. For this reason, this theory is rejected by many scientists.
There are two representational theories:
higher-order perception (HOP)
higher-order thought (HOT).
According to HOP, being aware of a mental condition means monitoring the mental state. HOT states that consciousness is about having a thought about the situation. A mental state is therefore conscious if the person has a higher order thought about what it is like to be in that situation. The difference between conscious and unconscious actions is therefore that there are HOTs in conscious acts.
In the philosophical field, functionalism states that mental states are functional states. Functionalism works well in explaining mental states such as desires and beliefs, but not well in explaining consciousness. Functionalism can not answer questions about what consciousness does or what the difference is between conscious and unconscious actions.
Baars designed the global workspace theory. He argued that the cognitive system was built on a global workplace just like the stage of a theatre. Unconscious processes (such as sensory perceptions, inner speech, ideas) compete to be at the center of attention on that stage. They do this to pass information to the unconscious audience in the room, ie areas of the subconscious brain. When passing on the information use would be made of the consciousness. Conscious actions are therefore those actions that have gained access to the global workplace, the working memory.
Baars states that consciousness is a form of biological adjustment. It is a kind of gateway to bring in and exchange information, but also to coordinate and exercise control. Baars also states that consciousness has nine functions and that these functions are necessary to integrate thoughts and actions. In addition, awareness would be needed to adapt to new circumstances. Baars is an opponent of the idea that consciousness does not play a causal role in the nervous system. He thinks that conscious actions are shaped by constant feedback, while that does not apply to unconscious actions. According to Baars, awareness has arisen to protect us from danger. He states that there is no gap at all between the mind and the body.
Hume states that the mind is a kind of theater where different perceptions appear, pass by, come back again and mix in different situations. Such a comparison sounds attractive and in this chapter the advantages and disadvantages of making such a comparison will be explained.
What does it feel like to be you? Some people will describe this as a situation where the "I" is somewhere in their heads and they look at the world with their eyes. The "I" can hear sounds that reach consciousness. If you close your eyes, it looks like you are looking at mental images. Thoughts and feelings come into the consciousness of the 'me' and then leave again.
If you make a similar description of the 'I', then this is what Dennett calls 'Cartesian theater (CT)'. This means that we feel that our "I" is somewhere in our brain. In this place, eveyrthing we are conscious of is present together. Dennett also states that many materialists (who reject dualism) implicitly still believe there is a place where the consciousness takes place and that there is someone to whom consciousness happens. Such a vision is dualistic in essence. Dennett calls this vision 'Cartesian materialism' (CM).
Both CT and CM have a dualistic approach. You are a supporter of CT if you believe that there is a space, place or stage within which conscious experiences happen. You are a Cartesian materialist if you believe that consciousness does not exist separately from the brain and that there is a sort of theater in the brain where everything comes together. If the Cartesian theater exists, we should be able to locate it in the head.
When we perform actions, we can find the brain processes that cause them. There is no specific part of the brain where our consciousness comes from. A lot of parallel processing takes place in the brain. In addition, there are complex feedback processes that the brain uses. So there is a lot of integration.
There is also no specific time in which the consciousness must express itself. It is true that information first comes in and that actions then follow, but between both there is multiple parallel processing. There is therefore no magic moment in which input is translated into output or a moment in which the consciousness is experienced.
Shepard showed participants a picture of blocks stuck together in space, but from different points of view. The blocks were rotated and the participants had to say whether it was the same image or not. To do this you have to rotate the position of the blocks mentally.The question is where in our head the mental rotation of the forms takes place. Shepard and Metzler discovered that the moment when people realized that it was the same image correlated with the time needed to actually rotate the blocks in space. So if a picture in the head has to be rotated very much (for example 180 degrees), it will take longer to decide whether it is the same image as the picture has to be rotated a bit (5 degrees).
These results show that something measurable happens in the head when people have to imagine things. However, the results do not show that consciousness is responsible for these representations. In addition, the results do not show that there is a mental screen on which images are projected (as with CT).
Mental rotations
Mental rotations can manifest unconsciously. It has been found that when we scan a visual image mentally, the visual cortex is activated, just as it happens when we look at an object. If you believe that there is a mental screen on which a rotated image is projected and that the 'I' consciously or unconsciously looks at that screen, then the question is where that screen is in the head. The 'I' should, think for itself and be able to look at the mental screen. This is very unlikely. We can only say that there is processing in different parts of the cortex. This allows us to solve rotation problems, look at mental rotation and describe this.
The problem that arises in the concept of Cartesian theater is the same problem described in chapter 3. We are aware of some actions, but not of all actions. We also know that all actions, perceptions and wishes are related to neural activity in the brain. The question that arises is therefore: what makes some events conscious and others unconscious?
Some of the alternative theories hold the theater metaphor in their minds, while other theories ignore the possibilities of a Cartesian theater. Examples of these alternative theories are discussed below.
This theory of Baars is based on the theater hypothesis. He states that conscious events happen in the theater of consciousness. He states that there is a big difference between the limited number of items available in consciousness and the many unconscious processes that are present. He believes that consciousness in the theater serves as a spotlight on the stage. With the spotlight, attention is focused on different actors (ie events from the outside world), so that we become aware of these events. The bright light is surrounded by events of which we are very vaguely aware.
The interactions between the stage, the audience and what happens behind the scenes are based on the idea of a 'global workspace architecture'. This view states that the brain is so structured that it is only possible to deal with a number of items at a time in the 'global workspace' (working memory or short-term memory). We can hold about seven items in our working memory.
Baars states that consciousness is not an incident, but he also states that it is not something mysterious. According to him, consciousness is the working part of the entire cognitive system. What causes us to be aware of an event, according to Baars, is that the event is processed within the working memory and that the event is made available for the rest of the (unconscious) system. Baars sees consciousness as a variable with different values. He thinks that we should therefore think in terms of 'more conscious' or 'less conscious' instead of 'conscious' and 'unconscious'. He calls this 'contrastive analysis'. He does not, like CT, state that there is a fixed place where consciousness is located in the brain. He does state that somewhere in the brain the information comes together from areas that have to do with working memory. His theory assumes that things can be in or out of consciousness. According to Dennett, Baars therefore has a Cartesian materialistic view. Baars states with his theory that availability of information in working memory explains the feeling of consciousness. However, he can not explain how and why that happens.
A similar theory is Dehaene's 'neuronal global workspace' model. This theory also states that unconscious processes are competing for access to the limited capacity of the global workspace, the working memory. This working memory probably works thanks to an extensive network of different brain areas. Information that has gained access can thus be extensively passed on to other areas of the brain.
The availability of information (global availability) that arises in this way offers the possibility of (non) verbal expression. There are two possibilities:
Many theories completely reject the controversial image of the stage and the theater. For example, Libet does not believe in the equation of consciousness and a theater with his theory of 'neuronal adequacy'. He states that we become aware of an event when neurons fire for a certain period of time. Many events remain unconscious because this threshold value is not reached by neurons.
Another example is the 'astonishing hypothesis' by Crick. This theory states that your joys, worries, ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will are nothing more than the coming together of nerve cells. According to Crick, conscious experience is equivalent to the action of neurons. Conscious experience is therefore not caused by neurons and the consciousness also has no interaction with neurons. Consciousness and the functioning of neurons are the same thing. Crick states that consciousness is most closely related to neural activities in the lower cortical areas of the brain. To become aware of something, these cortical areas need to be supported by a kind of short-term memory.
The "eliminative materialism" of Paul and Pat Churchland equates conscious experiences with brain activity. They state that it is quite simple: neural processes and subjective experiences are the same. "Electromagnetic waves do not cause light, do not correlate with light; they are light. That is what light is. "
Dennett states that we can best avoid CM if we ban the entire concept of CT. In his view, we no longer have to think in terms of a theater or an audience. Dennett is in favor of the multiple drafts model. This model states that all mental activities (perceptions, emotions and thoughts) in the brain arise through parallel processes in different brain routes. These processes ensure that sensory input can be interpreted. These processes would constantly be revised. For this reason our perceptions and thoughts are constantly being revised and transformed.
But which versions of our perceptions and thoughts are conscious? If you think in terms of CT then you would say that only some versions can be seen by the public. Dennett calls such an explanation the 'myth of double transduction'. In Dennett's theory, there are only multiple designs of feelings, thoughts and perceptions with which the brain works. Some of these designs (drafts) are used to guide behavior or produce speech, while others are stored in memory.
Dennett states that, as claimed by CT, there is no question of an audience. We talk about our experiences and therefore feel that there is a kind of 'I' that is responsible for this. According to him, it is an illusion that there is an observer (the 'I'). We ask two more questions: is this theory CT, and how does this theory explain subjectivity (ie the fact that we feel we are experiencing something)?
In this theory there is no CT, since Dennett does not believe in the comparison of consciousness with a theater and an accompanying audience. In addition, he states that subjectivity should not be seen in terms of what the "I" experiences. Yet he has a view on the issue of subjectivity. There is always a translation of a parallel stream of events in the brain and these events can be translated and /or interpreted in different ways.
A few centuries ago, James asked the following question: does consciousness cause attention to be directed or is consciousness the effect of paying attention? We feel that our consciousness causes some parts of the world to light up, while leaving some other parts in darkness. This is also called 'spotlight of attention'. So it feels like we can focus our attention on something consciously.
Numerous theories about attention have been carried out. For example, around 1950, researchers conducted experiments with the dichotic listening task. In such an experiment, someone gets to hear different messages in both ears. It is the intention that someone only pays attention to the messages that come into one ear. The result of this experiment was that what comes into the other ear is perceived unconsciously, even though no attention is paid to it. These kinds of findings led to the ongoing debate about the moment of attention selection: early, close to the sensory level, or only after much processing has taken place.
Other theories saw attention as a bottleneck, where pre-conscious sensory filters were needed to decide what should be passed to deeper stages of processing. This perception fits well with the idea that the brain has a limited capacity for detailed processing. There is then parallel processing.
There are various ideas today about the relationship between attention and consciousness. Mack states on the basis of 'inattentional blindness' (see section 6) that no conscious perception can exist without attention. Crick, on the other hand, states that consciousness is closely linked to attention.
So there are basically two opposing ideas about consciousness and attention. The first idea is that if attention is paid to something, it will end up in consciousness. The other idea is that consciousness leads the attention processes and that this is the greatest function of consciousness. This fits with our own experience of consciousness, namely that we choose what we focus our attention on.
James mentioned the above ideas as the effect theory and cause theory. He stated that it is almost impossible to know which theory is correct and based his decision on ethical grounds, saying that personal will (or spiritual force) is the reason for consciousness (and therefore a cause). Today, researchers are still wondering whether consciousness is a cause or a consequence.
Attention can be involuntary or intentional and these two processes depend largely on different systems in the brain. Often attention is involuntarily focused on something. For example, we react immediately when we hear a loud sound or when someone speaks our name. This involuntary attention is driven by the ventral attention system and mainly takes place in the right hemisphere in the frontal, parietal and temporal areas. Some physical systems constantly try to ensure that the body, the eyes and the head always remain coordinated in relation to the outside world.
Some of these control systems are based on 'retinocentric coordinates'. This means that they keep objects stable on the retina. Other systems use 'craniocentric coordinates'. This means that the world is kept stable in relation to the position of the head. Often, both types of control systems go together with fast and unconscious processes.
Directing the eyes to an object is not the same as paying attention to that object. Helmholz proved that it is possible to look at the one object, but to focus attention elsewhere. This is also called 'covert attention scanning'. The superior colliculus and the frontal eye areas (FEFs: 'frontal eye fields') are responsible for looking at an object and neurons in the posterior parietal cortex ensure that attention can be shifted. Activity in these FEF neurons corresponds to the mental 'spotlight of attention'.
Another form of involuntary visual attention occurs in 'pop-out'. If there is a stimulus between different stimuli that is different from the rest, it will 'pop out', and attract attention.
Libet carried out experiments showing that there should be about half a second of neural activity to cause consciousness. This is also called 'half-second delay'. During his experiments, Libet stimulated the sensory cortex of people who were awake and aware. Their somatosensory cortex was stimulated with electrodes. This stimulation always differed in frequency, intensity and duration. The result was that the participants stated that they had conscious sensory perceptions.
Libet discovered the connection between the intensity of the stimulation and how long the sensory experience lasts (train duration). He stated that a certain amount of intensity is needed for sensory perceptions. If this amount is not achieved, no observation would take place, no matter how long a part of the brain was stimulated. He discovered that that the 'train duration' must last at least half a second. Libet also concluded that only the somatosensory cortex itself can provide conscious perception.
The referral hypothesis ('backwards referral hypothesis') predicts that stimulation of the medial lemniscus should be referred back ('subjective referral'). Lemniscus is part of the pathway leading to the somatosensory cortex. Libet investigated this hypothesis by asking participants about the timing of different stimuli. As predicted, he found that when a touch on the skin occurred at the same time as the stimulation of the medial lemniscus, participants felt that they were both occurring at the same time. The stimulation of the medial lemniscus was only felt when the stimulation lasted long enough. In general, critics have not reached agreement on the weaknesses and results of Libet's experiments. The only way to be sure is to repeat the experiments. It is unfortunately no longer possible to replicate his experiments, because nowadays stricter rules are used for stimulating the brain. There are researchers who come to a different conclusion about consciousness on the basis of Libet's experiments.
Libet therefore states that an experience is only conscious when it lasts for at least half a second. With this he distinguishes between conscious and unconscious processes. Milner and Goodale state that the ventral route leads to consciousness, while that does not apply to the dorsal route. Libet only states that an activity must last a certain length of time for it to be deliberately noticed. Libet also states that the referral hypothesis provides evidence against materialism and the 'theory of psychoneural identity'. This theory states that the consciousness and activity of neurons are the same thing. Eccles, Popper and Penrose believe that Libet's findings provide evidence for dualism.
Wundt discovered the 'subjective time displacement' phenomenon. This means that when you ask participants to determine the relative timing of auditory or visual stimuli, people make mistakes in determining which event happened first.
We do not always experience things in the order in which they happen. An idea is that there are two worlds:
an outside world in which events happen in one order.
An inner experienced world of consciousness in which events happen in another order.
Evidence for this idea is given by the so-called phi phenomenon.
If two flashes (in different positions) are shown very shortly after each other, then the observer has the feeling that there is one light that moves. He or she therefore does not see two separate flashes. With the phi phenomenon, the color of the flash changes from red to green even before the second flash is shown. However, someone who observes this only sees one moving light point that changes from red to green.
Another example is what is called 'cutaneous rabbit'. If you are touched on your wrist a number of times, then on your elbow and finally on your upper arm, those touches do not feel as separate, but as a whole. It feels as if something 'climbs' from the bottom to the top.
What does it mean to see? Is visual experience an illusion? The term 'grand illusion' arose as a result of research into 'changing blindness' and 'inattentional blindness'. The term 'the grand illusion' stands for the idea that the richness of our visual world is an illusion. Alva Noë states with his 'new skeptism' that the brain builds an inner model of the world, so that we are actually misled about the nature of our experiences. An illusion is not something that does not exist (like a fairy or a spirit), but something that is not what it seems to be.
There are two types of theories about visual experience. The first idea is that there is a stream of conscious visual impressions that must be explained. The implication of this is that there is an infinite number of parts at any moment in an infinite visual stream. The second idea is that seeing means having internal mental pictures; the idea that the visual world is represented in our heads. This idea is at least a few centuries old and Leonardo da Vinci was the first to describe the eye as a 'camera obscura', a dark room in which an image of the world was projected.
James says we can not take in everything we see while looking around. Yet we are not aware that we have looked over things. How is it that we do not perceive these 'gaps'? In vision, the brain will fill in the missing parts themselves. Another possibility is that it is not necessary to fill in the holes, because the gaps stand for a lack of information.
There are all kinds of visions about gaps:
The brain actually fills in all the details so that a complete image is created in the brain (or in consciousness?); this is called 'isomorphic filling-in' and probably takes place at low levels of the visual system. As we have already seen, Koch states that active processes such as completion are used for this.
The gaps are filled to a higher level of the visual system and this is more conceptual in nature, instead of a picture being filled in. This is called 'symbolic filling-in'.
The brain does not need to fill in gaps. The latter is the most skeptical vision.
Ramachandran states that if people see two vertical lines (one above and one below the blind spot), they still think that the vertical line continues. In addition, Ramachandran has shown that gaps in color and movement are also filled in by the brain.
Research shows that people often do not notice changes in images when they have to make an eye movement, for example when they first have to look at a picture on the left and then look at a picture on the right. In this experiment, parts of the surrounding text were altered during a saccade (here an outward movement of the eye was measured with certain equipment) and these changes did not notice the people. An eye movement ensures that we can only rely on our memory to determine changes. Apparently our memory is not perfect and we do not always have a stable and detailed picture of the world in our consciousness. It does not even appear to be necessary to use two different pictures. It is also possible to shift a picture a bit and in the meantime make a change in the picture. Then, people do not notice the change either. With change blindness, attention is needed to notice changes, but the question is whether to focus attention is sufficient, as changes are more likely to be detected if subjects are attending to the part of the image that changes. Probably this is not the case because the phenomenon does not disappear when people turn their attention to an object, picture or event.
Mack and Rock state that conscious perception depends on attention. They came to this conclusion by examining 'inattentional blindness'. Inattentional blindness means that there is no conscious perception when something is not being payed attention to.
These experiments tell us that there is probably no such thing as as a 'steam of vision'. Seeing is probably not a process of building detailed representations that can be used to compare details. We apparently do not store as much information as we thought, otherwise change blindness would not exist. Yet we feel that there is continuity when we look at the outside world. We do not feel that we see loose pieces, but that vision continues, flows.
Simons and Levin say that we have a rich visual experience when we focus on something. From that we extract the meaning or gist of the scene. Our perceptual system assumes, however, that the visual details have not changed. We therefore do not observe any changes. This creates a phenomenal experience of continuity without too much confusion.
Rensink believes that people can never have a complete representation of the world. We only make a representation of an object when it is needed, but we do not have a representation of it everywhere. O'Regan agrees. There is no need to store large amounts of visual information because we can use the world as external memory as 'the best model'. He does reject that we need internal models at all: the visual world is not something we have, but what we do.
O'Regan and Noë believe that seeing has nothing to do with building internal representations of objects. They are in favor of a sensorimotor theory of vision and visual awareness. They argue that traditional theories can not explain how internal representations lead to visual awareness. They ignore this problem by saying that seeing is not building models but an act to explore the environment. An organism has the experience of seeing when it develops the skills to extract visual information from the world. Interaction with the visual information is done through physical movements, blinking and other actions through which you 'visually manipulate'.
What you see then is not a picture of the world but information that requires further exploration. If you stop manipulating the world, when you do not interact, you see nothing. The inconsistency of the stream of vision and the assumption of an internal stream of images and representations is assumed by the results of filling-in, inattentional blindness and change blindness. The most extreme view that you can take is that the entire stream of vision is an illusion.
Questions about the nature of consciousness are closely tied to questions about the nature of the self. The 'self' we experience seems to be central to everything we are aware of at every moment. As a result, the self has both uniqueness and continuity. The problems start when you ask what kind of thing that experience might be.
How is it that we feel that there is a 'self' that has all kinds of experiences? There are two ideas about the self in psychology:
there is such a thing as a self that has all kinds of experiences and makes decisions, and
it seems as if there is a self, but this in reality, this is not the case
From the first vision the egotheories arise and from the second vision the bundling theories originated. In many religions the first vision is assumed. Only in Buddhism is it denied that the self exists. Many forms of substance dualism are egotheories, because they state that the mind equals the self. An example is the theory of 'dualist interactionism' by Popper and Eccles. According to this theory, the self-conscious mind has control over the brain. The distinction between monists and dualists is not the same as the distinction between egotheories and bundle theories. There are materialists (monists) who believe that there is a self.
