Does knowledge consist of facts that have come from experience? - Chapter 1

What is the common sense view of science?

In the first four chapters of this book, the statement "science is derived from facts" is critically analyzed. Throughout the book, this statement's meaning changes slightly. Facts are statements about the world that can be sensed. Facts are neither personal opinions nor speculative ideas. If the world is perceived accurately and without prejudice, the facts that are established are, therefore, a reliable and objective basis for science. Scientific knowledge is reliable and objective if the facts guide conclusive reasoning to laws and theories that make up the basis for scientific knowledge. Before the 17th century, science was primarily based on authorities such as the Bible and Aristotle. Due to people like Galileo, this idea changed in the 17th century. People started to see observation as the basis of science.

Empirists (such as Berkeley, Locke, and Hume) and positivists held the idea that we can see facts as indisputably correct through observation. It follows from this reasoning that knowledge derived from this is objective and reliable. However, it is doubtful that science is based on observable facts. The problem that arises following the statement that science can be deduced from the facts relates to:

1. The nature of the 'facts' and the way in which scientists have access to those facts;
2. The way in which laws and theories can be derived from the facts, once we know those facts.

Some believe that facts are at the basis of science because they have the following assumptions:

• Facts are directly accessible through the senses to all unbiased observers;
• Facts precede the theory and are independent of it;
• Facts are a solid and reliable basis for science.

These three presuppositions are debatable, which means they can only be accepted to a certain limit.

Is seeing believing?

In this section, Chalmers explores 'visibilities' limits to creating facts.

We see with our eyes, this is due to the light which falls on an object being is reflected by our retina. When the observed image is transported to the brain, the differences, between people, in perception begins. Two assumptions are more or less debatable, namely:

• A human observer has more or less direct access to knowledge of some facts about the world, insofar as they are processed by the brain during the act of seeing;
• Two average observers looking at the same object or landscape at the same position, see exactly the same.

The above two assumptions are not always correct. Are visual experiences only determined by the observed object?

There is enough empirical evidence that when people see the same object, they don't perceive the same thing. Observing through the eye is more then what we only see. Because of the observer's perception and experience, two people who perceive the same thing (get the same image on their retina) can see something different under the same circumstances. The end result is determined by our processing. Examples are optical illusions that can be interpreted in different ways, depending on whether or not a pattern is discovered. Moreover, training can increase our ability to distinguish details in complex images. A layman does not see any form of cell division under a microscope, an experienced biologist does. Both probably see the same thing, but give it a different meaning. When two biologists look through the same microscope, this also does not mean that they are experiencing the same observation.

However, to clarify, Chalmers does not conclude that

• Physical causes of images on the retina do not necessarily have anything to do with what we see; we cannot see what we want to see;
• Under many different circumstances, what we see in different situations remains fairly stable;
• When observers look at the same thing that they physically see different objects to each other, he means that they perceive the same object differently.

How are observable facts expressed as statements?

In normal language, there are multiple meanings to the word 'fact'; a fact can be the state of affairs in reality, but it can also be a statement in itself. Reality has facts in it, but statements in themselves are also facts. In other words: it is necessary to distinguish factual statements from the observations that form the basis for these statements. On this basis, you could argue that facts alone do not provide a sufficient basis for a theory, because then statements would also be a sufficient basis for a theory. We must distinguish between facts, interpreted as statements, and the different situations that describe these statements. We must also make a distinction between statements about facts and the observations that result in these statements being accepted as facts. Those statements are constituted through a conceptual framework because we articulate the facts in a cognitive way. Without knowledge, we cannot get the statements derived from the facts. Therefore, the previously formulated assumptions 1) facts are directly accessible to the senses through all senses and 2) facts precede the theory and are independent of it cannot be maintained. It cannot, therefore, be the case that you first establish the facts and then deduce your knowledge from them.

Do facts always precede theory?

It has been described that theory or knowledge is generally based on observing and interpreting facts. That is not true, because we need a manual for transforming observations and obtained facts into theories.

An alternative position states the following:

• That the formulation of observation statements require considerable knowledge;
• That the search for relevant, observable facts in science is guided by that knowledge.

A theoretical framework is needed for the development of more complex areas of research. For example, if a scientist wants to perform botanical observations, he must first have knowledge about plants. However, the facts that he observes are not the complete theory. For example, he only recognizes a plant when he has knowledge of certain plant families. Knowledge is, therefore, necessary for the formulation of statements about facts.

Are observation statements imperfect?

The original starting point was that observations were able to reliably determine what 'true' and 'false' are. However, it is not that simple. This is because not everyone perceives the same thing. This creates differences of opinion about what observable facts are. Judgments about the appropriateness of statements based on observations are based on assumptions that are sometimes imperfect. We may also ask ourselves whether the observation facts depend on existing knowledge. Moreover: is that knowledge reliable? Developments in knowledge and technology make it possible to avoid observation errors. Both the facts and the knowledge are imperfect and therefore capable of being wrong. They are, therefore, eligible for improvement. Scientific knowledge and the facts on which this knowledge would be based are independent of each other. The intuitive notion that science is derived from facts was the notion that scientific knowledge has a special status; partly because it is founded on a certain basis. Perceptions, however, are influenced by the background and experiences of the observer. The following chapter discusses the possible solutions to the problem of perception as a basis for science. For example, observations cannot form a direct and solid basis for science, as it has been, and is, assumed.

Is observation a practical intervention? - Chapter 2

Perception: passive and private or active and public?

Passive perception is the view that one only has to open one's eyes or just look at something to see. This is a private matter because the meaning is interpreted for oneself. This is an unreliable conception of perception. Observation takes place actively in daily life. People often have to make an effort to observe. This is done, for example, by accommodating the eyes or listening 'sharply' with the ears. A person who perceives actively performs all kinds of actions; many automatically and unconsciously to determine whether an observation is valid. Even if someone looks at something, but is not sure whether he sees it through a glass window or if the image he sees is reflected in that glass, he will show active behavior to investigate whether or not that image is a reflection. Tools can be used to prevent perception from having a harmful effect on the truth. As a result, subjective unreliable differences in perception can be minimized. These tools are accessible to everyone and therefore public. The challenge in science is to organize an observable situation in such a way that confidence in certain claims is minimized.

How did Galileo objectify his observations?