Bundle theories are based on the work of Hume that states that the self does not exist, but that there is a bundle of sensations. The life of a person would consist of a succession of sensations, impressions and ideas, which follow each other in a continuous flow at lightning speed, for a lifetime. Hume and Buddha share the idea that there is no self. Hume, however, admitted that bundle theories go against something that we perceive as normal. We all have the feeling that there is a self.
In people with multiple personalities, it seems that several selves live in them. For example, someone can have the self of a small child, an old woman, a general and a teacher. The personalities alternate and they have different skills, different levels of intelligence and different memories. They can not remember memories of each other.
The most famous example of a person with multiple personality disorder (now: dissociative identity disorder) is described by Prince who treated Mrs. Beauchamp. This lady had a terrible childhood, had pain and was very tired. Prince used hypnosis to reduce pain and fatigue. During the hypnosis, a second, passive personality emerged, called BIII, and one day Mrs Beauchamp started to talk about herself in the third case, due to her third personality, Sally. Mrs. Beauchamp and BIII had no knowledge of each other or of the third personality, and each life had voids in the memory which corresponded to the times when the other personalities were active, but Sally seemed to know the other personalities and claimed to be able to remember events when the personalities lost control. Prince called Sally a 'subconscious' self, and he wanted to find the 'real' Miss Beauchamp and stated that the other selves (like Sally) stand for a split of conscious states. Prince managed to bring all the personalities together into the real self of Miss Beauchamp.
Prince was clearly a supporter of the ego-theories. He believed not only in the 'true Mrs. Beauchamp', but also in various other different selves who were different states of consciousness with a separate will. James believed that the existence of people like Miss Beauchamp provides evidence for the fact that the same brain can create more than one self. Harré and Gillett argue that several of them existed in the body of Miss Beauchamp, but not because Miss Beauchamp herself had several selves, but because the multiple selves had arisen through reasoning.
In the case of multiple personality, the brain of the person in question remains intact and the dissociation is more mental than physical. The reverse seems to happen when a person has a brain divided into two.
Around 1960, operations were performed in which the passage(s) between both hemispheres was cut to reduce symptoms of epilepsy. A person in whom this operation was performed is called a 'split brain patient'. Normally information goes from the left visual field to the right hemisphere and information from the right visual field to the left hemisphere. If you put a split brain patient in front of a computer screen and show two images, something interesting happens. The picture on the left of the screen is processed by the right hemisphere and this ensures that someone can not say what he or she has seen. The right image is processed by the left hemisphere. Since the left hemisphere is specialized in speech, someone can name what he or she has seen on the right picture. Sperry states that one brain hemisphere does not know what the other one is doing in the case of a split brain patient. So every hemisphere has its own memories and these memories can not be passed on to the other brain.
Gazzaniga initially believed that there is a 'double conscious system' in split brain patients. So there would be two different forms of consciousness among these people. Later, Sperry changed his opinion because he believed that there is a kind of 'interpreter' in the left hemisphere. If a patient sees a snow-covered house on a screen on the left and sees a chicken leg on the right, something crazy happens. If he or she then has to point out which objects belong to these pictures, the patient points to a chicken (because it belongs to the chicken leg) and also points out a shovel. However, he does not say that the shovel is needed to remove the snow. He says he has chosen the shovel because a shovel is needed to clean the chicken shed.
Based on his experiments, Gazzaniga believes that the left brain uses language, organizes convictions and attributes actions and intentions to people. Only the left hemisphere would be responsible for high-level consciousness.
Research shows that both hemispheres have different functions. The right hemisphere is responsible for facial recognition, while verbal skills are in the left hemisphere. If the left hemisphere of a person is removed, then this person still maintains his or her consciousness. This could mean that Sperry was right when he stated that there are two different forms of consciousness present in both hemispheres.
MacKay believes, however, that there is no evidence for this assumption. He distinguished between executive parts of the brain ('executive levels of brain function') and supervising parts of the brain ('supervisory levels of brain function'). Executive parts of the brain can lead to targeted activities and they can evaluate these activities in terms of priorities set.
Supporters of the bundle theory claim that the discussion of split brain patients having one consciousness or two is unnecessary, because according to them there is no separate 'self'.
So far, we have divided the theories about the self into two categories: ego theories that bring a kind of permanent continuity and bundle theories that do not. Egotheories make it difficult to design testable hypotheses and bundle theories have no explanation for the fact that people feel that they have a self. Egotheories have something like the idea of a Cartesian theater, in which the self perceives all sorts of things. It is difficult to deny that the self exists. We do have the feeling that we have a self.
James has written a lot about consciousness and self. His work is mainly about how the self feels. We feel that we have a personal identity. Central to this is continuity and unity of the self. We also feel that our thoughts are ours and are close to us; in this we distinguish and differ from others. He distinguishes between what he calls:
the empirical self or objective person ('me') and
subjective thoughts or the pure ego ('I').
The empirical self is easy to deal with and contains three aspects:
the material self; consistsing of the body, clothes, belongings, family and friends,
the social self; which is about someone's reputation and what image others have of that person and how he esponds to them,
subjective experiences, which are the source of attention and effort.
James states that the pure ego ('I') is difficult to describe. According to some, the pure ego stands for the mind and according to others is invented. The latter group therefore believes that the self does not exist. James rejects both ideas and goes for a middle way.
James sees continuity of the self only as a potential: the thought is a temporary administrator of other thoughts. James' theory is not able to give an explanation to for how and why the existence of temporary human language is connected with the functioning of our minds. James states that his theory is between the ego theories and bundle theories.
Dennett states that the filling in of visual gaps does not occur because there is no self where that could happen. Ramachandran , however, proved with his experiments that the filling in of visual gaps does occur in some situations. It seems that the filling in of visual gaps is not done for someone (ie for the self), but for something else, namely for another brain system. Ramachandran talks about the executive system that MacKay also talks about. MacKay also specifically looks at control processes in the pre-frontal areas. Ramachandran gives more attention to the limbic system. The processes that best correspond with the idea of the self have to do with the combination of motivation, emotion and actions. This combination is triggered by incoming sensory perceptions (qualia). We use this qualia to operate the limbic system. Our conscious experiences are therefore the input for the limbic system.
Ramachandran states that a self located in the brain does not exist, but he does not explain how input from outside can be experienced. In addition, he does not explain how qualia can be used as input.
Damasio distinguishes between the 'proto-self', the 'core-self' and the 'autobiographical self'. The proto-self consists of a set of neural patterns that store the state of an organism at any moment. The most basic form of consciousness is core-consciousness, which occurs not only in humans but also in animals. This form of consciousness does not depend on memory or on language skills. This form of consciousness gives an organism the feeling that it exists in the here and now. The 'core-self' is connected to this. The 'autobiographical self' depends on personal memories and continues to develop as someone grows older. This form of the self can also occur in animals in a less developed form.
Damasio states that consciousness is a feeling and that feelings are neural patterns. However, he can not explain where subjectivity comes from. In the GWT theory (Global Workspace Theory) of Baars we experience a self because some information in our heads is in the spotlight and therefore gets the attention. According to Baars, there would be a 'self-system' that influences what will be in the spotlight. Baars uses the distinction that James makes between 'me' and 'I' in order to distinguish the self-concept from the more fundamental 'self-system'. This self-system is fundamental, because consciousness should interact with it. The consciousness and the self are always connected to each other in this way. This theory does not see the self as an illusion.
According to Hofstadter, the brain is full of loops, consisting of many levels of loop-like self-descriptions. Together they form a conscious self. At this level, the self is no illusion. At a lower level we arrive at neural activity. The 'I' then falls apart. Viewed on this level, the self is an illusion. The 'theory of strange loops' is a bundle theory.
Metzinger introduces the 'phenomenal self-model' (PSM). Through a pattern of neural activity, parts of the world are integrated into an inner image of yourself as a whole. In Metzinger's theory, the self is the content of the PSM. According to him, conscious experiences are not an image of reality, but a tunnel through reality. The PSM theory is also a bundle theory.
Strawson described what he called the pearl vision ('pearl view'). He believes that there are many mental selves that alternate themselves at different times, just like pearls on a chain. According to this view, selves really exist, but they are not separate entities.
The selves represent different patterns of neural activity or states of activation that come and go. He states that the selves perceive experiences (Subjects of Experience that are Single Mental Things, SESMET). According to Strawson, each self can take a number of seconds, but also much longer, but if one disappears, then another person comes in its place. For a self, a personality or long-term memory would not be necessary. So there is no question of one permanent self. Strawson's theory is clearly not a ego theory. However, it seems that the theory is not a bundle theory either, since Strawson admits that we feel that the pearl itself has a sense of unity. He, like supporters of bundle theories, does not claim that experiencing the self is merely a bundle of sensations and perceptions. However, the theory can not explain why we feel that there is a self that is permanent.
Dennett states that there is no Cartesian theater and that there is no show or audience in that theater. Why then do we feel that there is such a theater? Dennett states that people think very much in terms of everything-or-nothing when it comes to a self.
So we do or do not have a self. He states that these are outcomes of evolution and that they are built piece by piece during our lives. Patients with a split brain are not necessarily one themselves. Two or more must be able to exist. He is in favor of the idea that there is no self and is therefore a supporter of the bundle theories. Dennett sees the narrative as an illusion. Several selves come and go. The story in it is constructed by minds, but the protagonist is missing. The idea of a single source, of unity and continuity, is a false idea created by real words.
The problem of free will goes back to the Greek philosophers, 2000 years ago. The basic question that was always asked was whether we are free to make our actions and decisions. There are two major problems here. The first problem is determinism: if this universe runs through deterministic laws, then everything that happens should be inevitable. If this were true, there could be no free will. The second problem is moral responsibility: if I am not free to choose my actions, how can I feel morally responsible for these actions?
Compatibilists believe that some things can be certain, but free will can still exist. There is a connection between the self and consciousness. We act as if there is an 'I' that makes conscious choices. It seems that our conscious thoughts are the cause of our actions. James rejected the idea of a permanent self, but believed in a spiritual power. In his view, the feeling of effort is no illusion, but the cause of consciousness and of personal will. We know that thoughts and emotions play a role in decision-making. We weigh things up and compare them with each other. The question is where consciousness plays a role in this process.
When we perform a voluntary action, the frontal lobes are activated. The prefrontal lobes activate motor actions. These send signals again to the premotoric areas that program the actions. This is again forwarded to the primary motor cortex to achieve motor output. The supplementary motor area is involved in the ordering and programming of motor actions according to a motor plan. The anterior cingulate selects the information needed for actions, pain and emotion.
Damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) can lead to a lack of spontaneous activity and to stereotypic actions. Damage to the prefrontal area and the corpus callosum can result in an 'alien hand'. Patients who have an 'alien hand' feel that their hand is performing involuntary actions. Damage to the corpus callosum can cause anarchic hand. In that case people find it difficult to let their hands do two opposite things. Stimuli that are not noticed, however, influence our motivations.
Research by Spence and Firth showed that the DLPFC is associated with the subjective experience of decision making.
Since 1960 it is clear that the 'readiness potential' (RP) precedes voluntary movements. The readiness potential represents a negative charge in the electrical potential that can be measured with electrodes applied to the skull before operations are performed.
Libet argued that if conscious intentions are the cause of action, then the subjective experience should take place first. This should then go together with cerebral processes. He conducted an experiment to see how voluntary movements relate to RP. He paid attention to three things:
the beginning of the movement,
the beginning of the RP, and
the moment when there is a conscious choice to move.
He could easily observe the beginning of the movement and the beginning of the RP. Interestingly, he found out that the conscious choice to move after the RP arises. These results seem to say that consciousness is too late to be the cause of the movement.
Libet argued that unconscious brain processes are the cause of a voluntary movement, but the consciousness can (just before the voluntary movement is carried out) stop it or not. This would be about 150 ms for the execution of the movement. In this way, Libet argued that consciousness nevertheless has a causal role in voluntary actions.
A lot of criticism has been made's experiment. Important criticisms were:
There was doubt about the way of measuring the will, the conscious intention. It is impossible to generalize the results to other actions, because the subjects in the experiment could not choose the actions, only the moment of the action.
There was doubt about the method of backwards referral.
Moreover, some researchers suggested that awareness of one's own actions coincides with events after the intention and preparation, but before the motor command is sent.
Dennett does not reject free will, but states that free will only has to be seen as something morally important, but not as something that is superhuman and connected to the soul.
Walter conducted a study with people with electrodes placed on their motor cortex. He put them in front of a screen with a slideshow and stated that people were allowed to press a button themselves when they wanted to see a new slide. The participants did not know, however, that a new slide was always on screen when there was activity in the motor cortex. The button had no effect, while people thought so. What turned out? The participants said that just when they wanted to press the button, the new slide was already on the screen. They did not understand how that was possible. This fact shows that people can manage their actions without feeling that they are doing so.
Wegner states that free will is an illusion created in three steps.
First, our brain plans action and executes;
After that we become aware of our thoughts about the actions and this is what we ourselves call an intention;
finally, the action is performed after the intention.
In Wegner's opinion, we draw the wrong conclusion when we say that our intention is the cause of our action, since we call brain processes intentions. This idea resembles the idea of James, since James claims that activating and inhibiting ideas compete with each other to initiate or inhibit a physical act. The activating and restraining ideas are mentioned by him as reasons or motives that are interpreted as the cause of the choice. Yet James and Wegner come to different conclusions.
Wegner states that a free choice must fulfill three criteria:
the thought must precede the action,
the thought must correspond with the action, and
the thought must have no other causes (except free will).
He conducted a research and the research results confirm what he calls 'priority principle': consequences are considered to be self-chosen when the thoughts precede the consequences.
Some people believe that we can understand consciousness if we can capture brain activity in more detail. Others believe that we can never understand consciousness. The question, of course, is how consciousness is related to the brain. To answer this question, a certain kind of research can be used, namely the research into 'the neural correlates of consciousness' (NCC). In this way aspects of neural functioning can be studied and it can be checked whether these correspond to the conscious experiences that people express. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear what aspect of neural functioning should be investigated for this. It is important to remember that the NCC is about the correlation between neural functioning and conscious experiences. Therefore, no statements can be made on the basis of NCC about cause-effect relationships between the brain and consciousness.
A human brain consists of 100 trillion neurons connected to each other by synapses together with glial cells. The brainstem, consisting of the medulla, punch and midbrain, is essential for survival because it performs many important functions (cardiac, respiratory and sexual functions and the maintenance of sleep and waking). Behind the midbrain is the cerebellum that has an important function in motor control. Between the midbrain and the cerebellum is the thalamus that receives sensory input.
The cortex is the outer layer of the brain and contains many structures that play a role in consciousness - the hippocampus, the amygdala, the hypothalamus and the cingulate gyrus. The neocortex is the part of the brain that developed last during human evolution. The two hemispheres are related to each other by white matter from the anterior commissure and by the corpus callosum.
The definition of an 'unconscious person' is someone who lives but is not responsive. For example, people under narcosis are insensitive to pain, but are also unable to respond or communicate.
In experiments it becomes clear which brain regions have to be stimulated to trigger reactions. In patients with PVS, activity occurred in the brainstem, thalamus and the 'primary somatosensory cortex' but not higher in the parietal lobes and 'anterior cingulate cortex'. Giving an anesthetic before the start of an operation also makes someone unconscious for a while. This person then feels no pain and does not know what happened after he or she woke up. Many types of drugs also have different influences on the functioning of humans.
Drugs can be divided into three groups:
drugs that weaken responsiveness,
drugs that cause memory loss, and
drugs that function as muscle relaxants. There is no specific part of the brain where all drugs (that go hand in hand with a form of unconsciousness) act on. Unfortunately, studying the absence of consciousness does not clarify what consciousness is exactly.
There are two theories that have been used to find the NICC. The first theory is from Penrose and Hameroff about the quantum coherence in microtubules. The second theory came from Flohr. He argues that outside awareness caused by drugs is caused by the inhibition of processes that depend on NMDA receptors.
He also states that consciousness depends on the occurrence of so-called 'higher-order self-reflexive representations'.
He drew up the 'representational theory of consciousness' on the basis of his statements. This theory states that states of consciousness occur when someone is in a certain cognitive state. When someone is aware of something, a mental representation is accompanied by a higher order representation for which the functioning of NMDA synapses is necessary.
Crick wonders what neural data goes hand in hand with conscious vision. Crick admits that no one has been able to capture a brain area so far in which neural activity corresponds exactly to the image we have of the outside world. He does state that conscious vision seems to be associated with the thalamic connections within the cortex. Other scientists have other ideas about this. For example, Ramachandran thinks that the functioning of the temporal lobes provides conscious vision. Crick is looking for a specific part of the brain to which he can link conscious vision, but this can be a wrong starting point. Perhaps no specific place can be found that corresponds to conscious vision.
'Binocular rivalry' occurs when different images are shown on both eyes. In that case, the images are not combined into an image. There is, however, a form of perception that, is always between the two images. This creates a new form of perception. We get the feeling that both images compete to enter our consciousness.
Research showed that there was increased activity in the occipital-temporal parts of the ventral route. In addition, increased activity was found in the parietal and frontal cortex. This fact provides evidence for the fact that conscious visual experiences are not related to parts of the sensory routes, but more to the central parts of the brain.
Koch finds on the basis of this fact that we are not aware of the early processing in sensory perception, but of the later processing. However, we still know little on the basis of this type of research results. Correlations are only used in the surveys, so no reasons and consequences should be mentioned. In addition, it is still not clear how conscious visual experiences are related to activity in the brain.
Pain is a subjective feeling. We can not show pain sensations to each other or clarify each other, because pain is mainly linked to feeling. Pain can, however, be found in the body.
When someone is injured, all kinds of changes take place in the body. For example, signals are transmitted by means of thin, unmyelinated neurons (c-fibers) to the spinal cord, brainstem, thalamus and parts of the cortex. The question is, of course, whether neural activity causes the pain experience or whether pain perception causes the neural activity.
Dualists state that pain is in the mind and therefore can not be localized. Damasio believes that having a self is necessary to experience pain. Humphrey states that sensory awareness is an activity. So if you feel pain, you do not remain passive. You try to do something to get rid of the pain. According to him, the perception of pain causes a form of pain perception and this feeling again ensures that we try to do everything to get rid of the pain.
How pain is inflicted appears to make a difference in neural activity. We all know that pain feels different when it is unexpected than when you bring it yourself. It is even worse if you are afraid of it beforehand. External pain causes activity in the posterior ACC (anterior cingulate cortex). This activity does not occur in self-inflicted pain. In the case of activity in the perigenual ACC, the opposite takes place. So there is a correlation between the type of pain and neural activity - and also between the degree to which someone experiences pain and neural activity.
It seems like we only have one consciousness. If you look at the brain, then you see that there is complexity and diversity. Often there are multiple processes that take place simultaneously through different brain routes. Yet we feel that everything forms a unity. We feel that only one exists and that we experience things not as isolated but as a whole. How come?
Dualists believe that everyone has a consciousness that is something other than their brains. Eccles believed as dualist that the mind plays an active role in selecting and integrating neural activity. This would result in a unified whole. But how should this happen? Where does the interaction between the mind and the brain take place? This problem recurs in all dualistic theories. The dualist Libet has the answer that the feeling of unity is achieved through a mental field of consciousness. That is why split brain patients still behave as one person.
When you pick up a coin and throw it in the air, there are immense things happening in your brain. For example, various brain areas are active for observing color, movement and shape. There are also auditory processes under way. There is no specific place or a specific moment in which all this information comes together so that the falling coin can be seen as a unified whole. Yet we do have the feeling that everything is processed as a whole and that the coin falls, as it were, in one go. How can you see the coin as one moving object?
This problem is described as the visual binding problem and more generally as the 'binding problem'. This problem can be described at different levels, for example at the neural level and at the phenomenological level. Some people think that the binding problem is the same as understanding how attention works. So if you focus your attention on a cast coin long enough, the characteristics of the coin will be merged.
When the attention is overloaded, the wrong characteristics can be connected to each other. However, it is not the case that connecting characteristics and attention are the same. For example, binding can also occur unconsciously. There is a relationship between attention, awareness and bonding, but this relationship is not yet well exposed.
Malsburg stated that the simultaneous, coordinated firing of neurons in the visual cortex is the basis of visual binding. All neurons that process certain characteristics of an object (for example color or shape) would come together, and fire at the same time. This would ensure that we experience characteristics of objects as unified. Crick and Koch think that this may be the neural translation of visual consciousness. They believe that consciousness depends on a kind of short-term memory and on successive attentional processes. The thalamus would lead the attention by making a choice from the object characteristics that should be connected to each other. This would be done by letting neurons fire.
Crick states that this has been useful in evolutionary terms. He states that it is better to have one representation of an object than to always send information to different parts of the brain. He says that the unity of consciousness really exists. Later Crick and Koch adjusted their opinion. According to them, there is no question of a single brain area where it all comes together.
Zeki doubts whether there is a unity of consciousness. He believes that there are many micro-consciousnesses. According to him, the visual system consists of many separate and specialized systems that function in parallel. Each system is independent and achieves an endpoint at a different time. Some characteristics must be observed before other characteristics can be observed. Zeki states that all these systems go together with a separate form of consciousness. He finds this because there is no 'end station' found in the brain where all the information comes together. This should therefore mean that there is not only one form of consciousness. Zeki can be seen as a Canestian materialist, because he states that there is a finish line where unconscious processes become aware.
Integration of information that enters multiple senses depends on neurons that respond to input from more than one sense. These neurons are found in different parts of the brain, but mainly in the superior colliculus in the midbrain. Neurons who find themselves there are already responding to multiple senses from birth, but this continues to improve as someone makes more use of his or her senses. It is not clear how integration of information from different senses produces a sense of subjectivity (ie consciousness).
Edelman and Tononi are trying to explain two characteristics of consciousness. First of all, they want to know how the unity of consciousness is caused. In addition, they want to find out how complex and diverse the consciousness is. They state that consciousness ensures that we experience things as continuous and coherent. This applies even to people with damaged brains.
Based on their vision, the researchers have designed the theory of reentry by neuronal group selection. Here they state that consciousness depends on continuous, self-repeating, parallel processes between parts of the thalamus and cortex. In addition, they argue that this time is needed to bring the long, self-repeating routes to a successful conclusion. Activity in these routes is necessary for consciousness, but not enough. Other factors are also needed.
They distinguish between two forms of consciousness. First there is such a thing as primary consciousness that occurs in many animals. This form of consciousness goes together with a short-term memory and being able to deal with the here and now. Clusters would arise in the brain and connections within a cluster would be stronger than connections outside a cluster. These clusters may depend on interactions between many brain regions. They ensure that different characteristics of an object can be combined. In addition, according to Edelman and Tononi, there is something like higher order awareness. This form of consciousness would have been developed in evolution at a later stage. Higher order awareness depends on connections between language and conceptual systems. This would ensure that a 'dynamic core' can arise and that there is also a feeling of a coherent self. The dynamic core is a large functional cluster that always changes, but still maintains continuity and integration, because there are connections with the rest of the system. The dynamic core can be involved at different moments in different parts of the brain. Other parts of the brain can then remain active, but are not part of the dynamic core.
This theory does not explain how the dynamic core creates subjectivity.
One way to escape the idea that consciousness is a unity is to think in terms of actions as unity. Cotterill believes that consciousness is a result of the interaction between the brain, the body and the environment. Hurley states that perception, action and the environment are closely linked. The unity of consciousness would arise through a dynamic flow of causal processes and multiple feedback routes that link input and output to each other.
These scientists see consciousness as a way of doing or acting, rather than a way to perceive information. They therefore believe that consciousness is connected with interaction with the world. Then the question remains why it gives a specific feeling when we perform an action. Some scientists believe that the unity of consciousness is only an illusion.
How is it to note that you see only half of the world? What is it like to be blind, but to believe that you can see? or to be paralyzed, but to be convinced that you can move? These and many other questions are motivated by neuropsychological changes caused by brain damage. Although almost all types of brain damage affect consciousness, only three specific examples that are relevant to the subject of consciousness will be given in this chapter.
Korkasoff's syndrome is the most common form of memory loss (also called amnestic syndrome) and is caused by the toxic effects of alcohol and by a deficiency of thiamine caused by malnutrition.
There are two forms of memory loss:
anterograde amnesia
retrograde amnesia.
In the case of anterograde amnesia, patients can no longer save new, long-term memories. The short-term memory functionality remains intact. Retrograde amnesia occurs when someone has lost all his memories about the past. This form of memory loss often occurs after accidents that cause brain injuries.
With Karsakoff's syndrome, episodic memory, which is in charge of the memory of the events of someone’s life, remains intact for events that occurred in the far past. However, new episodic memories are no longer stored. New information can still be stored through classical conditioning and procedural learning. However, they themselves do not realize that they are learning.
People with memory loss are conscious. They are awake, respond to Stimuli, talk, laugh and have emotions. But who exactly has a consciousness? Since the capacity to store new episodic memories is lost, amnesic patients’ consciousness is trapped in the past. They can relate to the events that happened before but fail to make sense of their present experiences. Due to these problems, it is very common to hear amnestic patients claiming that they have just waken up or regained consciousness. Furthermore, people with memory loss also lack of memories of a continuous self.
We speak of neglect when people is unable to be aware of items that are in half of space. This often occurs after a brain injury that affected brain’s right hemisphere. An example of this is paralysis and how some patients are not aware of their situation. This is called anosagnosis.
Anosagnosis only occurs when certain parts of the right parietal lobe are damaged. Damasio says that the core of consciousness remains intact, but that the extended consciousness, which goes beyond the here and now, is damaged. Another example is people with Anton's syndrome are blind but are convinced that they can see. When they bump into something, they invent excuses for it.
People with 'hemifield neglect' (also called 'unilateral neglect') are unaware of the existence of everything that happens at their left side. This disorder, like anosagnosis, occurs when the right hemisphere is damaged. For example, people with this disorder only apply make-up on the right side of their face. When people with this disorder are asked to draw a clock, they leave out the left side of the clock (the numbers six to twelve) or they put all the numbers in the right half of the clock. If they are asked to make mental representations of places, they also leave out the left side of the places. This disorder can be seen as a lack of attention. Patients simply do not pay attention to the left side of everything they see. As a treatment, they can be trained to pay more attention to the left side of objects. However, the left side is completely ignored.
Blindsight is common in people who have damage to parts of the visual cortex on one side. This causes degeneration of cells, while other visual pathways remain intact in the cortex. blindsight Patients that suffer from blindsight seem to not be aware of what is in their visual field. It is possible that someone with blindsight does not 'see' one half of the field of vision, but they can often report what is presented in this field of vision. A patient with blindsight therefore has vision without consciousness. Blindsight can be tested in many different ways. For example, people with this disorder deny that they are conscious of what they see, but still make eye movements when they see stimuli, point at the location of objects and mimic the movement of objects presented in the blind field.
People with blindsight can also often 'guess' the color of stimuli that is shown in the blind area. So they can notice stimuli, but they find it difficult to determine shapes or designate similar objects. We know for sure that blindsight exists, but what this disorder tells us about consciousness is still unclear. People with blindsight are aware of fast moving stimuli with a lot of contrast (which fall into their blind area). This is also called the Riddoch phenomenon.
It is thus possible to experience movement of a stimulus, while you are not aware that you perceive the stimulus. Milner and Goodale share the opinion that blindsight represents a number of visual capacities that are mediated by the dorsal route and are linked to subcortical structures. This view fits in with the fact that the accuracy of reactions of people with blindsight differ. The proper functioning part of the eyes seems to be occupied with object identification, while the blind area deals with the detection of a stimulus.
Does the existence of blindsight really prove that there is such a thing as qualia? Some scientists think so. Holt believes, for example, that blindsight and superblindsight are evidence of the existence of qualia. Block, however, has a different opinion. He states that there are two concepts of consciousness:
'phenomenal consciousness', and
'access consciousness'.
The first is about the experience of consciousness, so the 'what is it like to be ...?' question. Access consciousness stands for the availability of information to be able to reason, talk and act. Block believes that stimuli in people with blindsight do not go hand in hand with both forms of consciousness. There is no access consciousness, because the patient cannot use the information and there is phenomenal awareness, because the patient is not aware of what he or she perceives.
Block states that people often confuse both forms of consciousness and think that certain functions go together with either form of consciousness, while this is not true. Weiskrantz states that people with blindsight do not have a 'commentary stage'. This means that they do not experience a phase in which information comes in to subsequently form an opinion about it.
In the past it was believed that everything in the world was designed by a designer, namely God. The biologist Darwin, however, proposed the theory of evolution. Evolution literally means gradual change. According to Darwin, there were slow changes on the earth and variation among organisms. Different organisms compete for food, water or other resources, this lead to a competition n which the weaker organisms were slowly dying and the organisms that would survive would pass on the information helped them survive to future generations. Their descendance would then have the characteristics that made survival easier. The organisms that are best adapted to the environment are therefore most likely to survive if, for example, food shortages exist. "evolutionary algorithm" refers to the idea that if there is the three-part algorithm variation, inheritance and selection, then there must be evolution. Design out of chaos without help from spirit.
Lamarckism
Lamarck agreed with Darwin that species gradually change into other species, but he stated that there must first be an internal force that directs progress in one direction and that, in addition, the inheritance of acquired characteristics is required. This theory is now called Lamarckism. Lamarck believed that if an animal wants to change itself, then the effect of this is passed on to the next generation. For example, if a giraffe always stretches its neck to get to the highest branches, then the next generation of giraffes would have a longer necks.
Although there are many similarities between the visions of Darwin and Lamarck, there are also differences. Lamarck believed that evolution always means progress, while Darwin does not assume this. Darwin also does not believe that there is an internal force that causes this progress. Lamarck's theory was more popular in the beginning than Darwin's, since the church had fewer problems with his theory.
Lamarck's theory, however, appears to be incorrect. If, for example, you are predisposed to obesity, but have been slim for years because of your diet, this does not prevent your future children from having a predisposition to obesity. Genetic information is therefore not influenced by external changes that have arisen after birth (but genes are turned on or off by behavior / environment).
Darwin's theory failed to explain the principle of heredity. Mendel was the first to describe heredity, which is known under the Laws of Mendel. He researched how genetic variation arises and is passed on by sexual means. He was of the opinion that adaptive design based on the rearrangement and mutation of genes is sufficient. Within this idea there are discussions between prominent people (including Dennett and Darwin among others) about the allocation and responsibility of different genetic processes. When Mendel's theory was accepted, for the first time there was an explanation for the mechanism of heredity, which led to neo-Darwinism. This means that all variation between generations and species can be explained by recombination and mutation of genes.
What is evolution good for? What are the benefits of evolution? People often think that organisms evolve because they want to increase the chance of survival of their species (in a group). Darwinism is often misunderstood as the mechanism that creates adaptations for the good of species. However, this is not entirely true, according to Blackmore.
Dawkins came in 1976 with the ' selfish gene theory' . The ultimate goal of natural selection is not the kind, not the group, not the individual, but the gene. Genes are egoistic ('selfish') in the sense that they want to be passed on. It is not that they have their own intentions or desires, but they want to copy their information, as it were, by passing on themselves. It is not smart to think that every human trait is good for the adaptation to the environment.
Thinking that every human trait is adaptive is also called panadaptionism. Panadaptionism states that many properties are not adaptations and are not optimal for the organism, but are still transmitted. Possibly they had previously been optimal for the organism. Another possibility is that some traits are influenced by coincidences and physical limitations.
Social biologists state that most human traits are adjustments to the environment, on the other hand, evolutionary psychologists list two reasons why this is not the case. First, they state that human traits that used to serve as a means of adaptation no longer have a value. For example, in the past, sugar and fat had an advantageous value for hunters and collectors, but nowadays many people suffer more and more from obesity because of their predilection for sugar and fat. A second reason is that evolutionary psychologists distinguish between:
replication strategies of genes
human strategies to seek pleasure and success.
We want to eat well and we long for sex, because people who ate well in the past and had sex, were more likely to pass on their genes.
The question that goes with the statement that consciousness has evolved is: does consciousness have a function? Chapter 3 already explains that it is difficult to say what the function of consciousness is. However, it is also difficult to believe that consciousness has no added value. For example, intelligence and memory are not developed without a sense of consciousness. How come? Why is there still consciousness? So why did not intelligence and memory develop separately from consciousness? These questions are somewhat like the question of what pain experience has for added value over the physical processes that cause pain.
Flanagan states that consciousness is not necessarily needed. Evolutionary processes would have ensured that intelligence bodies like us exist and this intelligence would not have to go hand in hand with consciousness. This vision is called ' conscious inessentialism' . According to this theory, zombies are possible.
Functionalist, however, believe that zombies are not possible, since consciousness can not be distinguished from adaptive traits. This view states that consciousness has no adaptive function.
In summary, it can be stated that there are four visions on the relationship between consciousness and evolution:
Epiphenomenalism: consciousness- essentialism According to this approach, the idea of ‘zombies’ is theoretically possible. They can be that look like us, but lack of consciousness. The awareness is separate adaptive features such as intelligence, language, and problem solving, but it does not make any distinctive difference (definition of a zombie) and it has no evolutionary effects (this epiphenomenalism). The most important question is: does evolution produce consciousness instead of zombies? .
The consciousness has an adaptive function: From this approach, zombies are not possible, because having a consciousness marks the difference. It can be separated from acquired adaptive such as intelligence, memory, language and problem solving and adds something new. The most important question is: 'what is the function of consciousness?’ or 'what does consciousness do?'
The consciousness has no independent function: Again, zombies are not possible, because every animal presents similar characteristics as those of what we would call conscious. The consciousness is not an acquired characteristic that presents an evolutionary purpose such as intelligence, memory or language. From this point of view, the most important question is: 'why is consciousness a necessary characteristic that should be passed among generations in beings like us? '
Consciousness is an illusion. Our ideas about consciousness are very confusing, most of what we know is pure speculation and has almost no empirical evidence. The most important question here is: 'why do beings like us become so concerned with the idea of our own consciousness? '.
An important question is: when did consciousness arise? It seems plausible to say that a few billion years ago there was no consciousness on this planet. How can awareness arise from unconscious matter? James presented the central problem and wanted to investigate how consciousness can arise without mental matter or soul. There are two central questions here:
When does consciousness arise during the human evolution?
Which contemporary beings are conscious?
An interesting question is when consciousness has developed during the evolution of man. There is disagreement about how and when consciousness has developed. Some scientists believe that consciousness has developed gradually. Greenfield believes that consciousness is not an all-or-nothing principle, but develops in different sizes. Some scientists believe that everything has a consciousness; even stones.
Pan psychologists believe in this latest vision, but argue that stones have a more simple form of consciousness than, for example, snails. Pan psychologists believe that consciousness was already present before evolution took place. The complexity of consciousness could, however, have been developed according to this vision. Others believe that consciousness can only arise when there is a brain. According to this vision, consciousness is the result of the evolution of complex brain structures. Then finally there are people who believe that the consciousness has been developed fairly recently. This view assumes that social skills have gone hand in hand with the development of consciousness.
How can your consciousness help you survive so that you can eventually pass on your genes? Baars answers that consciousness can save you from danger: you are fleeing from a ferocious bear. Velmans suggests that life without consciousness does not represent anything and that survival would be useless. Gray states that the proper attunement (' fit') between our perceptions of the world and our activity in that world can not be a coincidence. It must have originated through selection.
Other theories state that consciousness has a surviving value, but is based on social reasons rather than on individual reasons.
Humphrey states that consciousness is an ' emergent property' . This means that the consciousness stands for a combination of factors. Just as dryness or wetness is a combination of the degree of water and oxygen, there would also be a combination of factors in consciousness. He also stated that consciousness is a ' surface feature' (just like the fur of an animal) where natural selection influences. Humphrey states that consciousness has a social function. Because we function in complex social situations, we want to understand, predict or manipulate people. To do this it is necessary to have a consciousness.
Humphrey states that natural selection has ensured that our ancestors who had a consciousness (or a kind of reflectivity) continued to survive. He states that within the brain there is a kind of internal eye (' inner eye' ) that gives an image of the brain activity of a person himself (and therefore not of the outside world). According to Humphrey, this is the function of consciousness. So consciousness is actually a model of the brain itself about the brain.
A consequence of this theory is that only intelligent and social organisms can have a consciousness. If this theory is correct, many other animal species have no consciousness. Humphrey states that he is not a dualist, despite the fact that he believes in the existence of an internal eye. He believes that the brain functions as a machine and that the internal eye is part of this functioning. According to him, consciousness is a kind of route of self-reflection of the brain itself.
Barlow states that introspection (looking at one's own observations and feelings) does not give an accurate picture of the causes of behavior. He gives pain as an example. When we look at our own pain experience, it seems as if we can best avoid pain.
However, it is a fact that pain protects us from further physical problems. People who can not experience pain can not respond well to physical wounds. Barlow states that introspection is not sufficient to explain the evolution of consciousness. Mithen thinks that consciousness plays a biological role in social interactions and that chimpanzees probably also have a consciousness. He does, however, state that the consciousness must be interpreted more broadly. If Humphrey was right, it would mean that the consciousness would only be reflected in social contacts.
The consciousness that we have now, according to Mithen, should have developed about 60,000 years ago. At that time people started to interact more and communicate with each other. According to Mithen, speech was mainly used in that period to communicate about social issues (' gossip' ). Language would gradually be used for more and more purposes. For this reason, today we would also be aware of more than just social matters. Humphrey and Mithen see consciousness as something that natural selection has ensured.
Churchland believes that consciousness does not exist at all and that this term will no longer be used when we understand everything about the evolution of human behavior. This is an extreme vision and most scientists do not go that far. Humphrey solves the mind-body problem by equating sensations to activity. The amoeba-like creatures of the beginning of life on earth reacted to the outside world by being away from it or wobbling to it. A kind of nervous system developed to be able to carry out more effective actions. Ultimately, beings started to learn about the outside world and their own feelings, simply by ' monitoring' how they behaved themselves.
Nowadays, several forms of functionalism are popular. For example, some scientists argue that subjectivity is equivalent to functions such as social interaction and language. The consciousness itself would not be a causal factor for behavior. Functionalists believe that consciousness does exist, but that it is not something that is separate from social interaction, language and problem solving.
Deacon and Donald state that consciousness is connected with the use of symbolic representations and symbolic thoughts. This link between symbolic thinking and consciousness is also discussed by Mead. He states that animals have a consciousness, but that only people have a self-awareness. This self-awareness would initially consist of gestures and other non-symbolic interactions. Language skills would then have ensured that it is also possible to form symbolic representations.
Mead states that consciousness has a social and not an individual cause. Claxton has a different idea about consciousness. He believes that consciousness has arisen because of the sudden high level of alertness required to respond to sudden dangers. Jaynes believes that people 3000 years ago did not base their actions on conscious processes, but for example on what the gods had told them. According to him, written articles from that time do not show that people acted on the basis of consciousness. Our understanding of consciousness in terms of subjectivity has only recently arisen.
Many evolution theories speak about the relationship between natural selection and genes. If there is variation and selection, there must be evolution. This principle not only applies to genes, but also to learning processes and physical processes such as the immune system. For example, the development of the brain coincides with the death of some neurons and connections. So a selection is made if there is variation.
Evolutionary processes that act on genes also work on all kinds of other forms of ' replicators' (which genes are an example of). Dawkins also calls this universal Darwinism. Edelman designed the theory of ' neural darwinism' . In it he states that group selection of neurons depends on three processes. First there is ' developmental selection' which is present early in the brain; this ensures the existence of many connections (and therefore a lot of variation) between neurons. Some compounds are often used and others die. Secondly, there is ' experiential selection' . This process continues throughout life. Some synapses within and between groups of neurons are strengthened and others weakened, but they do not die. Finally, there is a process of ' re-entry' . Through this process, different events in different parts of the brain can be linked together. This allows motor and sensory events to run parallel to each other.