Galileo is famous for manufacturing the first telescope and using it to observe things that had never been observed before. Initially, he was discredited by his contemporaries. However, after his opponents had learned how to use the telescope, they realized that Galileo was right. Galileo, therefore 'objectified' his observations. One can, therefore, observe better with objects. Some objects can also help us see things that cannot be seen with the naked eye. Although Galileo could not prove that he was able to perceive reality, his arguments were much more likely than the prevailing views that the moons of Jupiter were illusionary.

Why are observable facts fallible?

Observations that are suitable for forming a basis for scientific knowledge are both objective and fallible. Objectivity implies that they can be tested by anyone and each person would get the same result. Observable facts are imperfect and therefore fallible. An observation is never 'complete'; there will always be an 'open end' until the current observation is improved by another observation.

What is the role of experiments in science? - Chapter 3

What is the meaning of relevant facts?

Reliable facts can be established by careful use of the senses. Science does not need 'just' facts, but relevant facts. These facts should come to us in the form of experimental results and not as observable facts - a large number of facts that can be determined by observation are totally irrelevant to science. If experimental results represent the facts on which science relies, they certainly have not come to us simply through the senses. Experimental results are fallible, can be updated or replaced, can be out of date, rejected or may be ignored. Outdated experimental results can be rejected and replaced with new ones. This has major implications for the orthodox philosophy of science because it undermines the widespread notion that science is based on certain grounds.

Which facts are relevant to science and which are not, depends on the current state of development of science. In order to collect facts that are relevant to the identification and specification of different processes, it is necessary to isolate the process in research and eliminate the effects of other processes. It is, therefore, necessary to conduct experiments.

What is the importance of setting up and updating experiments?

Starting a new experiment is not easy, it can take months or even years. When the experimental design is appropriate and disruptive factors have been eliminated experiments should be suitable and interpretable in what they measure or what they attempt to measure. Any flaw in the relevant facts could create these disturbing factors which in turn could lead to unsuitable experimental measurements and incorrect conclusions. Therefore, experimental results may be wrong if the knowledge on which they are based is missing or incorrect. Experiments can be updated when they no longer apply because new research shows different results or when they are considered irrelevant.

What requirements are set for the results?

It is not only necessary for the experimental results to be adequate but they must also be suitable or significant. The extent to which a result is significant depends very much on how the practical and theoretical situation is understood. It is also important for the results to be objectifiable and replicable. In addition, results must be objective. This means that everyone who performs the same experiment should get the same results.

Is an experiment an adequate basis for science?

Experiments are theory-dependent in certain respects aswell as fallible and revisable. Experiments are also determined by the world and not purely by theory. If a theory is used to assess the adequacy of experimental results and the same results are presented as evidence for the theory, then we are in an infinite circle. Therefore, there is the possibility that the relationship between theory and experiment contains circular reasoning. However, this does not mean that results that are labeled as significant only ever involve one reason and therefore one form of truth. However, it does help to reach a point where the attempt to test the adequacy of scientific theories against experimental results is significant.

If there is a dispute between proponents of opposing theories, there is a chance that none of them will be accepted. In such cases, additional observations will be needed and, if the area is interesting, scientists will want to contribute immediately. Within science, hypotheses that cannot be verified are viewed with suspicion. They are therefore not quickly accepted.

What does induction mean? - Chapter 4

Introduction

The first chapters deal with the fact that scientific knowledge is derived from facts, how these facts can be established and its criticisms. This chapter deals with the derivation of theory and science from those facts. The interpretation that scientific knowledge is formed by first establishing the facts and then establishing the corresponding theory has been shown to be incorrect. In this chapter, we will explore how to interpret the concept of 'derive' into a more logical meaning instead of a temporal/physical one. It is important to determine to what extent the facts confirm the theory. The statement that theory can be derived logically from facts cannot hold. This becomes clear as we consider some basic characteristics of logical reasoning.

What does baby logic mean?

Logic is about establishing facts that should logically follow from other facts. If the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. This would then be a logically valid argument. If the premises are true, everything that is logically derived from it is true. The most important thing is that the reasoning is correct/valid and not whether the premises are true. All that logic can offer is that as the premises are true and the argument is valid, then the conclusion must be true. However, the question of whether or not the premises are true cannot be answered with mere logic. An argument can contain perfect logical deduction, even if it contains a false premise.

Can scientific laws be derived from facts?

An example:

Premises:

1. Iron expands when it is heated.
2. Copper expands when it is heated.
3. Steel expands when it is heated.

Conclusion:

All metals expand when heated.

This reasoning is logically invalid. It is, of course, true that all metals expand. It does not follow from the premises that metal will never shrink when heated. This is how we distinguish deductive from inductive reasoning. We speak of valid deductive reasoning when conclusions are derived from a number of facts. Inductive reasoning (which is the example above) is based on a finite number of facts, from which a general conclusion is drawn. Inductive reasoning never contains logical validity, because inductive reasoning can never exclude that something else may have happened.

What makes an inductive proof valid?

The interpretation of facts on which science is based on can never be deductive. This event must always be inductive. The reliability of inductive reasoning requires the following conditions:

1. A large number of observations must be made in order to form the basis of generalization;

2. The observations must be repeated under a large number of different conditions;

3. None of the accepted observation statements may conflict with the derived general law (one of the other observations)

Condition three is essential as it becomes the principle of induction. The principle of induction states that:

"If a large amount of Cs is observed under a wide variety of conditions, and all observed Cs have property D without exception, then each C always has property D".

Problems arise, namely:

• In regards to statement 1: What exactly is a large quantity?

• In regards to statement 2: What is a relevant deviation in circumstances (how many/what type of conditions must you control?)

• In regards to statement 3: there would be hardly any scientific knowledge if we were to follow the rule that there must be no known exceptions.

What other problems with regard to inductivism are there?

Inductivism can be described as the position in which scientific knowledge is derived from observable facts of inductive reasoning. The followers of inductivism are called inductivists. There are even more problems with inductivism:

• With inductivism, the problem of the observation requirement plays a major role. For example, in DNA research, not everyone can perceive DNA, because the potential observer needs very specific knowledge for this.

• Testing scientific laws against theories is debatable, among other things because of the use of formulas. As a result, the measurements that provide evidence for the laws are inaccurate, however, the laws contained in formulas are accurate.

• The validity of inductivism within itself is debatable. Namely, if we take the following premises:

  • The induction principle works in situation C

  • The induction principle works in situation D

  • Conclusion: The induction principle always works, so this reasoning is itself inductive reasoning. Circular reasoning thus arises.