Nobleman, however, does not speak about the inheritance aspect that goes hand in hand with variation and selection. This inheritance aspect probably also does not apply to Crick and Koch's idea of competing clusters of neurons. The clusters vary and compete with each other for dominance, but they are not copied. Calvin, in fact, involved heredity in all kinds of brain processes. He stated that there are patterns of neurons in the cerebral cortex. These patterns represent words, concepts or images. These patterns would depend on how cortical cells are arranged in columns. In these columns there is talk of inhibition but also of activation of signals. This creates structures that can be passed on to the next generation. This is where the heredity factor comes into play.
'Memes' are ideas, skills, habits and stories that are passed from one person to another person. It can be written and spoken words, but also rules, habits, songs, dance and technical information. Dawkins was the first to use the word ' meme' . He argued that ' memes' can serve as a kind of ' replicator' , just like genes. They also have to deal with variation and selection. Memes are passed on by means of imitation, learning and reading. Sometimes that is perfect, but there is variation when the passing is not perfect because someone for example has misinterpreted part of the joke. Old memes are also used to produce new memes . This means that culture can be seen as an evolutionary process based on memes.
There are differences between genes and memes. Genes are transmitted through DNA and this is done in a very reliable way. The reliability of memes depends on the extent to which people pass on memes well. Both memes and genes can be called selfish; they both want to be passed on. Dennett uses the concept of memes as a fundamental part of his theory about consciousness. He states that it is created by the interaction between our body and the memes that we get. He sees it as a benign, illusionary user of his own virtual apparatus, the consciousness, which itself is also a complex form of all kinds of memes . One criticism is that memes can be passed on: if the consciousness consists of mere memes , we could pass on our own experiences to others in a perfect way. That is not the case, however. No one is the same as you. In addition, memes can be temporarily disabled while the consciousness persists.
There are two extreme visions about whether animals also have a consciousness.
The vision that only people have an awareness. Descartes believed that only people have a consciousness, because only we have language skills. According to him, animals act like automatic machines.
Because so many species are physically similar, they must all be conscious. Perch states, for example, that consciousness is a fundamental biological one adaptation is and it already occurred in the first mammals. He argues that we can not say that other species have no subjectivity to experience.
In addition, there are also theories where it is assumed that different animals have different forms of consciousness. We can not assume that there is only one kind of consciousness. Every animal species has developed sensory systems that fit their way of life.
Can we say that some animal species have a more developed consciousness than other animals? Is a frog, for example, more aware of itself than a fly? Greenfield states that consciousness becomes more complex as the brain grows larger. If this is true, then elephants should have a better developed consciousness than humans. This seems to be unlikely. We can try to categorize animals on the basis of their intelligence, but we have to know that our idea of intelligence is connected with our own, human ideas about which skills belong to intelligent organisms.
Another question is whether one animal experiences more pain than the other animal. Stamp Dawkins states that we can determine on the basis of three things whether an animal suffers pain:
the general state of health of the animal,
the physiology of the animal and
the behavior of the animal.
Dawkins states that we can best know if an animal is suffering if the animal tries to avoid the reason for the pain. We must therefore not rely on empathy to decide whether an animal suffers, but on the behavior of the animal.
How do we know if animals are self-aware? To test this,we can use a mirror test, to examine whether animals can recognize themselves in the mirror. Many animals, such as dogs and cats, do not recognize themselves when they are put in front of a mirror.
Darwin put two young orangutans in front of a mirror. He noticed that they were surprised when they saw themselves. They tried to kiss their mirror image. However, it does not appear that they recognize themselves. It could also be that they thought they were looking at another monkey they wanted to give a kiss.
Gallup put chimpanzees in front of a mirror. At first they thought they were looking at another monkey, but after a few days they looked in the mirror to see their teeth. Gallup could not conclude from this, however, that the chimpanzees recognized themselves. Gallup therefore went a step further and drew two red dots on the face of the chimpanzees. When the animals were put in front of a mirror, they found out that something was strange on their faces. They tried to sweep the red dots away. From this Gallup concluded that the chimpanzees recognize themselves.
The test with the red dots is not fair for all animal species. For example, dolphins can not touch their face to make it clear that they are noticing that something strange is going on. However, there is still a way to measure MSR. Reiss and Marino drew a dot on the body of two dolphins, in a place they could not see without a mirror. Both animals wriggled and twisted, apparently to see the spot they had discovered in the mirror.
Another problem with the red dot test is that most monkeys perceive it as threatening when staring at them. This may mean that a monkey probably does not want to look long at the monkey he sees in the mirror. However, we still do not know for sure which animal species can recognize themselves. In addition, it is not certain whether self-recognition is an expression of self-awareness. Gallup is convinced that chimpanzees can recognize themselves and have a concept of self-awareness. Povinelli states that chimpanzees have a self-concept, but that they are not aware of their own psychological state.
Part of our consciousness is that we have beliefs, desires and mental states and that we also attribute mental states to other people. We also call this ' theory of mind' (TOM) . Dennett speaks in this context of 'intentional stance' : to understand other people's behavior by assuming that others also have desires, convictions and fears.
Babies are not born with this skill. When they are two years old, they begin to follow someone else's gaze and see what someone points to. When they are three years old they can talk about their own desires and preferences, but also about those of other people. However, they do not yet understand that other people may not see something as they see itthemselves. They do not understand that other people can have wrong beliefs. The question is whether animals also have a theory of mind.
People find it easy to imitate others and they do so spontaneously. This happens already when a child is very young. Imitation is the basis for experiencing empathy for others. Darwin thought that dogs, cats and monkeys learn through imitation. We now know that there are very few animals that can imitate their congeners. It is possible that there is a habit under a species, but this was previously explained by imitation. This appears to be a wrong conclusion. There is often an individual learning process that results from attempts that lead to mistakes and to success. This means that rarely there is imitation of others.
This is an important point, since evolutionary processes are often explained in terms of imitation. We know that groups of chimpanzees have different cultures. In each group there is a search for food in a different way. However, there is disagreement among scientists about how much cultural skills chimpanzees are taught by imitation. The answer to that question is important for the question of whether or not animals other than human beings have 'memes'.
The biggest difference between people and animals is that animals don't have a language. This means that if language is the cause of someone's self-consciousness, the consciousness of other organisms should be different than our own. However, if the human consciousness is an illusion, then this conclusion would not apply.
Children in every culture pick up a language very quickly, without being specifically taught a language by others and without others improving them. This is also called a 'language instinct' . Animals sometimes have complex forms of communication. For example, monkeys make different alarm sounds for different types of hazards. Yet it can be said that the meaning of animal signals is fixed and that animals can not come up with new representations by combining signals.
Many attempts have been made to teach language to animals. Because monkeys can not pronounce letters, they tried to learn sign language (American Sign Language). It seems they do have some understanding of grammar, because they can understand the difference in meaning between two sentences. However, there is still a big difference between the way in which monkeys and children use language. Monkeys are not intrinsically motivated to use the learned sign language. They only use what they have learned when they need something. Children use language skills for many more reasons.
Is there something special that allows people to talk, think, see or hear? Or are we simply machines? More and more is being known about the biology of perception, memory etc. However, suppose we would know everything about these mechanisms: would we then better understand consciousness? Or is there then an artificial form of consciousness that differs from the human form?
When asked if people are a machine, two answers are possible. We can start with biology and try to understand how neural systems work or we can make artificial systems and see to what extent they correspond to a human being. We will talk about artificial consciousness ( "AC" or " machine consciousness ' ,' MC '), which is closely related to artificial intelligence ( 'AI').
Descartes believed that the human body is a machine, but that this machine can not provide voice and rational thought on its own. Rational thinking could be the result of the workings of consciousness. However, a spirit is needed for this.
In 1642 Pascal built the first calculator, which was improved by Leibniz. Leibniz believed that matter consists of small 'wisps'. He disagreed with Descartes who claimed that the mind can influence the brain. Leibniz thought about the existence of thinking and observing machines. He presented a thought experiment in which he imagined that there would be a conscious machine that a man could fit into. If one would enter this machine, he could find parts that work on each other and he would not find parts that could explain the perception.
Boole believed that the human mind could eventually be explained by means of mathematical formulas. He has never been able to find these formulas. Yet thanks to him, algebra was used during the computer revolution. Turing argued that problems could be solved with algorithms. He spoke about a simple, abstract machine that could move. He believed that this simple machine could specify the steps needed to solve any problem. Such a machine is also called a Universal Turing Machine. An important part of this machine is that it can be used by inserting chips or brain cells. It is important that the machine carries out the same operations, which the machine also works on.
Craik believed that the human mind translates all aspects from the outside world into internal representations in the head. He stated that these internal representations can be manipulated according to fixed rules and that machines could do this too. According to him, consciousness is equal to mental representations.
Computers became more sophisticated and it was soon said that they were intelligent and could think. So it seemed possible that something like artificial intelligence existed. All attempts to design artificial intelligence consisted of programmers who told the machine what to do. These computers used algorithms and processed information according to fixed rules. This is now called " GOFAI" ("Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence") . A problem with GOFAI is that the information that computers process is seen as representations of things from the world, but that these symbols are not based on the real world.
In short: the computer itself does not know what it is doing; he is only performing. This is also called ' rule-and-symbol AI' . Searle distinguishes between ' strong AI' and ' weak AI' .
According to ' strong AI' , a computer that uses the right program is intelligent and has a mind as we have. Having a mind is therefore no longer a thing of using the right program. According to ' weak AI' computers can only imitate intellectual abilities (such as thinking and making decisions) . According to ' weak AI' they will never be really intelligent or really have a mind.
Connectionism is based on artificial neural networks ( ANNs ) and parallel processing. ANNs are used to mimic human human cells. The big difference with AI is that ANNs are not programmed, but are trained.
Imagine: a machine must recognize on photos whether a man or woman stands up. People can do this automatically, but a machine needs to be taught this. If we use ANN, the machine must look at a photo and output every time. If he makes a mistake, the neural network of the machine is adjusted so that he no longer makes the mistake. How does such a network work exactly?
The network consists of many units. These units are similar in effect to neurons. The units are connected in a network of parallel connections. A simple network can consist of three layers:
an input layer,
a hidden layer, and
an output layer.
Connectionist networks do not just do what programmers say they have to do. This is something very different from the ' rule-and-symbol AI' . ANNs have many applications, for example reading manuscripts, controlling robots and as a spam filter.
The machines that have been described so far do not have a 'body'. They stand on shelves and they interact with the world. Previously it was believed that the essence of thinking is abstract and rules-based. Thinking could also be done without a body according to this vision.
Embodied cognition stands for the idea that the mind can only be created if something interacts with the environment. The environment provides us with information storage and feedback that enable perception, intelligence and awareness. To construct machines in this way means working from bottom-up to top-down. This approach is sometimes called 'situated robotics' or 'behavior-based'. A consequence of such a work system is that intelligent behaviors can arise from simple systems, which creates the hope that the consciousness may also arise from the construction of simple systems.
If you program robots so that they do not collide with things in their environment, it means that they do not have to create a representation of the environment in order not to damage themselves. The traditional form of AI assumes that intelligence goes hand in hand with mental representations of the outside world, but nowadays robots are being built that make no internal representations of the outside world at all. These robots can move forward without colliding with complex environments. They can also accomplish tasks such as cleaning up waste. These robots have different control layers that are all responsible for simple tasks. These layers are on top of each other and have limited connections. One layer can suppress the other. This is also called ' subsumption architecture' called. It seems that these robots perform intelligent actions. These findings are important for the discussion about consciousness.
We have the idea that conscious experiences go together with internal representations of the world. But how can a mental representation conscious experience be ? Perhaps it is not useful to think in terms of representations of the outside world, but this can lead to other problems. If we do not reason in terms of representations, what is the alternative?
Turing wanted to test a way to investigate whether machines could think. For example, he thought that it was possible to see if machines could play chess. He stated that if a machine can play chess, then he should be able to think. Turing also carried out a second imaginary investigation. He wondered whether a computer can have a conversation with a person. People were very skeptical about this idea and believed that there should be a trick if something like that would happen. Turing described ' the imitation game' . In this (imaginary) research there is a decision maker (C) who has to choose which of two people is a woman. The man (A) and the woman (B) are in another room, so that C can not see and hear them. C can only communicate with them by asking them the right questions and receiving typed responses. A and B both try to respond as women. It is therefore very important that C asks the right questions.
Turing wondered what would happen if A were played by a machine. Can a male machine behave like a woman? So can machines think? Turing predicted in 1950 that by 2000 it would be possible to program computers in such a way that a questioner would only have a 70 per cent chance of discovering whether a person or a computer gives the answers. Turing was not far wrong. In an experiment in 2008, people were given five minutes to communicate with a computer and with a person. Three of the twelve people thought that the computer was a human being.
Could a machine be aware of something? This question is more difficult than the question of whether machines can think. If you ask the latter question, you can go two ways. You can say that it depends on how the word 'think' is defined. You can also say that you want to design an experiment that shows that a machine can think. This is what Turing has done. It is more difficult to know whether a machine has consciousness.
First of all, there is no clear definition for the word 'consciousness'. In addition, there is no experiment (such as the Turing test), with which it can be investigated whether machines have an awareness. If we assume that consciousness has to do with subjective experiences, then only the machine itself can know whether it has a consciousness.
Some people believe that if you ask a robot if he has a consciousness and he says that this is so, it is likely that he pretends to have a consciousness, because he has been programmed in this way. A functionalist will say that robots have a consciousness because they can perform certain tasks as robots. According to functionalists, the consciousness depends on being able to act. Consciousness is not a cause according to this view of task performance. An inessentialist does not believe that machines or robots can have a consciousness because there is no inner experience with machines. If both visions (both those of the functionalist and the inessentialist) were legitimate then there would still be no simple test to examine the consciousness of a machine.
There are several arguments to indicate that machines could never have a consciousness. First, it feels unnatural to think that a machine can have a consciousness. You can also assume a dualistic perspective. For example, based on your religion, you can say that God has only given a consciousness to humans. It is also possible to adopt a non-religious dualistic perspective. In that case you can say that the mind is something that is separate from the brain . Since this is not the case with machines, they could never have a consciousness.
You could say that the machine is a zombie (and therefore has no consciousness), that God has given a soul or mind to the machine or that a machine simply has a consciousness. It is also possible to say that robots have no consciousness, because only living organisms can have a consciousness. You could say that the function of neurons can never be replicated with robots. Another argument is that organisms grow and learn before they have developed a consciousness.
Searle believes that brains are the cause of the mind. Surprisingly, however, he does not call himself a dualist. He states that consciousness has a neurological basis, but that consciousness must be experienced. He believes that brains have the ability to create experiences. Searle does not think that brain tissue is necessary for consciousness. He believes that other organisms can also have a consciousness, but only if they, like the brain, can cause a mind with experiences.
A fourth argument against the consciousness of machines is that for some things a consciousness is needed and that machines can not execute these things because they have no consciousness . An example is developing a sense of humor and enjoying an ice cream. There is also the vision that is called 'Lady Lovelace's objection'. A machine could only do what is asked of him. A machine itself could never be creative.
Turing was an opponent of the idea that we can only know what our own mind is.
We could also really understand other types of intellects (for example, machines). Searle did not agree with this and thought up the well-known Chinese room thought experiment. According to him, ' Strong AI' does not exist, because using the right program by a machine is not enough to develop a capacity for understanding.
The thought experiment of Searle goes as follows... Imagine: you are in a closed room and you get to see Chinese reading pieces there. You do not understand Chinese yourself and you can not speak it either. There is also an English book with rules in the room. People outside the room give you two Chinese reading articles about a story, together with a questionnaire that you have to fill in about what you have read. The English book with rules shows you what reaction you should give to the questions. At a certain moment this goes so well that people outside the room think that you can read and understand perfect Chinese. Afterwards, people outside the room will give you an English story to read. You answer these questions yourself because you are English yourself. Yet your answers to the Chinese story and the English story to the outside world are equally good,but there is a crucial difference: you really understand the English stories, while you do not understand the Chinese story. In the case of the Chinese room you behave like a computer that receives input from the English book to give the correct answers.
In short:The conclusion of Searle is that a computer itself can never really understand anything . He can not connect meanings to the input he receives. So there is no question of a capacity for understanding. Searle thinks that man has intentionality and the machine does not. Intentionality is about focusing attention on something to understand it. According to Searle, intentionality is a subjective issue and therefore related to consciousness.
There has been a lot of criticism on Searle. So there has been the ' brain simulator reply' . This means that there can be a program that can simulate the way neurons fire in Chinese brains. Searle says that perhaps that is possible, but that you can not design intellect or consciousness with that. Chalmers believes that people can interact with other objects in a concrete way, while that does not apply to computers. He states that implementation is an important concept in this respect. Having the right computer program is not enough to create a consciousness. It is about applying the right program.
There are also differences of opinion about what Searle's thought experiment really proves. Some people say that Searle proves that computers can not have real understanding, while others think the experiment does not prove anything. Finally, there is the argument that there are things that machines can not do. If we can do these things, it means that we are more than just machines and that we have something special, namely a consciousness. Turing also calls this the ' mathematical objection' . The first part of this argument is correct. There are indeed things that a Turing machine can not do, but the ' incompleteness theorem' states that all systems (including human systems) are ultimately not complete. But does this really apply to people?
Turing states that humans can easily make mistakes and that man is not necessarily superior to a machine. Penrose argues that arithmetical understanding goes beyond just counting and that a consciousness is needed for this. Searle believes that consciousness can be imitated in machines (although it will never take human form), but Penrose does not even believe in it. Penrose thinks that understanding something is something very different than calculating something. Penrose believes that consciousness arises through coherence in microtubes . These are proteins that resemble tubules and can be found in almost all cells of the body. Because of these microtubes we feel that we have a self and a free will. Penrose's theory becomes ' objection reduction' called.
Kurzweil is an opponent of the vision of Penrose. Machines may not be able to solve all problems, but people certainly do not, he thinks. People can only make estimates of problems according to Kurzweil, but computers can do this too. Grush and Churchland are also opponents of Penrose's vision. Microtubes are located throughout the body and not only in the brain.
It is said that no evidence has been found that microtubes have anything to do with consciousness. Moreover, it is suspected that effects from one microtube can not be transferred to the other microtube to explain the unity of consciousness. Yet Penrose's theory remains popular because he does not explain consciousness in terms of neurons. Most people find it a strange idea that consciousness only comes from neurons that work together. Penrose uses principles from quantum physics to defend his theory. For many people that sounds much more appealing than just a statement based on the activity of neurons.
Many robot and computer technicians ignore all arguments against designing machines with a consciousness and go stiffly with trying. There are two ways to tackle this:
make a conscious machine, or
make a machine that seems to be conscious
We must remember that it may seem as if machines have intentions to achieve goals, while that may not be the case at all. In addition, it is surprising that we do not think that other objects experience subjectivity, while we treat them as if they did.
Kismet was the first robot to look like a human being. He had control over attentional processes and vision and watched movement and color. The mood of Kismet was a combination of three variables: happiness, alertness and openness to new stimuli. Kismet could hear and make sounds, but do not understand words. You might think that Kismet has no consciousness because it consists of metal and performs simple routine actions.
Yet it is true that there is no place in Kismet where 'everything comes together' (as is sometimes said about consciousness). In short: Kismet did not have a Cartesian theater . Dennett believes that this also applies to people. Suppose a new robot is created that recognizes emotions in people, laughs, can cry and can respond to the person he is conversing with. Would you still think that he has no consciousness? We can say that it only looks like this robot has a consciousness. Another possibility is to believe that he really has a consciousness. Which vision is correct and how do we find out?