Why is inductivism attractive?

Because we need the knowledge to see facts and to classify them into important and unimportant facts, we cannot clearly deduce knowledge from those facts. Since induction has a predictive value (with the aid of observation and knowledge, these predictions are plausible), it is very attractive. In general, scientific explanations and predictions can be compiled as follows:

Premises:

• Laws and theories

• Initial conditions

Conclusion:

• Statements and predictions.

What does falsificationism mean? - Chapter 5

What is this chapter about?

In addition to inductivism, there is falsificationism. Karl Popper was a great advocate of this method. He strongly disagreed with scientists who believed in the purity of science. He also fiercely challenged the use of facts to confirm theories. Instead, Popper thought that, to be valid, a theory should be falsifiable: a practitioner of science should first write a challenging hypothesis. The purpose of establishing such a hypothesis is to prove that this hypothesis is incorrect. In this way he hoped to develop a theory that was most correct at that moment in time. This is something other than a true theory. Every time an idea is created, this idea is invalidated and then an idea is created. This eventually becomes a theory, which is subsequently invalidated and so forth. The most important characteristic of falsificationism thus is falsifiability. The development of theories thus proceeds through trial and error.

Falsificationism therefore assumes that induction does not form the basis of the scientific method, because these scientific theories have no truth prevention. We should consider these theories as preliminary and, on the contrary, try to prove that they are incorrect.

What are arguments for falsificationism?

The supporters of falsificationism try to prove that theories are wrong instead of endorsing them. They are looking for falsification instead of confirmation. The focus is on the falsehood of observations. Theories must be rigorously tested through observation and experimentation.

What is the criterion for falsificationism?

The only criteria with regards to validity of a theory for falsificationism is that a theory should be falsifiable. Consider the following examples to understand the concept of falsifiability:

1. The sun never shines on Monday.
2. All substances expand when heated.
3. Heavy objects fall straight down to the earth.
4. When a light beam is reflected by a flat mirror, the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection.

If you observe that the sun shines on a Monday, the first statement can be invalidated. The second also when observing the fact that certain substances do not expand when heated. The third is debatable: heavy objects might fall up one day. Yet this statement is falsifiable, just like the fourth. A hypothesis is falsifiable, "if a logically possible observation statement or set of observation statements conflicts with this hypothesis".
Statements describing all possibilities cannot be falsified. For instance:

"It can freeze, and it can thaw,"

Some theories, according to the falsificationist, are not falsifiable and are thus not valid theories. For example, Popper thought that Marx's history theory, Freud's psychoanalysis, and Adler's psychology were valid theories. A theory is only informative if it can be falsified.

When can a theory be falsified?

If a theory is very complex, it might be easier to falsify some parts of the theory. A good scientific law or theory is falsifiable because the theory makes clear and concise statements about the world. A very good theory is a theory that makes far-reaching claims about the world and as a result, this theory is easily falsifiable. Preference is given to theories that are falsifiable, provided they have not yet been falsified. Theories that are falsified must be rejected. Science is the preparation of falsifiable hypotheses and then trying to falsify them; said, Popper. We learn from our mistakes. Science is moving forward using trial and error. Falsificationism is derived from this. It is not about establishing sustainable theories, but about proving how those theories are wrong. In order to be able to falsify theories, they must be formulated very clearly and precisely. The more precisely a theory is formulated, the more falsifiable it is.

How, according to falsificationism, can science progress?

The supporters of falsificationism believe that the course/progress of science is as follows: science starts with inexplicable ignorance and then falsifiable hypotheses are drawn up to explain the problematic phenomenon of scientific ignorance. Some ideas last a long time, others fall away quickly. The concept of progress, thus the growth of science, is a central concept in the falsificationist perspective on science.

In addition to inductivism, there is falsificationism. Karl Popper was a great advocate of this method. He strongly disagreed with scientists who believed in the purity of science. He also fiercely challenged the use of facts to confirm theories. Instead, Popper thought that, to be valid, a theory should be falsifiable: a practitioner of science should first write a challenging hypothesis. The purpose of establishing such a hypothesis is to prove that this hypothesis is incorrect. In this way he hoped to develop a theory that was most correct at that moment in time. This is something other than a true theory. Every time an idea is created, this idea is invalidated and then an idea is created. This eventually becomes a theory, which is subsequently invalidated and so forth. The most important characteristic of falsificationism thus is falsifiability. The development of theories thus proceeds through trial and error.

What does erudite falsificationism mean? - Chapter 6

Relative or absolute levels of falsifiability?

The erudite falsificationist not only wonders whether a theory can be falsified but also examines the possible improvement of that theory compared to the previous one. Science must, after all, develop. The value of a falsification depends on the extent to which it works in an innovative way. That indicates the importance of falsifying. You cannot compare infinitely many theories with each other.

How are ad hoc modifications dealt with?

Ad hoc modifications sometimes prevent theories from being falsified. The falsificationists believe that this should not happen. Ad hoc modifications are changes, to a theory, which have no testable effect which were not previous effects of the unchanged theory. That is why we do not understand the changes in a theory that lead to a new test. An example is a story based on the life of Galileo. The craters on the moon that he discovered were inconsistent with the teachings of Aristotle about the perfection of the objects in the sky. His rival used an ad hoc reasoning to attempt to save his theory: there would be an invisible substance that fills the craters and falls over the mountains in such a way that the moon is still perfectly round. That, of course, could not be tested and is therefore not an acceptable theory for a falsificationist.

Reject or confirm?

The proponents of falsificationism prefer to reject ad hoc hypotheses and want to encourage daring hypotheses to be drawn up in order to improve any falsified theories. New testable predictions follow from these daring theories that cannot be derived from the original falsified theory. If a hypothesis leads to new tests, it is worth investigating. Not all forged hypotheses lead to major improvements. Only when the new theory has passed at least some new tests can it be characterized as an improvement of the problematic theory. In addition, the new theory must also make several new predictions that are confirmed to be eligible for the predicate improvement. Confirming new predictions which arise from daring hypotheses is of great importance in the falsificationist interpretation of the growth of science.

When is a hypothesis bold?

'Bold' and 'new' are variable terms, which means that the valuation of these terms cannot be determined with certainty. What was bold and new earlier in time could be generally accepted in the present. It can only be determined whether a theory is new, after looking at the amount of background information. If a theory is not conceivable in the light of background information, then it can be said that this theory is risky. An example is the general theory of relativity of Einstein in 1915. This was daring since the theory went against the assumption that applied at the time. Predictions are new when the background knowledge at that time has no references about the relevant object in the prediction.

What is the difference between inductivists and falsificationists?

Inductivists emphasize the design of established theories that follow from a succession of observations. Falsificationists, on the other hand, do not emphasize this, they believe that the growth of science is very important. Therefore, according to them, a new theory is only a better alternative to a previous theory, if the latter theory is no longer valid and must, therefore, be rejected. Inductivists believe that the importance of confirming a theory is only determined by the logical connection between the confirmed observation statements and the theory that is supported by these statements. They find the historical context irrelevant. Falsificationists, on the other hand, believe that the meaning of affirmations depends on their historical context: confirming a hypothesis is only important if it was not expected in the historical context.

What are the advantages of falsificationism over inductivism?

With inductivism, there are major problems with regard to establishing facts. Nor can the accuracy of an argument be established. These problems do not arise with falsificationism. They are not a supporter of the existence of a static theory. Falsificationists are constantly looking for innovation, not the truth or untruth of a theory.

What limitations does falsificationism have? - Chapter 7

What problems arise from conflicting observations?

According to the Duhem-Quine theorem, it is not possible to test hypotheses in isolation, because in practice there are always other factors involved.

It is impossible to reject an entire theory based on conflicting perception. According to the falsificationists, the following applies: if C is true, D is not true. Again a problem arises: how can we test that C is really true? And what is the importance of the truth of D? A fallible observation statement is different from a fallible theory. Problems also arise with a complex system of assumptions. It is then unclear to which part of the theory the falsification relates.

Is falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds?

According to falsificationism, a theory must be rejected once it has been proven that this theory is incorrect. This means that if all scientists had followed this rule in history, science would not have developed and no progress had been made.

What was the Copernican revolution?

Copernicus and Galilei caused a revolution in thinking about the earth. Copernicus introduced a new kind of astronomy, which included a moving earth. According to him, the earth is not the center of the universe, the sun is. When he introduced his ideas in 1543, there were many arguments that could be used against him. Aristotle thought the earth was the center of the universe (geocentric theory) around which the other planets revolved. He thought there was an upper and lower ground area. Even in the Middle Ages, it was thought that the earth was the center of the universe, around which the other planets and stars revolved. Copernicus and Galilei had a heliocentric theory: the sun is the center of the universe and the planets and all stars revolve around it. They did not reason in an inductive way: they did not formulate rules with the help of careful observations. They also did not reason on a purely falsificationistic method: they took a number of principles from the theory to be rejected as the basis.

What is true science?

Popper thought there was a difference between true science and pseudoscience. True science means that the theories thereof are falsifiable. This difference cannot be maintained because science requires clear-cut principles. If we reject the theories that are criticized too easily, science cannot develop. Popper's innovative critical insight lead to the destruction of those theories.

What is Kuhn's paradigm? - Chapter 8

The context of justification refers to the collection of philosophical issues around the legitimization of scientific knowledge. In that case it is not about where a certain research question comes from, or why the question is asked - it is about the accuracy in the legitimacy of the scientific answer to the question. The context of discovery does raise questions about the origin of the question - this is the way in which a theory was developed historically. The historical criticism focuses on the context of discovery.

Should theories be viewed as structures?

In this chapter, theories are viewed as structures, because this way of looking at theories offers more guidance. Inductivism and falsificationism fight each other on all sorts of points and this does not lead to useful scientific practice. Science comes about through complex processes. There is not just one standard. The more accurate the theory, the more precise the observation statements. Concepts depend on the theory for which they are used in and for. There is also a discrepancy between these concepts. Field concept is defined as the relationship between the electric field and other electromagnetic quantities. For example, the concept of 'mass' is much more precise than the concept of 'democracy'. After all, there is no precise agreement on the precise meaning of the concept. The meaning of concepts arises in part from theories. Chalmers wants to develop a principle to view science with the help of theoretical frameworks, within which scientific research and scientific discussions take place. Here and in chapters 9 and 10, the work of three major philosophers of science who have dealt with the above principle is written.

Who is Thomas Kuhn?

In his famous book " The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962), Kuhn criticized the scientific views of inductivism and falsificationism. He discovered that the traditional scientific views of the time did not match the historical evidence. An important characteristic of his theory is the emphasis on the revolutionary nature of scientific progress, whereby a revolution involves the abolition of a theoretical structure and the replacement by another theoretical structure. Another important characteristic is the important role played by sociological characteristics of societies. Kuhn's way of scientific progress can be schematized as follows:

pre-scientific period - normal science - crisis - revolution - new normal science - new crisis.

His views are still valid in the philosophy of science. He found that the development of science takes place within a paradigm. A paradigm is made of general theoretical assumptions and laws and the techniques for their application, which members of a certain scientific community adopt. A paradigm, therefore, forms the basis for the work of scientists within a certain discipline. The people who practice science adhere to the above rules and refine the paradigm (field of science). According to Kuhn, science is developing chronologically according to a certain schedule:

1. Pre-scientific period: a paradigm does not yet exist;
2. Normal science: a paradigm exists;
3. Crisis: the paradigm is faltering;
4. Revolution: the paradigm is rejected and a new paradigm comes;
5. New normal science: the new paradigm is used;
6. New crisis: the new paradigm is also shaking.

This paradigm is therefore constantly developing and thus forms an open system.

What is the relationship between paradigms and normal science?

Everything is investigated within a paradigm to better align the paradigm with nature. That is why a paradigm is difficult to define. It is more a sort of overarching basis for scientists working and researching within the discipline. The different components of a paradigm can be defined somewhat, for example, the components 'theoretical assumptions' and 'fundamental laws'. The paradigm prescribes how the laws are applied in different situations. All paradigms also contain methodological instructions and regulations. Normal science contains detailed attempts to articulate a certain paradigm with the aim of improving the match between the paradigm and nature. Kuhn described normal science as a puzzle-solving activity that is played by the rules of the paradigm. These puzzles are theoretical and experimental in nature. Puzzles that are never solved are more anomalies than falsifications of a paradigm. The difference between a pre-scientific period (1) and normal science (2) is that within the latter one works under fixed principles (there is a paradigm) that are endorsed by everyone and that is not yet the case in the pre-scientific period. People who have only just been studying science take over the knowledge of the established scientists uncritically and tacitly. But a paradigm can get into trouble and be replaced by a competitive paradigm.