In 1979, McCarthy, one of the founders of AI, claimed that thermostats have beliefs: they can believe it's too hot, too cold or the temperature is right. A thermostat can observe the environment and respond to the environment on that basis.
It seems strange that McCarthy thinks that thermostats have convictions, but his example invites us to think about what real intentionality is exactly. You might think that the convictions of thermostats are as real as the beliefs of people, but that they are simpler. You might also think that there is no such thing as real intentionality and intentionality that seems real . Other people again make a clear distinction between intentionality and consciousness. If you believe that robots do not have real intentionality, then you should be able to explain what real intentionality means to people and whether it can be implanted in a machine.
Suppose people have an X that ensures that they have a consciousness. If we want to make a conscious robot, then we have to figure out what this X is. McGinn wonders whether this X (which he calls C *) can exist in objects. He concludes that we can never know that. He believes that we will never know how the brain and consciousness are connected. He therefore believes that we can never find out what C * is.
Other scientists are less pessimistic. Chalmers believes in artificial intelligence and rejects the thought experiment of the Chinese room from the previous chapter. Chalmers is a dualist, but believes that every system that is organized in the right way can have a consciousness like ours. According to him, having the right system is not enough. Implementing this system is very important. He states that we must find the X of human consciousness for this. One way to do this is to make a list of possible Xs
Stuart proposes 'engaged embodiment' ; purposeful animation, perception, imagination and the ability to recognize experiences as own experiences. Aleksander takes phenomenology as a starting point. He comes to the following criteria to make a conscious robot:
perception of himself in an 'out there world';
imagination of the past and fiction;
attention;
plan;
emotions.
Aleksander devised the Kernel Architecture (KA) for these five criteria. The key mechanism in this is depicting: creating a direct representation where elements of the world are located that ensure that attention can be directed in a suitable manner. According to Aleksander, KA also contains an image of the self in his world. He therefore concludes that a robot can be aware if he has a KA.
Another approach is to start from existing theories of consciousness. The ' Global Workspace Theory' (GWT) states that the content of the consciousness consists of representations that are processed by the ' global workspace' . The 'global workspace' is itself a large network with cooperating neurons. The content of these neurons would be aware and they would make this content available to the entire system that is unconscious. In this theory, the x factor stands for general availability. A robot would therefore have a consciousness if it had a ' global workspace' that could ensure that the content would be available for the entire system.
Franklin designed IDA (Intelligent Distribution Agent ) as software for the US Navy. This software is based on GWT, but according to Franklin, this software only has a consciousness and no self-awareness. In addition, the software would not have subjective experiences (' phenomenal consciousness' ). Franklin therefore draws the conclusion that IDA has no real consciousness.
Edelman and Tononi say that the consciousness is the result of a dynamic core, with neurons in the brains. This nucleus would have all kinds of connections with the rest of the brain. It might be possible to design a machine that also has such a dynamic core.
Hameroff and Penrose argue that the implementation of a dynamic core would not provide a real form of consciousness. They state that consciousness arises through coherence in microtubes of cells.
There are also scientists who think that consciousness is a big illusion. It would only seem like we have conscious experiences. We would have this illusion because we have language skills. We quickly think in terms of 'me' and the 'self' and that would create a sense of consciousness.
Many attempts have been made to design speaking machines. In the past, the GOFAI approach was mainly used . This approach has been used to program computers with the right rules. The GOFAI approach has also tried to teach robots language. The problem here is that natural languages do not always follow certain rules. For example, words have multiple meanings and sentences can be interpreted in several ways. Machines can weigh different meanings and choose the most likely ones, but they will not really understand the languages they learn.
A new approach is the 'evolutionary theory of memetics' . According to memetics, if organisms imitate each other, they then evolve. This could mean that if imitation occurs, languages can arise spontaneously. The same thing would happen if machines can imitate each other. There is evidence from computer simulations and robot studies that there seems to be an evolutionary system. Steels has, for example, designed robots that can identify and imitate each other's sounds. Language could also be seen in the same way: a changed system in which words and meanings emerge spontaneously. This would mean that robots can learn language as children do. What's more, this means that robots that imitate each other can quickly come up with their own language.The memetics approach states that machines that can imitate each other are clearly different from machines that do not, just like people differ from animals. For example, robots could design their own culture, as we do.
Kurtzweil believes that it is a matter of time that humans become immortal. We could do this by putting parts of brain functions on a computer. The first question is whether you still have a consciousness and the second question is whether you are the same (conscious) person as before. The answers to this depend on how you define consciousness and whether you are a supporter of bundle or egotheories.
Scientists had a very early interest in unconscious processing (also called implicit or subliminal perception ). We know that there can be perception without consciousness. People can think for themselves that they have not perceived anything consciously, while their behavior shows that they have observed something.
We do not assume that we have two selves: one for conscious processing and one for unconscious processing. In earlier experiments, conscious experiences were defined in terms of what people themselves said they had observed. This sounds logical, but this method has a disadvantage. Whether someone says that he or she has perceived something consciously depends on how careful someone is with his or her judgment. There is no clear limit to indicate between when someone has observed something or not. Behaviorists did not want to be dependent on whether people said they had observed something. They wanted to make objective measuring instruments so that there was no need for them. This is a strange idea, since saying whether you have observed something, is as reliable (or unreliable) as pressing a button to make it clear that you have observed something.
Marcel showed that people react faster to a target if the prime matches this. Marcel made the primes unrecognizable to participants by placing a visual distractor on the image immediately after the prime appeared. People could not consciously perceive the prime. Even so, the target was reacted even faster. This phenomenon is also called ' semantic priming'.
Cheesman and Merikle distinguished between:
objective threshold value, and
subjective threshold value.
The objective threshold value represents the level of detection in which a distinction is made between perceptual information on the basis of random phenomena. The subjective threshold value is about the value at which participants say that they could not distinguish between perceptual information and that their answers come from random phenomena.
Cheesman and Merikle used the Stroop test where participants have to name the color of a word after being primed with a colored word. Corresponding (congruent) colors and words provide a faster response time. When colors and words do not match, there is incongruity. Cheesman and Merikle drew the conclusion that there is unconscious processing when information is presented below the subjective limit value and above the objective limit value.
It is also possible that unconscious perception affects the emotions of people. Threatening images (which people deny having seen) can evoke emotional reactions and change perceptual thresholds. Sometimes it even happens that people who have been sedated have nevertheless unconsciously observed what the surgeon said during the operation.
Merikle and Daneman state that unconsciously observed information leads to automatic reactions and that consciously observed information leads to more flexible reactions. However, it can not be said with certainty that unconsciously observed information causes automatic reactions. It is also possible that more flexible reactions cause awareness or that flexible responses and conscious processes are the same.
Brain scans also show that unconscious perception can be found in the brain. Unconsciously perceived images of frightened faces lead to more activity in the amygdala compared to happy faces. This confirms that even when information is unconsciously processed, there can still be effects on different parts of the brain that would also be activated when the same stimuli were consciously observed.
The idea of a Cartesian theater must be wrong, since it has been found that unconscious processing also influences the actions of the human being. Cartesian theater assumes that information enters consciousness and that "I" can choose what he or she does with this information.
Cartesian materialism is also wrong, because in this vision it is also believed that something 'comes' into consciousness, as is the case with Cartesian theater. In Cartesian materialism, it is not believed in a "self" that looks at a mental screen in its own head (which is an assumption in Cartesian theater). With our findings about the influence of unconscious processing, we can conclude that these visions can not be correct.
Opinions vary widely as to whether unconscious problem solving takes place. Broadbent and Berry have conducted studies showing that it is possible to unconsciously solve problems. It happens that people who are good at performing a task can explain very poorly how they accomplish the task. Sometimes people do not even know what information they used to complete a task during an experiment.
Lewicki proved that without people knowing it, they can become better at performing a task on a computer screen. He believes that unconscious information processing processes are faster than conscious ones and that they are also more refined. Among scientists there are differences of opinion about how 'smart' unconscious cognition is.
Claxton states that many tasks can best be performed without interference from consciousness. Many experiments show that when trying to learn something explicit, implicit learning can suppress.
Sometimes insight can come much later than desired. Intuition can be seen as making decisions or drawing conclusions without explicit processing or reasoning.
There are three parts of intuition. First, there are cognitive processes that allow the brain to derive information from complex patterns and guide behavior. Cognitive processes probably contribute to many everyday skills; from playing computer games to guessing which row will probably be the shortest in the supermarket. In addition, there are social skills that make us feel that someone is unreliable, for example. We also use social skills when we want to estimate when the best time is to bring bad news to someone. These skills are quickly picked up by children. Women have better verbal skills and are more interested in social relationships. For these reasons they might well have a better developed intuition.Finally, there are still emotions. Intuitive knowledge is often accompanied by emotions.
People with damaged frontal lobes become very superficial on an emotional level. This ensures that they become indecisive. They find it difficult to make choices about the smallest things. They can rationally weigh alternatives, but they lack in-depth emotions. Because of this they can not sense which choice is right.
Creativity can be seen as a way in which explicit and intuitive skills come together. However, it is not clear where creativity comes from. For example, many famous writers and painters say that their best work comes to them. The question is where it comes from. They do not feel that they consciously make a beautiful painting or write a beautiful poem; it all seems to go by itself. It therefore seems as if there is 'selfless' creativity, being a force that comes from the outside.
Creative people score high on fantasizing, hypnotizability, and 'absorption'. This last term stands for being able to easily blend into a book or film. We could also show creativity from an evolutionary framework. Perhaps creativity allows people to bring together cultural knowledge ('memes') in special ways to form new memes. They must be motivated for this and can sense which combinations of memes go well together.
In daily life we often distinguish between the outside world and what goes on in our heads. We do this without knowing that we use a skill for this. This skill is called ' reality monitoring' or ' reality discrimination' . Research shows that 'reality monitoring' is influenced by our expectations about whether something is real or imagined. For example, Perky asked people to look at a blank sheet and to imagine that a tomato is depicted there. Without the people being aware of it, it was ensured that a picture of a tomato was projected onto the back of the leaf. Despite the fact that it became increasingly clear, participants continued to believe that it was their own imagination.
Distinguishing between events that have really happened and things that we think happened tends to be difficult. 'Memories' of events that never happened, are also called ' false memories' .Real memories can be determined because we can place them in a context. This is also called ' source monitoring' . ' False memories' can be easily generated in the laboratory. They can continue to work for a long time.
It is important to make a distinction between hallucinations and illusions. Hallucinations are experienced entirely from within, while illusions are misinterpretations of external states. Examples of visual illusions are the Muller-Lyer illusion and the Ponzo illusion . Hallucinations are perceptual experiences, while there is no external stimulus.
True hallucinations are sometimes distinguished from pseudo-hallucinations . With pseudo-hallucinations, the person himself knows that the hallucinations are not real. For example, if you hear a voice in your head, but know that this can never be real, then there is a pseudo-hallucination. In addition, a distinction is made between hallucinations and mental imagination. Hallucinations are uncontrollable and therefore can not ' go out' of your head if you do not want to think about it anymore. The distinction between hallucinations and mental imagination is not very clear.
What happens in the brains of people who are hallucinating? Many studies show that there is activity in hallucinations in the brain regions that would also be active if people actually heard an angelic choir (or whatever hallucination they have). However, there is also evidence that complex interconnections are involved. How real the hallucinations seem to be depends on how many areas of the brain are involved.
Slade and Bentall state that a hallucination is an experience that:
occurs in the absence of a stimulus,
has a great influence on real perception, and
can not be voluntarily controlled.
Hallucinations are common in people with schizophrenia. The symptoms of this disorder vary per person. For example, schizophrenic people may feel that alien creatures determine their behaviors. Often they hear voices from, for example, fairies that are in the walls. These hallucinations are experienced as real.
Although hallucinations are often aligned with pathology, there are several reasons to reject this. Firstly, it is not clear how hallucinations can be distinguished from other experiences and secondly, hallucinations are common in the population. Third, there are cultural differences in attitudes to hallucinations. In some cultures, people look very positive about hallucinations.
Research shows that visual hallucinations occur more often than auditory. Women also report having hallucinations more often. The most experienced hallucination is that people see someone who does not really exist.
Some hallucinations occur spontaneously and others are caused by drugs, illness, hunger, lack of sleep or the use of rituals. No sensory input increases the chance of hallucinations. The sensory systems then try to use everything we have received and use a different criterion for what is a real experience. Jackson came with the ' perceptual release theory' to explain hallucinations.
According to this theory, memories are normally inhibited by sensory information. This is not the case with hallucinations. There are many different hallucinations, but they do have common characteristics. People often see spirals, certain patterns, wavelengths and bright colors. How can it be explained that these characteristics often correspond to people?
Kluver investigated this using the anesthetic mescaline. He discovered that the use of this product results in people perceiving bright colors in different forms. These forms are tunnels, spirals, webs and grids. These forms are all found in hallucinations caused by other drugs, but also in hallucinations due to fever, migraine and epilepsy.
Where do these agreements come from? The cause of these similarities could be related to how the visual system in the brain is organized. The primary visual cortex is organized in column form. Spirals, tunnels, webs and grids go together with lines in different directions. This means that when activity spreads in straight lines within the visual cortex, the experience is equivalent to looking at real rings or circles. A reason why lines are activated in the visual cortex is disinhibition . Drugs, lack of oxygen and certain diseases can affect inhibitory cells; much more than on activating cells. This creates an extremely high amount of activity that can spread in the brain in a linear way. This ensures the experience of tunnels, spirals, webs or grids.
There are also similarities in the movement and colors of hallucinations. In more complex hallucinations, there are also similarities between people's experiences. For example, people often see cartoon-like creatures, great cities, animals and creatures from myths. Siegel and Jarvik discovered that when using drugs, people first have simple hallucinations, then experience tunnels and schedules and then experience complex hallucinations.
We often have hallucinations just when we almost fall asleep. Maury called these hallucinations ' hypnagogic images' or ' hypnagogic hallucinations'. Hallucinations that arose upon awakening, he called ' hypnopompic images'. People at these moments feel that they are flying or are falling through tunnels. It sometimes happens that people who have been engaged in a task all day, see images of this task just before they go to sleep. Others think at that moment that someone is calling their name. Then there is also something like sleep paralysis . During REM sleep everyone is paralyzed. For this reason, no one can perform what he or she is dreaming about at that moment.
Consciousness during sleep paralysis occurs when normal paralysis during REM sleep begins too late, the person just falls asleep or when paralysis takes too long when someone is awakening.
Children often have imaginary friends. Some children play and talk for years with the same imaginary friend. It also happens that imaginary friends are animals or invisible toys. Some people are said to have a ' fantasy-prone personality' . These people often have more imaginary friends than other people, because they can fantasize and be creative.
In many cultures, hallucinations are valued because it could be closer to ghosts or gods. An example is the Yanamamo strain that can be found in Brazil and Venezuela. They believe that there are spirits ('hekura') in the heavens and that they can penetrate the body of people from the chest. To invoke these spirits this strain uses 'ebene': a green powder that causes hallucinations.
There are at least two good reasons for studying the paranormal phenomenon:
paranormal experiences are common and many people believe in it;
The popular view of the paranormal is that physical phenomena are the proof of the 'power of consciousness'. Consciousness is independent of time and space. Within parapsychology, terms such as 'awareness', 'abnormal effects of conscious intention', 'awareness interactions' and 'awareness-related anomalies' are common.
In the event that paranormal claims are wrong, the extended beliefs and frequent reports of physical experiences must be explained in a different way. When paranormal claims are correct, it is important to further investigate the implications for the science of consciousness.
Often, ideas about the paranormal are used to undermine materialistic visions about consciousness. Accepting that something supernatural exists means that not everything can be explained by means of brain processes. Between 1800 and 1900 there was a lot of attention for spirits and people who could communicate with them. Spiritualism was very popular during that period. People who say they can communicate with spirits are also called mediums. It has often happened that mediums used all sorts of tricks and thus pretended they were clairvoyant. Cheating is not the only alternative to a paranormal interpretation. People can also misinterpret things they see for many other reasons, such as hallucinations and delusions.
J. B and L. Rhine tried to find evidence against materialism and behaviorism. Behaviorism used to be very popular and emphasized observable and measurable outcomes. Rhine and Rhine wanted to show that an independent mind exists. J.B. Rhine wrote a book and used the term ' extrasensory perception' (ESP) for the first time . This term covered three types of communication that require no senses. First there is (1) telepathy, where information is passed on from one person to another. In addition there is such a thing as (2) ' clairvoyance'. In this case, information comes from objects or events that are remote. To examine these terms, Rhine did several experiments. He stated that everyone had paranormal skills, even if this was very weak for some people. To accomplish this, subjects in his experiments were normal people and not people who claimed to possess specific physical powers.
Finally, J. B. Rhine spoke about (3) 'precognition': information coming from the future. These terms are still used in parapsychology. Rhine and Rhine described experiments to test the existence of these three communication methods. They believed that everyone has paranormal skills, no matter how weak these skills are. Rhine and Rhine carried out the experiments and found significant results. Now we know that these results were not correct, as there was a good chance that someone would by chance choose the right alternative in an experiment. They also believed in the existence of psychokinesis (PK) . Psychokinesis would be the case when someone with his mind can influence when a wheel will stop turning, for example. Rhine and Rhine used the term ' psi' when they talked about paranormal activities. 'Psi' therefore consists of both ESP and PK. All forms of psi are described as communication without the use of senses. One consequence is that hypnosis is no longer seen as psi, because psychology has been able to explain hypnosis.
Much criticism was expressed on the methods Rhine and Rhine used to prove that paranormal activity exists. The main problem was that there was no randomization in the Rhine and Rhine experiments. It is then easier to attribute the results to an effect if that is not true in reality. People seemed to be telepathic, for example, because they knew the person they were getting information from.
Since people were allowed to choose which information they wanted to "send" to another, it seemed that there was telepathy, because people who knew each other well were thinking about the same subject. Nowadays parapsychologists try to use randomization.
When people have to choose from cards, it is possible that they happen to choose the right card. You can then easily find a statistically significant effect, while this effect does not exist. Other studies have been carried out to avoid this pitfall.
With 'remote viewing' it is the case that someone (the target) for example goes to a randomly selected location and looks around for a while. Meanwhile another person (subject) is going to sit down and relax. This person tells you which impressions or images come to him or her. Afterwards the subject tries to match the impressions with a set of possible target locations and to choose the right one. This research method was also criticized because people would be sent too far towards the right match.
Suppose that this type of research proves that telepathy exists, for example. What consequences does this have for the discussion around consciousness? If ESP exists, this does not mean that this skill can be practiced voluntarily. In principle, it does not say anything about the mind or consciousness. In addition, it has never been proven that 'good' answers during this kind of experiment are caused by a change in consciousness. There is no direct evidence that consciousness plays a role in ESP.
Psychokinesis (PK) stands for the ability to influence objects or events without touching them or using a different force. Nowadays PK's research is mainly about micro-PK, the so-called effect of the human mind on microscopic or mechanical systems. The observational theories are derived from quantum physics and do not describe psi in terms of a force occurring at a specific moment, but as a change in the chances caused by conscious observation of the results. PK would occur when feedback is given, not when particles are released. The parapsychologists who are convinced of the existence of PK make explicit claims that the consciousness is involved. Some of them are dualists and they believe that the non-physical mind, or consciousness,acts as a force on the physical universe. Other theories, based on quantum physics, claim that consciousness is independent of time and space.
People often interpret random phenomena incorrectly and think that there is a real effect. Because people rarely believe in coincidence, they try to find explanations for the results found. If no good explanation for an event is found, paranormal activity is soon discussed. People who are better at probability believe less often in paranormal activity. It is also true that people remember details that come true, but forget the rest.