When is a paradigm replaced?

The paradigm of scientists is their 'tool' and because of this, a possible failure of their research is not due to that paradigm, but to the scientists themselves. It does not mean that there is a state of crisis when there are anomalies (puzzles that are never solved). Only when an anomaly is very serious and it is not very much in line with crucial ideas within the paradigm, could it mean that the paradigm is banned and exchanged for a competitive paradigm. It is then difficult to determine which paradigm is better. This is because each paradigm has its own rules and those rules, in turn, form the basis for the scientific practice of the scientists within that paradigm. If the paradigm no longer has supporters among scientists, it will have consequences. If scientists become supporters of a competitive paradigm, the old paradigm will disappear.

What is the function of normal science and the revolutions?

Kuhn also dealt with the functions of science. It seems as if he described science in an unscientific way. Nothing could be further from the truth: he described a science theory by explaining the functions of the different parts of science. He found that normal science and revolutions perform necessary functions. In the normal science period, scientists develop the esoteric aspects of theories. Paradigms cannot develop without this activity. Science, in turn, cannot develop without paradigms being refreshed every now and then. Science must have a means at its disposal to go beyond the one paradigm and to switch to the other. This is the function of revolutions. If a crisis arises, it is very important that a revolution takes place, in which the entire paradigm is refreshed by another paradigm, so that science progresses.

What are the benefits of Kuhn's theory?

Chalmers agrees with Kuhn that science often happens naturally within a paradigm. Astrology also makes its explanation of the nature of science plausible. According to falsificationism, astrology was not a science. Yet astrology has resulted in Kuhnian revolutions in science. Kuhn has also demonstrated very clearly that science is experiencing continuous and recurring growth. Nor does this growth take place through an accumulation of scientific visions. Sometimes old insights are rejected, so that science keeps itself pure. Kuhn also put the problems that arise in the development of science into perspective: these problems are viewed from different paradigms so that they are not just judged just like that.

What ambivalence is there in Kuhn's theory?

Kuhn expressed both perspective and non-perspective on the questions regarding scientific progress. According to Chalmers, that perspective of Kuhn means that the question of whether or not a paradigm is better than the new paradigm cannot be answered definitively and neutrally. This answer depends on the personal, group, and cultural values ​​of the judging parties. Every person appreciates change in a different way and views revolutions differently. Kuhn also describes scientific growth in general. Therefore, an answer must be given to the question of how progress can be claimed if a paradigm refreshes another paradigm.

What is the significance of subjective knowledge for a paradigm?

According to Kuhn, a scientific paradigm suddenly changes to another paradigm. He compares it to Gestalt switches: images that change as you view them differently. Something like that does not happen just like that. The difference in the notion of knowledge is important. There is a difference in the subjective and objective meaning of knowledge. The subjective meaning of knowledge creates a lack of clarity with regard to the question, as a result of which a paradigm must be described as new or old. According to Kuhn, that is a matter comparable to converting to a different religion. So there is no question of a rational change founded on objective arguments, but of a subjective choice based on components of feeling.

Kuhn speaks about the inadequacy of paradigms. This is the idea that paradigms can be so different from each other that it is impossible to make a clear comparison of two paradigms. Shifting in paradigms were therefore subjective and, according to him, the history of science had no constructive character. Later paradigms are no better than older ones they are only different.

The context of justification refers to the collection of philosophical issues around the legitimization of scientific knowledge. In that case it is not about where a certain research question comes from, or why the question is asked - it is about the accuracy in the legitimacy of the scientific answer to the question. The context of discovery does raise questions about the origin of the question - this is the way in which a theory was developed historically. The historical criticism focuses on the context of discovery.

What is the significance of research programs? - Chapter 9

Who is Imre Lakatos?

The Hungarian Imre Lakatos, who moved to England in the late 1950s, was a follower of Popper, but he disagreed with Popper's falsificationism. He also only partially agreed with Kuhn's views. He challenged the relativistic aspects of Kuhn's ideas and investigated the viability of his own and self-developed research structure. According to him, there was a lot of overlap in the ideas of Popper and Kuhn. Both ideas are opposed to positivism and inductivism. In addition, they both prioritize paradigms and theory rather than observations and claim that the search for, and interpretation of, accepting and rejecting certain results are in the light of a certain theory or paradigm. He developed a research program without the problems encountered by the good views of Popper and Kuhn. Lakatos found that there is a theory first and that observations are only made afterward. In this way, he tried to find another view for Kuhn's paradigm.

What are Lakatos research programs?

The falsificationists could not specify clear rules for the problem of the validity of the falsification when asking which part of a theory one can falsify. Lakatos had a solution: the research areas differ from each other. There are, after all, less fundamental and more fundamental research areas, of which a research program consists. The fundamental elements usually persist, while the less fundamental components of the program become weak. Lakatos called these fundamental principles the hard core of science. This consists of the defining characteristic of the program. Surrounding it is a protective layer, which he calls the protective belt. In this belt, there are ideas about conditions that concern the beginning. Lakatos also talks about heuristics in his theory. He understands a series of codes that are a guide to solving problems. Heuristics consist of positive and negative heuristics.

Positive heuristics of a program indicate exactly what scientists should and should not do. It is a manual for how to accomplish the fundamental principles ( hardcore). The protective belt is the result of this. It also offers instructions about how to use this protective belt. Only then can a program result in explanations and predictions of observable phenomena. Negative heuristics indicate exactly what scientists are advised against doing. For example, researchers are discouraged from investigating the hardcore of the program within which they work. The examples of programs with positive heuristics are the studies by Newton and Copernicus. Whether a research program is successful is determined by:

• The confirmation of new predictions;

• Whether there is a program of study is provided by a research program.

The positive heuristics must be so coherent that they can directly follow research with the help of planning a program. The progressive research program remains coherent and sometimes results in newly confirmed predictions. However, the degenerative research program loses coherence and/or has the consequence that the predictions that arise cannot be confirmed. Lakatos has the following view on scientific revolution: a progressive program replaces a degenerative program.

What are Lakatos methods?

It is very valuable to discuss the methods that Lakatos uses in his scientific research programs. The connection within those methods consists of research within a program and the confrontation of one program with another. If one studies the method of Lakatos, one sees that he implicitly rejects the entire program when he destroys the hardcore. That is because the program then falls apart because the hardcore has disappeared. According to Lakatos, ad hoc modifications are also not part of his scientific research programs. The protective belt stands on the breach for the hardcore. The falsification notions have no control over this. According to Lakatos, the development of a research program takes place through protective and degenerative research programs. At a given moment, a degenerative research program is exchanged for a progressive research program (better prediction of new phenomena). He calls this progression of a research program.

What is the role of the prediction?

Lakatos believes that one of the criteria for assessing a research program is the prediction level. But what is meant by a new prediction? Popper claims, quite logically, that a prediction is new if it was previously unknown. Lakatos elaborates on this with the statement that a program makes new predictions, such as those predictions of course and not conceived.

What is the importance of history for the methods?

Lakatos shared his importance for the history of science with Kuhn. By going back in time with regard to science, current forms of science can be assessed, Lakatos says. This way you can see if the methods are of value; whether they are bad, valuable or innovative.

What problems are there with the methodology of Lakatos?

Is it possible to test the methods that Lakatos advocates for history? After all, the methodology itself has no hardcore. Can scientific researchers save the hardcore of their own scientific discipline from falsificationism? What kind of answer does Lakatos give to the question: what is the characteristic of science? Are the case studies (with which he wanted to justify his methods) reliable?

What does Feyerabend's anarchist science theory entail? - Chapter 10

Introduction

All the people within the movement that had ideas about what science really was, caused problems. The positivists, inductivists, the falsificationists, Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn; they all encountered problems inventing a science theory. Another person is introduced in this chapter: Feyerabend.

What is the anarchist representation of Feyerabend?

Paul Feyerabend published the book 'Against method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge' in 1975. According to Feyerabend, no method is suitable for describing science. There is no method that is better than the other method. Only one method is effective and that is the description of science that keeps all possibilities open. This is what we call Feyerabend's anarchist representation of the reality of science theory. He also criticizes Lakatos' concept of science, he finds his methodology too unclear. Feyerabend's conclusion is that all science descriptions and demonstrations prove nothing for a theory of that science. He, therefore, finds science no better than voodoo or magic. According to him, science is not the superior of other forms of knowledge. He denounces the many discrepancies between scientific views. He also examines the historical course of science.

What is the humanitarian attitude?

Feyerabend is a strong advocate of individualism and a humanistic view of science. He describes this position as a 'humanitarian attitude'. According to this principle, every person must have freedom. Every person, including anyone who practices science, is free to do what he or she wants, without state ideology. Scientists should not be hampered by methodological rules, paradigms, research programs, etc. in the exercise of their profession. Only then can they make a responsible choice between knowledge and science. Moreover, science could be studied in combination with fairy tales and myths of "primitive societies," so that each individual has the information they need to make a decision. According to him, there is no method at all in the practice of science within which scientists should assert their subjective wishes. He leaves all options open.

What criticism is given on Feyerabend?

Chalmers has criticized the concept of 'freedom' used by Feyerabend. He thinks that people are not really free. When they come into the world, they are already bound to many established things: their innate characteristics and aptitudes, the position of their parents and their environment. It is, therefore, a negative freedom, because people do not have freedom from constraints. That is why they cannot freely use the patterns and rules of scientists. Human freedom is just as illusory as the idea that science can be described correctly and completely.

What methodological changes are there? - Chapter 11

What arguments are there against the universal theories?

Chalmers also agrees with Feyerabend that there is no such thing as non-historical, general, universal views on science. Scientific views cannot be disconnected from the past. With regard to the uniqueness of science, according to Feyerabend, many methods were very contradictory in their statements about the development of science in history. Perhaps it is better to find a compromise between, on the one hand, a complete rejection of any methodology with regard to science (Feyerabend) and, on the other hand, the earlier full universal theories.

Is a change in science necessary?

Galileo used a telescope to obtain observations. As a result, he has changed the perception of perception. It can be deduced from this that science must change.

What is changing within science?

The changes that Galileo brought up cannot be viewed separately from the context of its environment. Of course, he had his rational reasons, but the reactions of his supporters and his opponents also had an influence. His opponents actually expected the same thing: they also wanted to describe the galaxy responsibly. The above means that the paradigm, the background of science, is not substantially subject to change. However, the visions, goals, observations, methods, and theories within science are subject to change. The part that remains after a change forms the background against which the next idea for change is set.

A light-hearted interlude

The vision of a no-nonsense philosopher is also possible. No-nonsense philosophers have a 'common sense point of view' regarding science. There is a difference with the universal method of science: the common sense vision only pays attention to arguments and not to the evidence that cannot be found with the current research methods. Chalmers fights against the so-called 'levelers' with the above; those who believe that science does not deserve a special status. Fifteen years ago, the discussion within the philosophy of science was about two items:

• The development of a vision for a universal method by adapting an interpretation of the probability theory;

• The development to combat the excesses of the prevailing scientific vision (which was governed by the theory).

What is Bayes' approach? - Chapter 12

Introduction

The Bayesians owe their name to Thomas Bayes: an 18th- century mathematician. In their approach, they find it inappropriate to endorse the probability of zero with a well-founded theory.

What is Bayes' theory?

Bayes' theory is about conditional chances, chances of propositions that depend on the evidence according to these propositions. The Bayes theory can be described as the following formula:

P (h/e) = P (h). P (e/h)

P (e) stands for the evidence

P (h) stands for the highest probability

P (h/e) stands for the lowest probability

This formula therefore shows how we can change the probability of a hypothesis to a new probability in the light of specific evidence. An important aspect of Bayes' theory is that the calculation of the highest and lowest probabilities always takes place on the basis of assumptions taken for granted. Popper previously referred to this as background information.

What are the differences within Bayesian?

The supporters of Bayesian disagree among themselves about a fundamental question concerning the involvement of the opportunities. We see two parties in this: the objective and the subjective supporters of Bayes. The objectives believe that the odds used in Bayes' theorem represent subjective degrees of probability. The subjects, on the other hand, use the degrees of probability in hypotheses to have a basis for the highest odds in their Bayesian-based calculation. Howson and Urbach insist that Bayes' theory is an objective theory of scientific imitation. There is no difference in the appreciation between Bayesian and deductive logic. This is because logic has nothing to say about the source of the opportunities that may form conditions or a deduction.

How is Bayes's formula applied?