Paranormal activity probably does not exist. Many significant results from parapsychological research often prove to be incorrectable in other studies. Despite the fact that a lot of research has been done, we still can not give certain information about this subject. If psi exists, then there is only a very small effect. The rejection of paranormal activity does not mean that someone by definition no longer believes in spirituality.
The 'other form of consciousness' formulated by James is now called 'altered states of consciousness', abbreviated as ASCs. However, this concept is difficult to define. For example, there is the question of whether we should define ASCs objectively or subjectively. If we choose an objective definition, then we are talking about the causes of the changed consciousness. We would then make a definition based on narcotics. A problem, however, is that you do not include the subjective experience in the definition. For example, how can we know if people who are drunk are all reacting in the same way? Is it also possible that the same drugs produce different ASCs?
Perhaps it is better to define ASCs in terms of physical variables and behavioral measurements. In this context one can think of heartbeat and the expression of emotions. A problem with such an approach, however, is that few ASCs are associated with unique physical patterns or behavioral changes. For this reason, scientists are still cautious when it comes to giving a definition based on physical processes to the state of consciousness (SoC) to.
It is also possible to give ASCs a subjective definition. In practice, this approach is used the most. In these types of definitions, ASCs are described as states in which it feels as if there is a change in the normal pattern of mental functioning. These types of definitions give rise to other problems. ASCs are compared with normal patterns of mental functioning, but what exactly is a normal pattern of mental functioning? In addition, the use of subjective definitions ensures that people's experiences can not be compared properly, because they can not be measured in the same way.
What exactly changes when someone experiences an ASC? We can say that consciousness has changed, but what exactly does this mean? There are a lot of differences among scientists about what consciousness means at all. Farthing states that we need to look at fourteen points if we want to know what exactly changes when someone experiences an ASC. He named:
attention,
perception,
imagination and fantasy,
inner speech,
memory,
high-level thought processes,
meaning,
time perception,
emotions and expression,
alertness,
self control,
suggestibility,
body image, and
sense of personal identity.
With some ASCs all these factors change, with others only one or two. After this, we will go deeper into three of these factors, namely:
attention
memory,
alertness.
These three often change in the case of an ASC.
Attention can be influenced in two ways by an ASC. First of all, attention can be directed inwards or outwards. In dreams, for example, attention is directed towards the inside. ASCs introduce changes in this part of attention. For example, they can reduce sensory input, as in the case of meditation. An ASC can also ensure that attention is experienced very broadly or is very limited. For example, some people who are high have a lot of attention for the pattern on the carpet.
ASCs also affect memory. For example, narcotics affect how much can be stored in the short-term memory. It is also possible that a narcotic means that someone feels that the time is very fast or very slow.
In addition, ASCs influence the level of alertness. For example, meditation is accompanied by very little alertness and deep relaxation. This can lead to little need for food and oxygen. There are also situations where people become extremely alert. An example of this are religious rituals.
Thinking about the above three terms (attention, memory and alertness) means that we can imagine a kind of three-dimensional space in which all possible ASCs are positioned. If SoCs were accurately mapped in such a space, we could understand how each SoC is related to others. However, this task is not easy.
Early psychophysiologists attempted to place visual and auditory sensations in a multidimensional space. The first attempts were done by Tart. He described a simple space with two dimensions: irrationality and the ability to hallucinate. By placing a person in this space he imagined three large clusters corresponding to dreams, clear dreams and normal consciousness. All other positions in space can not be used or are unstable. These zones called Tart 'discrete zones of consciousness'. He stated that you could never be between two different states.
A second two-dimensional space was described by Laureys. His dimensions are completely different from the dimensions as described by Tart, namely: the level of arousal and the awareness of the environment and the self. Arousal refers to the physiological alertness or level of consciousness and depends on the arousal system of the brainstem. The awareness of the environment and the self refers to the content of consciousness and this requires a functional integrated cortex with subcortical loops. For most states, the level and content are positively correlated with each other.
The AIM model is a three-dimensional view developed by Hobson. AIM is the abbreviation for the three dimensions that make up this model:
(1) 'Activation energy': is equal to arousal and can be measured, for example by EEG,
(2) 'Input source': can vary between mere external or purely internal sources of information.
(3) 'Mode': the ratio of amines in comparison to cholines.
Types of drugs
Psychoactive drugs affect mental functioning or consciousness. These drugs can be classified into different categories.
The first category consists of the stimulants. Examples include nicotine, caffeine, cocaine and amphetamine. Cocaine causes a feeling of intense pleasure, a lot of energy and a lot of self-confidence. It goes along with tolerance. Tolerance means that a higher dose is always needed to experience the same effect. People who use a lot of cocaine often suffer from hallucinations. They also have the feeling that there are beasts living under their skin.
Amphetamine (also called speed) is also a drug that inhibits the reuptake of dopamine. This drug also gives a lot of energy. In addition, there is tolerance and withdrawal with depression. The use of speed can also lead to delusions and hallucinations.
MDMA (also called xtc) is taken out of speed. MDMA has three important effects:
inhibiting the reuptake (reabsorption) of serotonin,
activating the excretion of serotonin, and
activating the excretion of dopamine.
The use of MDMA goes hand in hand with a lot of energy and feelings of love and empathy. The effects do depend on the setting in which the drug is used. If someone uses MDMA in nature alone, this gives the feeling that the universe is one. At that moment someone feels a lot of love for the world. MDMA, like other drugs, is addictive and goes along with tolerance.
Examples are alcohol, tranquillizers and sleeping pills. These agents have a different effect, for example facilitating the neurotransmitter GABA. Other mechanisms of action are effects on endogenous opioids and inhibition of adrenaline and acetylcholine.
Examples of this category are heroin, morphine, codeine and methadone. These drugs have a big influence on mood and are very addictive. However, they do not cause ASCs that help us to better understand the consciousness. An exception is opium.
Examples include tranquilizers such as chlorpromazine and lithium carbonate. These drugs are used to treat people with schizophrenia.
Here are three types of:
tricylic antidepressants (TCAs),
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), and
monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs).
SSRIs ensure that serotonin remains available for longer and MAOIs ensure that noradrenaline, dopamine and serotonin are less likely to be broken down.
Anesthetic agents fall In this category. An example is ketamine. This means that the working memory, the episodic memory and the semantic memory are disturbed. This substance is rarely used as an anesthetic because it can cause symptoms of schizophrenia and nightmares.
The effects of these drugs are very strange, but also varied. Examples of psychedelics are DMT, psilocybin (mushrooms) and LSD. In terms of structure they resemble one of four neurotransmitters: acetylcholine, dopamine, noradrenaline or serotonin. Often they are not addictive, but they can be dangerous.
In the past, cannabis was mainly used for medical purposes. This drug is often smoked or burned in special pipes. Describing the experiences of people who have used cannabis is not easy. They often indicate that it is indescribable what cannabis has for them. In addition, it is also the case that the effects per person are different. When using small amounts of experienced people intense pleasure (euphoria) and relaxation. Use of large quantities is accompanied by anxiety and paranoia.
An example is mescaline. Using mescaline makes people feel that the world is perfect and colorful.
You can speak of a lucid dream if, during the dream, you realize that you are dreaming. So you are aware of the fact that you are dreaming during your dream.
Every day we take cycles with three states: (1) being vigilant, (2) REM ( Rapid Eye Movement ) sleep and (3) non-REM sleep . A cycle repeats itself four to five times a day. These sleep phases are classified based on physical measurements and behavior measurements.
For example, during REM sleep, the brain is very active and the EEG pattern resembles that of someone who is awake. Yet it is more difficult to wake someone up in REM sleep than during non-REM sleep. During the non-REM sleep there are mainly long, but slow waves to be seen on the EEG. Adenosine is the most important neuromodulator that induces sleep.
The REM cycle is guided by the reticular formation in the pons of the brainstem. Here are nuclei that constantly brake and activate REM sleep. Sensory input is blocked by the thalamus and the cortex during the non-REM sleep. During REM sleep, the brain blocks motor skills. Someone seems to be paralyzed during sleep.
When people wake from a non-REM sleep, people often say that nothing has gone through their heads or that they have not thought of anything during their sleep. Reports of non-REM dreams are often short and have few details. When people wake up during the REM sleep, they often say that they have had a bizarre and complex dream.
Research shows that there are similarities between the dreams that people have. Even the dreams in different cultures appear to be comparable. Men dream more often about men than women do. They also dream more often about aggressive interactions with other men. Children often dream about animals and are often the victim of aggression in dreams.
There are several problems to generalize the above to all dreams, because of the effects of the method of collecting dream reports. Many different results are found in studies, for example on the prevalence of bizarre dreams.
Hobson drew up three categories to show that bizarre dreams can take different forms. These categories are:
'incongruity': the non-matching of characteristics of characters, objects, actions or settings;
'discontinuity': sudden changes in the above elements;
'uncertainty': explicit vagueness.
Research suggests that the way characters and objects are transformed into dreams follows certain rules, but that the changes of a scene and a plot do not.
Hobson designed the AIM model about sleep. AIM stands for three different dimensions of sleep:
activation energy (measured by EEC patterns),
input source ( external or internal ) and
mode (the ratio amines and cholins ).
During the awake state, amine neurotransmitters and neuromodulators (such as norepinephrine and serotonin) are dominant and necessary for rational thought, voluntary action and attentional focus. During REM sleep, acetylcholine takes over and thoughts begin to assume a delusional and irrational form. The ratio that Hobson speaks is therefore about the difference between the waking state and REM sleep.
According to Hobson, sleep phases can be distinguished on the basis of values on these three dimensions. He has designed a cube model for this. He added a fourth dimension to this, namely time. As a result, the values of A, I and M change.
Edelman and Tononi state that a unified consciousness depends on the constantly changing dynamic core of activity in the brain. This dynamic nucleus would be supported by connections between the cortex and the thalamus. This would lead to integration, but there would also be changes that continue in the brain. During the non-REM sleep, consciousness would disappear.
Many physiological, neurochemical and behavioral variables are related to subjective descriptions of a dream. However, the measured correlations are not perfect. However, it seems certain that people have vivid dreams during REM sleep, while these dreams rarely occur during non-REM sleep. Being in the REM phase does not necessarily mean that you are dreaming at that moment. You can also dream without being in the REM phase.
The REM phase is therefore not necessary (but not always sufficient) to dream. In addition, REM sleep can occur if people do not (can) dream. For example, fetuses are in the REM phase for fifteen hours a day, but they can not dream about anything because they have no experiences yet. When they are born, the time spent in REM sleep becomes shorter and shorter. Blind people do not dream in terms of images, but in terms of words and ideas. As children grow older, their dreams are increasingly related to their cognitive skills. When they are about five years old, their dreams begin to become more lively. In addition, there is more and more movement in their dreams. Reptiles do not have REM sleep, but birds and mammals do. We can not know if birds and mammals have dreams,even though they are in the REM phase during their sleep. The question is whether subjective experiences and physiological processes in the brain are the same.
Are dreams conscious experiences? Many scientists think so. If you dream about yourself, your 'self' in the dream often does not realize that he or she is in a dream. This ' dream-self' also carries out actions that you would never have carried out in daily life. Your 'dream-self' therefore behaves differently from yourself. In the previous chapter, an ASC is defined as a changed state of consciousness that someone is aware of. In your dream, however, you often do not realize that you are dreaming. In that case, there would therefore be no ASC. A lucid dream , on the other hand, would be an ASC, because in such a dream you know that you are dreaming.
Dreaming takes time, it is not that you start a dream just before you wake up. Dennett speaks about the ' cassette theory of dreams' . This theory states that the brain stores potential dreams. If someone wakes up from REM sleep, a ' cassette' would be taken from the storage place in the brain, making it seem like we had dreamed. This theory states that dreams actually do not exist at all. We do not dream, but we feel that we have dreamed.
So there are two ideas about dreams:
there are dreams that occur in consciousness or are presented to consciousness during sleep, and
arise unconsciously during sleep and are 'remembered' when someone wakes up.
We will probably never know which of the two is correct. In addition, there is also the ' retro-selective theory' (also called ' backwards-weaving theory' ). This theory states that during the REM sleep all sorts of brain processes are in progress. These processes are not 'inside' or 'outside' consciousness. When someone wakes up, he makes a story by selecting one of the many possible stories that are in the memory. These stories have been produced by all kinds of brain processes. This theory states that dreams are not conscious experiences, since they do not occur in consciousness. According to this theory, there is nothing that occurs in consciousness at all.
Sometimes it happens in a dream that there is ' false awakening' . In that case, the dreamer dreams that he or she has woken up. It also happens that people at 'false awakenings' see a green glow or hear buzzing noises. These experiences are similar to hallucinations. Experiences where the entire environment has been replaced by hallucinations are sometimes called 'metachorical experiences'.
In a lucid dream is it that while dreaming you know you are dreaming. Sometimes people say that in lucid dreaming they can influence what they dream. You could say that the consciousness is the cause of this, but we can not draw this conclusion.
For a long time, lucid dreams were only examined by parapsychologists. Many psychologists did not believe that there is such a thing as a lucid dream. Self-reflection and making conscious choices would be impossible while dreaming, so lucid dreams should arise before or after sleep. Hearn and LaBerge proved that this view is not correct. During REM sleep, the muscles are paralyzed, so that someone can not say that he is experiencing a lucid dream. Hearne and LaBerge discovered that someone can make eye movements during REM sleep.
Research has also shown that lucid dreams last about two minutes, although they can also last fifty minutes. Lucid dreams often arise when there is a lot of alertness during REM sleep, but also when there are pauses in the breathing and small changes in the heart rate. In addition, there is an increased activity in the left parietal lobe. This may have to do with the more solid self-awareness in a lucid dream.
Research shows that eye movements go hand in hand with the contents of a dream. For example, someone can dream about a tennis match and this can be seen from the eye movements he makes from left to right. The nervous system is also involved in the physical actions that are being dreamed about.
Brain scans show that when we see or hear something, the same sensory areas are activated as when we only imagine it. The same seems to apply to dreams. Thus something about the dream content can be said on the basis of activation patterns. You can discover whether someone dreams about emotions or about memories. Voluntary breathing during lucid dreaming corresponds to how normally breathing is. There are techniques to cause lucid dreams. These techniques often go hand in hand with special equipment, such as the 'dream machine' from Hearne and LaBerge's MILD technique. This latter method is based on the idea that we spend a lot of our time in an alert state and that if we are more lucid this vigilance turns into dreams.These methods are equal to those of meditation and mindfulness.
Some people say that they have exceptional experiences that others can not imagine. For example, James speaks of someone who is standing on a mountain top and feels that his soul 'opens' and goes to infinity. Such an experience is also called an ' exceptional human experience' (EHE) . This category includes religious experiences, lucid dreams and mystical experiences.
What do these kinds of experiences actually say? There are roughly three different answers to this:
Out-of-body experiences, OBE, are events in which someone feels that he is outside of himself and looks at the world. An OBE can occur just like that: if someone walks on the street or sits on the couch. Before such a thing happens, people are often relaxed and have reduced sensory input. An OBE often takes a few minutes. With an ' asomatic' OBE, someone only has the feeling that he has a consciousness, while he is not in his own body. With a 'parasomatic' OBE, there is a second body outside the body that you have.
An OBE is not something like a dream. People who experience an OBE say that their senses become sharper during an OBE. OBErs are less afraid of death when they have experienced an OBE. In addition, they often remember their dreams better and often have lucid dreams.
There is no connection between OBE and psychopathology. It is not easy to generate an OBE. In the past, hypnosis was often used in this context, but nowadays it focuses more on relaxation and imagery exercises. Drugs (and especially psychedelics) can lead to an OBE. Some people use the existence of OBE as evidence for the idea that consciousness exists and functions independently of the body. Other explanations are, however, also possible.
OBEs are so compelling that people are convinced that their consciousness has left their bodies and that they can survive death. Researchers from the nineteenth century who pursue theosophy assumed that everyone has multiple bodies. When the consciousness leaves the one (physical) body, it ends up in the astral body. The term ' astral projection' is still used today. So theosophy starts from a form of dualism. There have been many attempts, but the existence of a non-physical body or entity has never been proven. The idea has also been put forward that no one will leave his body during an OBE, but that this will feel the same. However, this does mean that the experience should be explained by means of neuroscience. The first question is whether there are ASCs, ie altered forms of consciousness.
Research shows that OBEs are associated with a relaxed way of waking up. There is no deep sleep during an OBE and certainly not REM sleep. Psychoanalytic theories describe an OBE as an extreme expression of the fear of dying. However, these theories can hardly be tested and do not lead us further to the understanding of OBEs.
Psychological theories, mostly from the 80s and 90s of the last century, build on the fact that an OBE occurs when sensory input and body image are disturbed. The cognitive system would like to solve this disturbance by creating a new (and incorrect) body image and creating a new world that is derived from memory and imagination. This new world really feels.
Research shows that people who have experienced an OBE are better at spatial representations, can better influence their dreams and often dream that they are looking at themselves from above. In addition, research results show that there is a link between body image and OBE. When the temporal lobes of people with epilepsy are stimulated, they shout that they feel as if they are outside their body. The temporal lobes seem to play a role at OBE.
The brain area that is involved in an OBE appears to be the tempo parietal junction (TPJ), on the right. Visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular information come together in this area. With this an image of the body is constructed. This image is continuously updated, as the body moves almost continuously. Research shows that an OBE occurs when this normal process becomes defective. Direct stimulation of this area causes an OBE.
In many cultures, people who are close to dying say that they have specific experiences at such a moment. The experiences are similar in many cultures. During a near death experience NDE, someone experiences a bright, white or golden light, positive and loving emotions, images of a different world, a reflection on life and the decision to return. It rarely happens that someone has very unpleasant experiences during an NDE. An NDE is not the result of medication. People who have attempted suicide often experience positive NDEs and then do a second suicide attempt much less frequently. In addition, it appears that people who have experienced an NDE, compared to people who do not, after their experience much stronger in life after death to believe.They are also less afraid of death, they become very interested in spirituality and feel a lot of love and acceptance for others.
Many people grasp the existence of NDEs to prove that there is a soul that can leave the body and survive on its own. This is also called the ' afterlife hypothesis' . Some scientists argue that the understanding of NDEs can only happen when a new form of science emerges that examines consciousness. The consciousness seems to be related to experiencing an NDE. First of all, it is true that people who experience an NDE state that they are very aware of themselves at that moment. This is an interesting fact, since their brains often function poorly because they have had an accident, for example.
How can it be that they feel that they are aware of themselves? This question is difficult to answer because we do not know when a NDE is exactly experienced. However, there are examples of people who can observe what happens around them during a coma. This can not be explained properly, because you would expect that their consciousness does not function properly at that moment.
The 'dying brain hypothesis' states that stress, extreme anxiety and oxygen deprivation in the brain ensure that there are no more inhibitions and that brain activity can no longer be controlled. This could result in an NDE. For example, tunnels and lights are often caused by the fact that the visual cortex can no longer be inhibited. During an NDE, people often see new worlds, but these worlds fit in with their philosophy of life.
There is no doubt that NDEs change through experience and there is some evidence that deeper experiences lead to greater change. It seems plausible that NDEs are involved in profound changes in the sense of self that are caused by a wrong integration in the TJP.
James states that an experience can be called 'mystical' if four conditions are met:
not being able to retell it in words ('ineffability'),
'neotic',
impermanence ('transiency'), and
passivity .
'Ineffability' means that people can not express in words exactly what they have experienced. 'Noetic' means that a mystical situation is a state of knowledge, insight and enlightenment. A mystical experience often lasts for half an hour to an hour before everything starts to become less sharp. Afterwards they can not be remembered exactly, but they can easily be recognized if they occur again. This phenomenon is summarized by the word 'transiency'. Finally, there is passivity: once the mystical experiences begin, they can not be influenced.