Bayes' formula can be applied in various theories. Often in the light of historical examples. Consider, for example, William Prout's hypothesis in 1815. He saw that hydrogen atoms play a role in elementary building blocks. The atomic weight of chemical elements is related to the atomic weight of hydrogen. Generally to whole numbers, it is assumed that the atoms of elements are made of whole numbers or hydrogen atoms. Bayes' approach can be used to criticize some of the standard accounts of the undesirability of ad hoc modifications and related topics. Supporters of Bayes' approach agree that a theory can be better confirmed by different types of evidence than by one specific type of evidence. A major difference with the assumption of the rule from the ad hoc modification is that the demand for an independent testing option is too weak. Moreover, it requires hypotheses in a way that is the least in conflict with our intuitions. To use Bayes' theorem, it is necessary to be able to evaluate P(e), the highest probability of evidence that is assumed. In a context in which hypothesis (h) is assumed, it is easy to write P(e) as a forward-thinking identity in probability theory:

P (e/h). P (h) + P (e/not h). P(not h)

Chalmers chooses, in Bayes' approach, to concentrate primarily on the analysis of Howson and Urbach. According to him, this analysis has the least inconsistencies. This is due to the way opportunities are interpreted in terms of degrees of assumptions, as they are seen by scientists. For example, their system makes non-zero opportunities impossible.

What criticisms are there of subjective Bayesian?

Some criticisms of subjective Bayesian are:

• Subjective Bayesian has the advantage that it is able to ignore many problems that bombard alternative Bayesians who strive for some sort of objective probability;

• The calculation of Bayes' theorem is presented as an objective mode of consequence that leads to the transformation of a low probability into a high probability in light of given evidence;

• The degree to which degrees of faith depend on prior probabilities in Howson and Urbach's analysis is the source of other problems.

What does the new experimentalism entail? - Chapter 13

Introduction

Popper's contribution to science was based on the idea that the theories that can stand different tests were the best theories. Yet there were also imperfections in his contribution:

• It did not provide a clear picture of when a theory, rather than pieces of background information, should be held responsible for a failed test;

• Nor was it able to say anything positive about the theories that passed the tests.

For a group of philosophers, including Robert Ackermann and Ian Hacking, a confrontation must be made with the problems that temporarily storm the philosophy of science. This is to prevent it from developing into radical independent theories and its sources.

What is Deborah Mayo's philosophy?

Deborah Mayo (1996), a philosopher of science, sought to capture the implications of new experimentalism in a rigorous philosophical way. She focused on the level of detail at which claims are validated in an experiment. One of her most important ideas is that something can only be claimed when it is supported by an experiment and when the various ways in which it can be claimed are investigated and eliminated. A conclusion can therefore only be rejected if it has been tested. Example: if someone has had two cups of coffee in the morning and has a headache in the afternoon, can it be concluded that the coffee caused the headache? From Mayo's perspective, experimental laws can be proven by various tests. The growth of scientific knowledge must be seen as an accumulation and extensions of such laws.

Learn from mistakes

Deborah Mayo does more than translate Kuhn's notion from normal science to experimental practice. Among other things, it indicates the direction in which the research facility should go in order to discover and identify errors and thus to know which of these contribute to a scientific revolution or which provoke it. Contained in the approach to new experimentalism is the denial that experimental results are always either theories or paradigms, depending on the extent which does not claim the assessment between theories.

In which perspective is the new experimentalism seen?

According to Chalmers, there is no doubt that the new experimentalism has made a valuable contribution to the philosophy of science. It has put science philosophy back on its feet, he claims. Yet he also has a few criticisms:

• The new experimentalism does not provide a complete answer to our questions regarding the nature of science;

• Experiments are not as independent of theories as is claimed;

• The new experimentalism does not show how a theory can be eliminated from science.

Yet he also sees positive contributions from the new experimentalism:

• He thinks they are right when they say that every experiment is an attempt to answer a question. In addition, an experiment is not necessarily dependent on a theory (think of Galileo who had no theory about the moons of Jupiter).

Characteristics of the new experimentalists:

• The new experimentalism insists that researchers have access to powerful techniques for acquiring experimental knowledge in a strong and reliable manner, which is relatively independent of rarefied (select) theory;

• Some new experimentalists would like to make a separation between established experimental knowledge on the one hand and high-level theories on the other. Some go so far that only experimental laws can be used to test conclusions about the world.

Why should the world obey laws? - Chapter 14

Introduction

We distinguish two types of questions: epistemological questions and ontological questions. Epistemological questions are questions about how scientific knowledge can be defended with evidence and the core of that evidence. How do we know and how do we know what we know? How do people come to know and how reliable is that knowledge? It is also called knowledge theory.

Ontology, also known as the theory of being, deals with the question of what it means to be/exist. What kind of entities are supposed to be, or what kind of existence has been established in the world of modern science?

What kind of issues behave in accordance with the laws?

A common answer to this question is the statement that this is not a legitimate question. Answers to this question have been strongly influenced by the philosopher David Hume. From Hume's point of view, it is a mistake to think that behavior that conforms to the law is caused by something. One of the standard conclusions is that no distinction can be made between accidental and regular laws. A clear answer from the defenders of the position of the regular laws is to reformulate the position in a conditional form. The position of the regular laws does not suffice when scientific laws are assumed to be applied both internally and externally and in experimental situations.

Laws such as characterization of power and decisions

Things happen in the world in their own way and they happen because entities in the world own one or more of the following:

• The capacity;

• The power;

• The construction;

• The tendency to act or behave as they do.

Example: a ball bounces because it is made of elastic material.

A thing

An important element of what a thing is is that it can do something or become something. According to Aristotle, we have to characterize things by their potency and their real being. When we add things like aptitude, tendencies, forces, and capacities to the characteristics of our material systems, then the laws of nature can be seen as the characterization of their aptitude, tendencies, forces, and capacities. Consider, for example, the laws of Galileo and Newton. Chalmers does not understand why the vast majority of philosophers are unwilling to accept an ontology that involves both aptitude and power. He suspects that unwillingness has to do with history when forces were still viewed negatively. They were primarily related to mystical and obscure acts.

What are the laws of thermodynamics?

Chalmers distinguishes different laws of thermodynamics:

1. The first law claims that the energy of an isolated system is constant;

2. The second law states that an isolated system cannot be lowered.

An example of this distinction between these two laws is James Thompson's prediction of the freezing point of water. All he needed for his derivation were the thermodynamic laws and the empirical factual knowledge that water is denser than ice.