Other criteria have been added by Suzuki. He says that a mystical experience still goes hand in hand with ' exaltation' and ' affirmation'. This means that the experience gives someone respect for everything that exists. In addition, he added the criterion ' sense of the beyond' . This is about the feeling that people experience something that lies outside the world of normal events.
Paranormal explanations of mystical experiences are inadequate. They are not supported by scientific research and are often not testable. Yet they are very popular. A less popular view is that the deepest mystical insights are monistic and not paranormal. These insights would go perfectly with science. This is because mystical experiences often experience that the universe is one and that the separate self is an illusion.
The research into consciousness is sometimes divided into two categories:
the objective third person approach, and
the subjective first person approach.
Sometimes a third approach is added: the second person approach (also called intersubjective approach). A distinction is made between first versus third person science and first versus third person methods .
It is difficult to call the first person approach scientific, because this approach looks at how people perceive things subjectively. This can not be measured objectively and it is also not reproducible. In addition, objectivity is important in science, so that personal bias can not influence results. Finally, it can be said that there is no such thing as a first person approach, because at the moment you say something, your description will already be data for the third person's science. So there can not actually be any first-person data.
All these reasons show that the first person approach to consciousness is not a good way of science . First person methods can be used. Subjective experiences can thus be published. They do not count as scientific evidence.
Dennett thinks he is the leader of the A team and that Chalmers is the leader of the B team. Chalmers sees science about consciousness as something different from all other forms of science. This is because there must be a connection between data from the third person and data from the first person. Third person data is about brain processes, behaviors and what people say, while the first person has data about the conscious experience itself. Chalmers starts from the assumption that the first person exists. He believes there are good methods for collecting third person data, but we should have better methods for collecting first person data.
Science should try to connect the first person data to the third person data. An example is that we have to find out which subjective experiences ( first person data ) go together with brain processes ( third person data ). Chalmers states that a ' fundamental theory of consciousness' must be designed, in which these connections between first and third person data must be recorded. Chalmers believes that a conscious experience does not fully correspond to brain processes. In short: first person data is not the same as third person data.
Searle, Nagel, Levine and Pinker also belong to the B-team. Searle believes that many neurons first fire in the brain and that we then feel an experience (eg pain). The objective event , according to Searle, thus causes the subjective experience. Searle says that you know in a way of your own pain that no one can fully understand. Searle believes that subjective facts exist and can not be reduced to objective events.
Dennett (from the A-team) thinks that a subjective experience is more than an objective event (namely a brain process), but that we can not know for sure. He states that the B team thinks that we can know and observe our inner states and that we can not have a wrong opinion about them. The A-team states that we only have access to experiences that seem to be true , but that we can not know whether they are actually true.
Chalmers distinguishes between three types: A, B and C. People with an A-view are often functionalists or eliminativists. People with a B-view are often also materialists, but reject the idea of logical supremacy of the physical. People with a type C view deny materialism and include different types of dualism. According to Chalmers, the gap between A and B is greater than between B and C.
Phenomenology is about the inner world that people experience. We can also use phenomenology as a method. In this practice, phenomenology has two meanings: broadly speaking, it refers to the systematic investigation of phenomenological experiences. More specifically, it refers to tradition as based on Husserl's philosophy.
Husserl states that no meaningful distinction can be made between the external world and the internal world of experiences. He believes that polite experiences are more important than scientific ideas. He states that people have to memorize their learned ideas and previous beliefs; especially those who deal with the relationship between the external world and individual experiences. He called this process epoché . In this way we could study experiences directly. He wanted ' eidetic reduction' achieve: a way to capture the fundamental characteristics of human experiences. He wanted to go back to the basics of all things to better understand consciousness. Not many people believe that the process of epoché provides equally reliable knowledge as the natural sciences.
Phenomenology still exists and is used to investigate emotional states. Yet phenomenology does not seem to be a first-person method, but a third-person method. Experiences that people say to have are analyzed by others. In addition, it seems unrealistic to expect people to put all their previous experiences and learned ideas aside.
The term neurophenomenology was used by Varela to indicate the search for a modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience. Varela agrees with Searle and believes that first person experiences can not be reduced to third person descriptions, but he proposes a new way to deal with this. He states that the difficult problem that Chalmers speaks about can not be solved by only looking at how subjective experiences correspond to brain processes. He thinks we need to rediscover the superiority of polite experiences. According to him, neurophenomenology is about experiences and how they correspond with knowledge from cognitive science.He states that findings from the first person approach must be part of neurobiological theories.
Attention should therefore be paid to subjective experiences of people. Thompson and Zahavi argue for joint research between phenomenology and neuroscience. This could for example be useful in the area of self-awareness.
Varela provided a simple diagram to understand the place of neurophenomenology in science. This diagram consists of the four directions in which theories can be about consciousness. These directions are:
functionalism;
reductionism;
mysterianism;
phenomenology.
Functionalism is at the top of the diagram because, according to Varela, this view is the most popular in cognitive science. This theory is purely based on third person data and validation. Mysterianists are opposed to this and argue that the difficult problem is unsolvable. Reductionists aim to reduce experience to neuroscience. Opposite is the phenomenology that illuminates the first person theories. The diagram is a tool to indicate the relationships between the different theories and to highlight the role of first person approaches in the science of consciousness.
Some people deny the difference between first person and third person methods. Velmans states that all sciences depend on observations and experiences of scientists. In principle, therefore, there is never a perfect form of objectivity. He talks about a thought experiment to clarify his point. Imagine: you look at a light and a researcher studies your reactions and brain activity. You have first person experiences, while the researcher has third person experiences (about you). Suppose you then turn your head towards the researcher and that the researcher will look at the light. In this case, the private experience of looking at the light becomes a public experience and an objective stimulus.
Velmans therefore says that there is no distinction between subjective and objective matters. He proposes a recurring model (' reflexive model of consciousness' ). He states that his model can ensure that all problems associated with consciousness can be resolved. He thinks we all have individual private experiences and he also agrees that there are objects and events in the outside world that people agree on. If researchers investigate mental states, they are busy with intersubjectivity. The experiences they examine are repeatable, because everyone can have them.
Therefore, according to him, the distinction between first and third person methods should disappear. He states that when your first or third person performs techniques, you will then observe or experience the results. So people experience the same things when they look at a certain object and therefore the distinction between first and third person methods can better be dropped.
Heterophenomenology is about studying things that other people experience. Dennett argues that heterophenomenology means that phenomenological descriptions of subjective experiences are understood. This can be done in three steps.
of all, the data must be collected. This can be done by means of brain scans, by asking people to press buttons when they see something or by asking them to describe their emotions .
the data must be interpreted. This has to be done if we want to use the data.
Finally, we take the ' intentional stance' . This means that we see a subject as a rational being that has its own convictions, a will and desires. Dennett says that this is a method that has been used so far in science. The question is whether heterophenomenology studies not only what people say and, in doing so, does not pay attention to the experiences themselves.
Does meditation coincide with a change in consciousness? Meditation is important in many religions. Nowadays, however, many non-religious people also engage in meditation. The best known meditation form is ' transcendental meditation' (TM) . TM would go hand in hand with deep relaxation, the disappearance of stress, an improvement in health, creativity and happiness.
Meditation can be summarized as:
do not think, but
have attention.
Meditation often goes hand in hand with a special body posture. The goal is to make the body alert and relaxed, so that you can sit in the same position for a longer time. The most familiar posture is the lotus posture. With this posture, the back is held straight and people are encouraged to breathe from the abdomen instead of just from the chest. The goal is always to create stability and alertness. Sometimes the hands also adopt a specific posture during meditation. This way the hands can be placed on the knees, but that is not necessary. Research has not shown that certain hand positions have an effect.
All forms of meditation have two things in common: (1) having attention and (2) not thinking. But what is attention paid to? If you do not want to think, then it does not work to force yourself not to think. If you do that, the suppressed thoughts will come back even more violently. Thoughts should not be suppressed, but be left on their course. There are two ways in which this can be achieved; through:
open methods and
concentration methods.
Open meditation means that you are aware of everything that happens around you, but that you do not react to it. This is often done by keeping the eyes (half) open and by facing a white wall. This is often done in Buddhist meditation (zazen) .
Mindfulness meditation is a form of open meditation derived from Buddhism, in particular the method 'skikantaza', which means 'sit alone'. Mindfulness is defined as 'maximizing the activity of breathing and clarity of consciousness' or 'giving attention in a certain way with the aim of living in the here and now without judgment'. Holding attention and not making a distinction between stimuli means that as much attention is paid to everything that is perceived. This is also known as ' choiceless awareness' . By means of exercise it is possible to achieve this.
The idea is to accept all distractions and not to oppose them. Do not respond to the distractions, do not think about them and they will leave on their own. This ensures that the differences between the self and the other and the mind and the contents of the mind disappears. This is also called 'nonduality' .
Concentration meditation is about focusing the attention on one thing without being distracted. In open meditation, openness (and acceptance) of distractions is important, but this does not apply to concentration meditation. Concentration meditation often focuses on breathing. For example, you can count the number of breaths.
Sometimes special techniques are used to adjust the speed of breathing or to exert influence on whether the breathing is more out of the abdomen or more out of the chest. Differences in breathing patterns affect consciousness. Mantras are words, sentences or sounds that are repeated. That can happen in the head, but also out loud.
This can ensure that you only pay attention to what you repeat over and over again. However, it is not about the words themselves; the words only ensure that you have something to focus on. Sometimes people who meditate focus on philosophical questions or stories that are difficult to answer for the mind. How does meditation help us to learn more about consciousness?
The answer to this question is related to the reason why people meditate. There are three reasons to point out:
religious or ritual reasons (for example, believe that you go to heaven through meditation),
reduce stress, improve personal abilities and live better, and
search for insight, whether it is done in a religious or mystical context. This chapter is about the last two reasons.
TM is seen as an effective method to relax and reduce stress. For this reason, meditation is sometimes prescribed by doctors to reduce high blood pressure. Holmes has conducted a study from which he draws the conclusion that meditation has no added value. Resting would have the same effect.
His conclusion has been criticized by followers of meditation. It is difficult to prove that meditation reduces stress, because it is difficult to measure such a thing. Which form of stress should be measured, for example? And how should this be done? In addition, there are different forms of meditation and it is therefore not clear what form should be used for research.
Most researchers have focused on the study of TM. This is logical, since TM is said to be the most important thing that reduces this meditation form of stress.
The question is whether we should carry out examinations in which the same people are examined before and after meditation, or that we have to carry out examinations in which different people are divided into different conditions. When the same people are examined before and after meditation, it is often found that stress is reduced. However, it should also be considered whether the results are the same as when people only rest instead of meditating.
Farthing states that meditation has no effect or has an effect that can also be achieved by another technique. The effect of meditation would therefore not be unique.
Some people think that meditation can lead to the acquisition of skills, such as siddhis. Siddhis are supernatural powers such as prophethood, hovering and control over others and nature. Float is also called ' vedic flying' . There are photos of people who take off during meditation.
The ' Maharishi effect' means that if enough people meditate together in the same place, their combined consciousness can ensure that people in that environment live peacefully. Evidence for this effect has been found: crime figures have declined and social cohesion has increased in places where meditation takes place (eg in government buildings or universities). Critics state, however, that no comparison material has been used and that these results do not have to be correct.
Meditation is often defined in terms of altered states in consciousness ('ASCs'). For example, terms such as enlightenment and experiencing 'no self' occur. Is it really true that meditation causes ASCs? Tart believes so, because people who meditate feel that their mental functioning has changed. Little consistent evidence has been found showing that meditation causes changes in consciousness. There is a theory that meditation is no more than sleep. Research shows that people sometimes sleep very briefly during meditation.
Since naps are good for memory and for cognitive abilities, it could well be that meditation has positive effects. Some people feel that the 'self' disappears during meditation. This would mean that people who think that an "I" is needed to have experiences are wrong.
Buddhism differs from other religions in various ways. Thus Buddhism, unlike other religions, knows no god, creator or soul. Buddhism is mainly about the individual who has to come to enlightenment. In addition, Buddhism has no truths that must be believed in particular.
Buddha taught his followers that all things that exist are relative and dependent on each other and that these things arise from what came before these things. This vision can be seen as an early statement of the scientific principle of cause and effect. Buddha denied the possibility of being aware without involved perceptions, actions and sensations.
Some scientists are very interested in Buddhism because Buddhism assumes that there is no self and that dualism does not exist. These scientists focus mainly on Zen Buddhism , because in this form of Buddhism little attention is paid to prayer houses or altars. Zen Buddhism is not very outward-looking in this respect. Zen Buddhism speaks of enlightenment, but what exactly is this?
This concept can be used in two ways. First of all, the process of enlightenment can be discussed . This process can take place quickly or slowly. In this connection, it is possible to believe in a kind of route that can lead to enlightenment. Enlightenment experiences ('kensho') can be experienced. A second form of enlightenment is the ultimate enlightenment. This is not a state of consciousness that resembles a religious experience, because it is temporary (like a kensho). Ultimate enlightenment can not be explained in terms of a state. There is no route that leads to ultimate enlightenment, because enlightenment is not something that can be obtained. Enlightenment can not be expressed in words in this connection.
In Buddhism, ' samsara' stands for a continuous circle of birth and death. This has to do with the origins of suffering. We suffer because we cling to things we love and we reject things that we dislike. In this way we become trapped in a cycle of being and becoming, called samsara . Lighting would ensure that someone can escape from that circle.
There are various similarities between Buddhism and psychotherapy and the question is whether they are not the same. Both have the goal of transforming the individual, although they do this in different ways. Psychotherapy aims to create a cohesive self, while Buddhism aims to transcend a sense of self. Zen Buddhism can be used as a therapy method. It is true that you first have to have a self-image and then believe that you do not have a self. Conversely, it is not possible.
Are Buddhist methods suitable for use during psychotherapy? Some people believe that spiritual therapies have added value, while others find it dangerous to mix spiritual methods with therapy. Meditation is quite confronting for an individual. People who are anxious and neurotic can therefore react incorrectly to meditation. Yet many therapists use Buddhist techniques. For example, therapists recommend methods to hold attention, breathe better and meditate.
' Awakening' is described as the end point of a long spiritual journey. It also happens that people say that they have 'awakened' and that this 'awakening' is the beginning of their spiritual journey. For example, Harding suddenly became 'awake', while it takes years for other people. Buddhism states that our experiences are illusions. An illusion is not something that does not exist, but something that is something other than what it seems. What is an experience? Buddhism assumes that experiences are illusions because we have wrong ideas about the world.
Buddha believed in ' conditioned arising' (also known as ' co-dependent origination' ). This concept means that everything is relative and dependent on each other and that everything comes from somewhere. Not accepting this is a form of illusion. Buddha also stated that everything is temporary and empty. He did not mean that something is useless with emptiness.
Buddhism is based on ' annatta' , which means 'no self'. This does not mean that the self does not exist, but is conditioned and temporary as everything is. This is contrary to what is claimed in most religions; namely that there is a soul that will always continue to exist. Buddha states that the perception of the self creates egoism and attachment to the world. He also says that it can not do things by itself: there are actions and consequences, but the person who performs them does not exist.
In Buddhism, 'karma' is also an important concept. Buddha states that karma is about free will and voluntary actions. These are the result of a wrong impression that there is a self that can think and act. If this assumption is no longer assumed, no more karma is 'collected'. This is because someone is rid of the idea that his or her actions are caused by a 'self' or an 'I'.
Buddhism is closer to psychotherapy than to science. The goal of both is to discover the truth to be free of suffering, and to liberate other people from suffering. This while science has as goal: to find the truth ' for its own sake'.
The problem of consciousness is related to one of the oldest questions of philosophy: what does the world consist of? Who am I? This is in principle related to the mind-body problem: what is the relationship between the physical and the mental? Solutions to this problem can be distinguished in monistic theories, which suggest that there are one kind of things in the world, and dualistic theories, which suggest that there are two kinds of things.
Monistic theories assume that the world consists of only one kind of matter (body or mind). Examples of supporters of these monistic theories are the materialists.
In dualism it is a combination of matter (the body) and spirit. The most famous dualist is René Descartes. There are two types of dualism, namely, knowledge of dualism and substance dualism.
The term "psychology" first appeared in the eighteenth century to describe the philosophy of mental life, but it was towards the end of the nineteenth century when psychology was seen as a science. Important psychologists during this period were James, Wundt and Freud. After that behaviorism came under the direction of Watson, who saw psychology as a natural science that should have the goal of predicting and influencing behavior.
Chalmers states that the ambiguities about consciousness can be divided into easy problems and hard problems.
Qualia are private qualities, the way someone experiences an experience. Conscious experiences consist of qualia and the problem of consciousness can be reformulated in terms of how the qualia are related to the physical world or how objective brains produce subjective qualia.
To investigate whether qualia can have added value, thought experiments such as Mary's experiment and the experiment of the philosophy zombie can be used. Different reactions are possible here.
Scientists have reacted in different ways to Chalmers' idea that there is a hard question when we talk about consciousness. These reactions can be divided into: (1) the hard problem is unsolvable, (2) the hard problem is solved, (3) it is essential to first solve the easy problem, and (4) there is no hard problem. Churchland even states that the problem is misunderstood.
We assume that our subjective feelings and conscious choices cause our actions. If you examine the brain, however, there seems to be no room for this. Information comes through the senses and is then further processed by various parts of the brain. This then ensures the actions of the individual.
Milner and Goodale state that there is a difference between two visual systems:
(1) visual perception and (2) visual-motor control. These systems are related to the ventral and the dorsal route. According to Milner and Goodale, visual motor control is more dominant than visual perception in tasks performed by the brain.
We can generally divide actions into five categories:
(1) actions that are always unconscious, (2) actions that can consciously be controlled, (3) actions that are consciously carried out, but with time unconsciously performed, (4) actions that can be carried out both consciously and unconsciously, and (5) actions that always have to be carried out consciously.
Representational theories can be subdivided into higher-order perception theory (HOP) and higher-order thought (HOT). According to HOP, being aware of a mental condition means monitoring the mental state. HOT states that consciousness is about having a thought about the situation.
Hume states that the mind is a kind of theater where different perceptions appear, pass by, come back again and mix in different situations. Dennett introduced the concept of 'Cartesian theater' (CT). This means that we feel that our "I" is somewhere in our head.
The global workspace theory (GWT) of Baars is based on the theater hypothesis. He states that conscious events happen in the theater of consciousness. He states that there is a big difference between the limited number of items available in consciousness and the many unconscious processes that are present. Baars states that consciousness is not an incident, but he also states that consciousness is not something mysterious.
Dennett is in favor of the multiple drafts model. This model states that all mental activities (perceptions, emotions and thoughts) in the brain arise through parallel processes in different brain routes. These processes ensure that sensory input can be interpreted.
There are various ideas today about the relationship between attention and consciousness. There are basically two opposing ideas about awareness and attention. The first idea is that if attention is paid to something, it will end up in consciousness. The other idea is that consciousness leads the attention processes as it were and that this is the greatest function of consciousness. James called these theories the theory of theories and the theory of success.
Attention can be involuntary or intentionally focused and these two processes depend largely on different systems in the brain. Examples of involuntary attention are covert attention (looking at the one object, while the focus is on another object) and the 'pop-up effect' (when there is a stimulus between different stimuli that is different from the rest, then it will 'pop out' and draw the attention).
Libet performed experiments showing that there should be about half a second of neural activity to cause consciousness. The referral hypothesis ('backwards referral hypothesis') predicts that stimulation of the medial lemniscus should be referred back ('subjective referral'). Libet states on the basis of his experiments that an experience is only conscious when it lasts for at least half a second.
The term 'the grand illusion' stands for the idea that the richness of our visual world is an illusion. This term arose from research into 'changing blindness' and 'non-intentional blindness'. Inattentional blindness means that there is no question of conscious perception when something is not in the attention.
James says we can not take in everything we see while looking around. Yet we are not aware that we have looked over things. There are all kinds of visions about gaps: 'isomorphic filling-in' (the brain actually fills in all the details so that a complete image is created in the brain), 'symbolic filling-in' (the gaps become at a higher level of the visual system and this is more conceptual in nature, instead of a picture being filled in) and the vision that the brain does not need to fill in gaps.
There are different theories about vision. Simons and Levin say that we have a rich visual experience when we focus on something. Rensink believes that people can never have a complete representation of the world. We only make a representation of an object when it is needed, but we do not have a representation of it everywhere. O'Regan and Noë believe that seeing has nothing to do with building internal representations of objects. They are in favor of a sensorimotor theory of vision and visual awareness.
Questions about the nature of consciousness are closely tied to questions about the nature of the self, because it seems as if someone experiencing it is needed to bring about experiences. There are two ideas about the self in psychology: (1) there is such a thing as a self that has all kinds of experiences and decisions, and (2) it seems as if there is a self, but in reality this is not the case. From the first vision the egotheories arise and from the second vision the bundling theories originated.
In people with a multiple personality, it seems that several selves live in them. The most famous example of a person with multiple personality disorder is described by Prince who treated Mrs. Beauchamp. Prince was clearly a supporter of the ego-theories. He believed not only in the 'true Mrs. Beauchamp', but also in various other different selves who were different states of consciousness with a separate will.
Around 1960, operations were performed in which the passage(s) between both hemispheres was cut to reduce symptoms of epilepsy. A person in whom this operation was performed is called a 'split brain patient'. Gazzaniga initially believed that there is a 'double conscious system' in split brain patients. So there would be two different forms of consciousness among these people. MacKay believes, however, that there is no evidence for this assumption. He distinguished between executive and supervising parts of the brain. Supporters of the bundle theory argue that the discussion of split brain patients has one consciousness or two is unnecessary, because according to them there is no 'separate' self.
Central to James' theory about consciousness and self is the continuity and unity of the self. James sees continuity of the self only as a potential: the thought as a temporary administrator of other thoughts. He distinguished between the empirical self and the pure ego. The empirical self contains three aspects: (1) the material self, (2) the social self, and (3) subjective experiences.
Damasio distinguishes between the 'proto-self', the 'core-self' and the 'autobiographical self'. Damasio believes that this itself is not a separate entity, but has to do with your life story.
According to Hofstadter, the brain is full of loops, consisting of many levels of loop-like self-descriptions. Strawson described what he called the pearl vision ('pearl view'). He believes that there are many mental ones that alternate themselves at different times, just like pearls on a chain. According to this view, selves really exist, but they are not separate entities.
The basic question about free will is whether we are free to make our actions and decisions. There are two major problems here, namely determinism (if this universe runs through deterministic laws, then everything that happens should be inevitable) and moral responsibility if I am not free to choose my actions, how can I be morally or responsible? for these actions?).
If we perform a voluntary operation, the frontal lobes are activated. Damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) can lead to a lack of spontaneous activity and to stereotypic actions. Research also shows that the DLPFC is associated with the subjective experience of decision making.
Since 1960 it is clear that the 'readiness potential' (RP) precedes voluntary movements. Research on this seems to show that consciousness is too late to be the cause of the movement. Libet argued that unconscious brain processes are the cause of a voluntary movement, but the consciousness can (just before the voluntary movement is carried out) stop it or not. However, this assumption has received much criticism, for example the doubt about the method.
Wegner states that a free choice must meet three criteria: (1) the thought must precede the action, (2) the thought must correspond with the action, and (3) the thought must have no other causes (except free will).
With the research into 'the neural correlates of consciousness' (NCC) aspects of neural functioning can be studied and it can be checked whether these correspond to the conscious experiences that people express. At NCC it is the correlation between neural functioning and conscious experiences without making any pronouncements about the causal relationship between the two.
There are two theories that have been used to find the NCC. The first theory is from Penrose and Hameroff about the quantum coherence in microtubules. The second theory came from Flohr. He argues that outside awareness caused by drugs is caused by the inhibition of processes that depend on NMDA receptors.
Dualists state that pain is in the mind and therefore can not be localized. How pain is inflicted appears to make a difference in neural activity. There appears to be a correlation between the type of pain and neural activity - and also between the degree to which someone experiences pain and neural activity.
It seems like we only have one consciousness. If you look at the brain, then you see that there is complexity and diversity. A central question here is: where does the interaction between the mind and the brain take place?
The binding problem consists of the question of how we perceive something like a falling coin as one thing. Some people think that the binding problem is the same as understanding how attention works. Malsburg stated that the simultaneous, coordinated firing of neurons in the visual cortex is the basis of visual binding. According to Zeki, there are multiple micro-awareness and the visual system consists of many separate and specialized systems that function in parallel.
Integration of information that enters multiple senses (called multisensory integration) depends on neurons that respond to input from more than one sense. The main part of the brain is the superior colliculus in the midbrain.
Supporters of the theory of re-entry by neuronal group selection 'state that consciousness depends on continuous, self-repeating, parallel processes between parts of the thalamus and cortex. A distinction is made between two types of consciousness: a primary consciousness and the higher order consciousness.
Korkasoff's is the most common form of memory loss (also called amnestic syndrome) and is caused by the toxic effects of alcohol and by a deficiency of thiamine caused by malnutrition. There are two types of memory loss: (1) anterograde amnesia (can no longer store long-term memories) and (2) retrograde amnesia (when someone has lost all his memories of the past). People with memory loss do have a consciousness. However, there is no interaction with them between current information and stored information.
We speak of neglect when people ignore one half of their visual field. This can occur, for example, when someone becomes paralyzed. Sometimes people do not realize that they are paralyzed, in which case we speak of anosognosia.
Blind vision is common in people who have damage to parts of the visual cortex on one side. It seems to a patient with blind vision that he is not aware of what he sees. A patient with blind vision therefore has vision without consciousness.
Evolution literally means gradual change. According to Darwin, there were slow changes on the earth and variation among organisms. Species that survive would pass on what helped them to survive to the next generation ('survival of the fittest'). Dennett speaks about 'evolutionary algorithm': if there is a three-part algorithm of variation, heredity and selection, then evolution has to take place.
Lamarck argued that there must first be an internal force that directs progress in one direction and that, in addition, the inheritance of acquired characteristics is required. His theory is called Lamarckism and is nowadays declared incorrect. Dawkins came in 1976 with the 'selfish gene theory'. The ultimate goal of natural selection is not the kind, not the group, not the individual, but the gene. Genes are egoistic ('selfish') in the sense that they want to be passed on.
The question that goes with the statement that consciousness has evolved is: does consciousness have a function? Four visions exist here: (1) epiphenomenalism: consciousness can be separated from adaptive characteristics, but it makes no distinctive difference and has no effects, (2) consciousness has an adaptive function, consciousness can be separated from adaptive characteristics and it adds something new, (3) the consciousness has no independent function, the consciousness can not be separated from adaptive characteristics, and (4) consciousness is an illusion.
Two central questions are: (1) when does consciousness arise during human development ?, and (2) which contemporary beings are conscious? Pan psychologists believe that consciousness is not an all-or-nothing principle, but develops in different sizes. They believe that consciousness was already present before the evolution took place.
Humphrey states that consciousness is an 'emergent property'. This means that the consciousness stands for a combination of factors. He also stated that consciousness is a 'surface feature' that influences natural selection. He states that within the brain there is a kind of internal eye ('inner eye') that gives an image of the brain activity of a person himself (and therefore not of the outside world). A consequence of this theory is that only intelligent and social organisms can have a consciousness.
Many evolution theories speak about the relationship between natural selection and genes. Evolutionary processes that act on genes also work on all kinds of other forms of 'replicators' (which genes are an example of). Dawkins also calls this universal Darwinism.
There are two views on the question of whether animals also have a consciousness: (1) the view that only people have a consciousness, and (2) the view that many (animal) species are physically similar and that therefore they all have to be aware to have.
To test whether animals are self-aware, a mirror test can be used. It is then examined whether animals can recognize themselves in the mirror. However, there are two problems with this test: (1) the is not fair for all animal species, for example for animals that can not touch their own face, and (2) most monkeys experience it as threatening when stared at them.
Part of our consciousness is that we have beliefs, desires and mental states and that we also attribute mental states to other people. We also call this 'theory of mind' (TOM). Imitation is also the basis for experiencing empathy for others. However, there is often an individual learning process that arises through attempts that lead to mistakes and success, which means that there is seldom any imitation of others.
The biggest difference between people and animals is that people do not have language and animals. This means that if language is the cause of man's self-consciousness, then the consciousness of other organisms should be different than ours. However, it is still not clear whether animals are conscious or not.
When asked if people are a machine, two answers are possible. We can start with biology and try to understand how neural systems work or we can make artificial systems and see to what extent they correspond to a human being.
Descartes believed that the human body is a machine, but that this machine can not provide voice and rational thought on its own. Tuning believed that there could be a simple machine that could specify steps needed to solve every problem, a Universal Tuning Machine.
Connectionism is based on artificial neural networks (ANNs) and parallel processing. ANNs are used to mimic human human cells.
Embodied cognition stands for the idea that the mind can only be created if something interacts with the environment.
Tuning has designed various tests to investigate whether machines can think, including a chess test.
When asked whether a machine has a consciousness, two answers are possible from two perspectives. A functionalist will say that robots have a consciousness because they can perform certain tasks as robots. However, an inessentialist does not believe that machines or robots can have a consciousness because there is no inner experience with machines.
There are several arguments to indicate that machines could never have a consciousness. For example, based on your religion, you can say that God has only given a consciousness to man. It is also possible to say that robots have no consciousness, because only living organisms can have a consciousness.
Searle coined the Chinese Room thought experiment with which he stated that a computer itself can never really understand anything. He thinks that man has intentionality and not a machine. According to Searle, intentionality is a subjective issue and therefore related to consciousness.
There has been a lot of criticism on Searle. So there has been the 'brain simulator reply'. This means that there can be a program that can simulate the way neurons fire in Chinese brains. There are also differences of opinion about what Searle's thought experiment really proves. Finally, there is the argument that there are things that machines can not do. If we can do these things, it means that we are more than just machines and that we have something special, namely a consciousness.
Kismet was the first robot to look like a human being. You might think that Kismet has no consciousness because it consists of metal and performs simple routine actions. Yet it is true that there is no place in Kismet where 'everything comes together' (as is sometimes said about consciousness).
Suppose people have an X that ensures that they have a consciousness. If we want to make a conscious robot, then we have to figure out what this X is. McGinn wonders whether this X (which he calls C *) can exist in objects. He concludes that we can never know that.
Stuart proposes 'engaged embodiment'; purposeful animation, perception, imagination and the ability to recognize experiences as own experiences.
Aleksander came up with the Kernel Architecture (KA). The key mechanism in this is depicting: creating a direct representation where elements of the world are located that ensure that attention can be directed in a suitable manner.
Cheesman and Merikle distinguished between an objective threshold value (the level of detection by which a distinction is made between perceptual information on the basis of random phenomena) and subjective threshold value (the value at which participants say that they could not distinguish between perceptual information and that their answers come from random phenomena). .
It is also possible that unconscious perception affects the emotions of people. Brain scans also show that unconscious perception can be found in the brain, for example in the amygdala.
Opinions vary widely as to whether unconscious problem solving takes place. Broadbent and Berry have conducted studies showing that it is possible to unconsciously solve problems.
There are three parts of intuition, namely cognitive processes, social skills and emotion.
Creativity can be seen as a way in which explicit and intuitive skills come together. However, it is not clear where creativity comes from. Perhaps creativity allows people to bring together cultural knowledge ('memes') in special ways to form new memes.
In daily life we often distinguish between the outside world and what goes on in our heads. We do this without knowing that we use a skill for this. This skill is called 'reality monitoring' or 'reality discrimination'.
A hallucination is an experience that: (1) occurs in the absence of a stimulus,
(2) has a great influence on the real perception, and (3) can not be controlled voluntarily. Although hallucinations are often aligned with pathology, there are several reasons to reject this. Firstly, it is not clear how hallucinations can be distinguished from other experiences and secondly, hallucinations are common in the population. Third, there are cultural differences in attitudes to hallucinations. In many cultures, hallucinations are valued because it could be closer to ghosts or gods
Some hallucinations occur spontaneously and others are caused by drugs, illness, hunger, lack of sleep or the use of rituals.
We often have hallucinations just when we almost fall asleep. Maury called these hallucinations 'hypnagogic images' or 'hypnagogic hallucinations'. Consciousness during sleep paralysis occurs when normal paralysis during REM sleep begins too late, the person just falls asleep or when paralysis takes too long when someone is awakening.
Paranormal experiences are common and many people believe in it. Moreover, paranormal experiences have many implications for science. Paranormal experiences have been described for several centuries, especially during the nineteenth century spiritualism was very popular.
Rhine and Rhine tried with the term 'extrasensory perception', ESP, to find evidence against materialism and behaviorism. ESP covered three types of communication that require no senses, namely (1) telepathy (where information is passed on from one person to another), (2) 'clairvoyance' (here comes information from objects or events that are remote) and (3) 'precognition' (information coming from the future). Rhine and Rhine used the term 'psi' when they talked about paranormal activities.
Psychokinesis (PK) stands for the ability to influence objects or events without touching them or using a different force. Nowadays PK's research is mainly about micro-PK, the so-called effect of the human mind on microscopic or mechanical systems. The parapsychologists who are convinced of the existence of PK make explicit claims that the consciousness is involved.
Paranormal activity probably does not exist. Despite the fact that a lot of research has been done, we still can not give certain information about this subject.
The 'other form of consciousness' formulated by James is now called 'changed states of consciousness', abbreviated as ASCs. However, there are many problems with the exact definition of ASCs. This makes it difficult to state the state of consciousness (SoC).
Farthing states that we need to look at fourteen points if we want to know what exactly changes when someone experiences an ASC. The three most important factors are (1) attention, (2) memory and (3) alertness. Thinking about the above three terms (attention, memory and alertness) means that we can imagine a kind of three-dimensional space in which all possible ASCs are positioned. Tart described a simple space with two dimensions: irrationality and the ability to hallucinate. A second two-dimensional space was described by Laureys. His dimensions are completely different from the dimensions described by Tart, namely: the level of arousal and the awareness of the environment and the self.
Psychoactive drugs affect mental functioning or consciousness. These drugs can be classified into different categories, for example stimulants, antidepressants, cannabis and psychedelics.
Every day we take cycles with three states: (1) being vigilant, (2) REM (Rapid Eye Movement) sleep and (3) non-REM sleep. Reports of non-REM dreams are often short and have few details. When people wake up during the REM sleep, they often say that they have had a bizarre and complex dream.
Hobson drew up three categories to show that bizarre dreams can take different forms. These categories are: (1) incongruity, (2) discontinuity, and (3) uncertainty. He also drew up the AIM model about sleep. The abbreviation AIM stands for three different dimensions of sleep: (1) activation energy, (2) input source, and (3) mode. According to Hobson, sleep phases can be distinguished on the basis of values on these three dimensions.
Sometimes it happens in a dream that there is 'false awakening'. In that case, the dreamer dreams that he or she has woken up. With a lucid dream, you know that you are dreaming while dreaming. There are various techniques to cause lucid dreams.
Brain scans show that when we see or hear something, the same sensory areas are activated as when we only imagine it. The same seems to apply to dreams.
An exceptional experience is referred to in English as an 'exceptional human experience', abbreviated to EHE. There are different views on the existence of EHE. Some people think that people lie with EHE. Others think that people with an EHE have a paranormal soul and others say that such experiences are normal.
Out-of-body experiences, OBE, are events in which someone feels that he is outside of himself and looks at the world. The brain area that is involved in an OBE appears to be the tempo parietal junction (TJP), on the right. Visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular information come together in this area.
During an almost death experience, near death experience NDE, someone experiences a bright, white or golden light, positive and loving emotions, images of a different world, a reflection on life and the decision to return. Two theories to interpret NDE are the 'afterlife hypothesis' and the 'dying brain hypothesis'.
James states that an experience can be called 'mystical' if four conditions are met: (1) not being able to retell it in words ('ineffability'), (2) 'neotic', (3) impermanence ('transiency') ), and (4) passivity. Other criteria have been added by Suzuki. He says that a mystical experience still goes hand in hand with 'exaltation' and 'affirmation'.
The research into consciousness is sometimes divided into two categories:
(1) the objective third-person approach, and (2) the subjective first-person approach.
Chalmers distinguishes between three types: A, B and C. People with an A-view are often functionalists or eliminativists. People with a B-view are often also materialists, but reject the idea of logical supremacy of the physical. People with a type C view deny materialism and include different types of dualism. Dennett thinks he is the leader of the A team and that Chalmers is the leader of the B team.
Phenomenology is about the inner world that people experience. The term neurophenomenology was used by Varela to indicate the search for a modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience. Varela provided a simple diagram to understand the place of neurophenomenology in science, consisting of the following four directions: (1) functionalism, (2) reductionism, (3) mysterianism, and (4) phenomenology.
Velmans states that there is no distinction between subjective and objective matters. He proposes a recurring model ('reflexive model of consciousness').
Heterophenomenology is about studying things that other people experience.
Meditation can be summarized as: (1) not thinking, but (2) having attention. Meditation often goes hand in hand with a special body posture. The goal is to make the body alert and relaxed. There are two methods for practicing meditation, namely (1) open methods and (2) concentration methods.
Open meditation means that you are aware of everything that happens around you, but that you do not react to it. Mindfulness meditation is a form of open meditation that is derived from Buddhism and is defined as actively maximizing the breathing and clarity of consciousness 'or' giving attention in a certain way with the aim of living in the here and now without judgments'.
Concentration mediation is about focusing attention on one thing without being distracted. Sometimes special techniques are used to adjust the speed of breathing or to exert influence on whether breathing is more out of the abdomen or more out of the chest.
Transcendental meditation is seen as an effective method to relax and reduce stress. For this reason, meditation is sometimes prescribed by doctors to reduce high blood pressure.
Buddha taught his followers that all things that exist are relative and dependent on each other and that these things arise from what came before these things. This vision can be seen as an early statement of the scientific principle of cause and effect. Buddha denied the possibility of being aware without involved perceptions, actions and sensations.
In Buddhism, 'samsara' stands for a continuous circle of birth and death. This has to do with the origins of suffering.
There are various similarities between Buddhism and psychotherapy. They both have the goal to transform the individual. However, the difference between the two lies in the fact that psychotherapy aims to create a coherent self, while Buddhism aims to transcend a sense of self.
'Awakening' is described as the end point of a long spiritual journey. Buddhism states that our experiences are illusions. An illusion is not something that does not exist, but something that is something other than what it seems.
Buddhism is based on 'annatta', which means 'no self'. This does not mean that the self does not exist, but that it is conditioned and temporary as everything else. In Buddhism, 'karma' is also an important concept. Buddha states that karma is about free will and voluntary actions.
In what ways is Buddhism different from other religions?
What does "samsara" stand for?
What is meant by "awakening" (awakening / waking up)?
What do Buddhists mean by "annatta"?
Explain why this concept fits so well with Buddhism.
Buddhism, unlike other religions, has no god, creator or soul. Buddhism is mainly about the individual who must come to enlightenment. In addition, Buddhism has no truths to be especially believed in.
In Buddhism, "samsara" stands for a continuous circle of birth and death. This has to do with the origin of suffering. We suffer because we cling to things we love and we reject things we hate. Thus we become caught in a cycle of being and becoming, called samsara.
"Awakening" is described as the end of a long spiritual journey. It also happens that people say that they have "awakened" and that this "awakening" is the beginning of their spiritual journey.
Buddhism starts from "annatta", which means "no self".
Buddhists do not claim that the self does not exist, but that the self is conditioned and temporary like everything else. Buddha argues that the perception of the self creates egoism and attachment to the world. In addition, he says that it cannot do things itself: actions and consequences exist, but the person who performs them does not exist.
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