Reply to Boyle

Different laws in physics can be understood as common laws. If this is possible, we can answer Boyle's question (what is it that forces physics systems to behave in accordance with laws?). The answer: it is the operation of the common forces and capacities, characterized by the laws that make systems obey. Despite this, we do not know why systems obey the law of conservation of energy.

What does (anti) realism mean? - Chapter 15

Introduction

A common assumption about scientific knowledge is that it tells us more about the world than we can see with the naked eye. Consider, for example, knowledge about electrons and DNA molecules. This is roughly the statement of realism, with respect for science. Yet there are also scientists who actually deny realism: the anti-realists. For them, their source of doubt about realism is in the degree to which conclusions about the unobservable world must be hypothetical with regard to the extent to which they exceed clearly established conclusions based on observation. The long-lasting part of science is the part that is based on observation and experiments. Theories are mere scaffolding that can be abandoned once they have proven their usefulness. This is a typical starting point for anti-realists.

What is the difference between realists and anti-realists?

Within realism, it is believed that science describes not only the observable world but also the world behind the apparitions. The position of the realist reflects the (in Chalmers' words) "thoughtless" attitude of most scientists and non-scientists. How could scientific theories related to unobservable entities (such as electrons) be successful if they do not exactly describe the unobservable, or at least come very close to it? That is the vision of a realist. The anti-realist emphasizes the imperfection of the evidence for the theoretical part of science. According to them, theories from the past have proven to be successful, even though there were no correct descriptions of reality. They, therefore, think it is reasonable to assume that this also applies to temporary theories.

What questions do global anti-realists ask?

Global anti-realism raises the question of how (scientific) language can go together in the world. We can only describe the world in the language of our theories. Global anti-realism denies that we have access to reality in general and not just within science. Knowledge of the truth is often seen as an important attitude in the debate about realism. The theory of truth is what a realist needs.

What does anti-realism state?

The antirealists maintain that the content of scientific theory relates to nothing more than a set of conclusions that can be supported by observations and experiments. That is why many anti-realists are often referred to as monumentists. An underlying motivation of anti-realism seems to be the desire to limit science to the conclusions that can be justified by scientific intentions. And moreover to prevent unjustified speculation.

What standard objection is there of anti-realism?

A standard objection to anti-realism is, for example, how it is possible that theories are successful in advancing if they are not at least roughly true? An anti-realist will answer that theories can certainly lead to new phenomena. However, the fact that a theory is productive in this regard does not mean that it is true.

What does scientific realism say?

According to scientific realism, science aims to make a true statement about what there is in the world and how it behaves. At all levels, not just at the level of observation. One of the core problems of scientific realism arises from the history of science and the extent to which history has reduced science to faulty and revisable. Conjectural realism is aware of the fallibility of our knowledge. They know that theories from the past, along with their conclusions about the different entities that exist in the world, have been falsified and replaced by superior theories that have changed the world quickly. The conjecture realism is seen by the conjecture realist more as a philosophy than as a science because it solves problems in more philosophical terms.

Idealization

Chalmers thinks that idealization in science does not reflect the problems that they often think do. Idealization can be seen as an educational approach to the discussion about the nature of laws.

The unrepresentative realism: an intermediate form

When we look at the most refined versions of realism and anti-realism, it is striking that they have both advantages. The realist can point to the predicted success of scientific theories and ask how this success can be explained if theories are mere calculators. On the other hand, the antirealist can point to scientific theories from the past that were successful, even if the realist labeled them false. Chalmers adds the benefits of these two visions to what he calls unrepresentative realism. His view shows similarities with structural realism, developed by John Worrall. Science is realistic in the way that the assumptions characterize the structure of reality. It shows regular progress and it has proved successful in an increasingly accurate degree.

What are Chalmers questions, answers, and conclusions? - Chapter 16

Which three questions did Chalmers ask?

Chalmers mentions three questions that kept him busy (and still do) while writing this book:

1. Did he answer the questions that formed the titles of this book?

2. What is the connection between historical examples and the philosophical issues in this book?

3. How do the general conclusions about the science of Bayesian relate to the issues against the method?

What are Chalmers' answers?

In response, Chalmers states that it is reconfirmed that there is no general scientific explanation, or a general scientific method, that applies to all sciences at all historical levels in their development.

Conclusion

Chalmers concludes his epilogue with some remarks about the relationship between the views on science as set out in the book:

• The insights of science philosophers are abundant and only the scientists themselves are consistent;

• It is true that scientists themselves are the best performers of science;

• Scientists do not necessarily need advice from philosophers;

• Scientists are not that capable of taking a step back from their work and describing and characterizing what really is the core of their work;

• Scientists are especially good at carrying out scientific processes, but now so much at expressing what the process consists of.

What is the conclusion about the relationship between philosophy and science? - Chapter 17

Introduction

An ongoing theme in this book is that philosophy and science are generally about the fallibility of scientific knowledge.

How are arguments confirmed?

No matter how well scientific conclusions are confirmed, they will be considered too light when they reach a new, higher level of accuracy or when they are applied in an environment in which they have never been tested. Arguments from coincidences only work to the extent that they are confirmed by evidence in a sufficiently strong feeling. A few factors can be mentioned for this:

1. Evidence from observations and experiments must have passed a series of rigorous and objective tests;

2. When conclusions come from evidence, they must be genuinely tested before they can serve as evidence;

3. Laws and theories must be augmented by additional assumptions before they are tested;

4. Theories have not been confirmed by evidence when they claim to a greater extent than is actually justified;

5. The greater the series of phenomena that confirm the theory, in a manner similar to the rules indicated in earlier chapters, the stronger the degree of confirmation of the theory as a whole.

What is the difference between atomism devised by ancient Greeks and atomism devised by contemporary science?

There are two major differences between the form of atomism that emerged with the Ancient Greeks and the atomism that has become the basis of contemporary science:

1. In philosophical atomism, ultimate explanations of physical reality were sought after compared to contemporary science;

2. Contemporary science is confirmed by empirical evidence, while in philosophical atomism this was, at best, only accommodated by the evidence.

What do Perrin's experiments involve?

Robert Brown, a British biologist, saw the movement of small particles suspended in a liquid for the first time in 1827 through a microscope. In Perrin's experiment, there is no doubt that the movements of Brown's particles are indeed caused by collisions of liquid molecules in which they shift. The measurements from Perrin's experiment have been confirmed as strongly as is reasonably possible. A basic assumption of kinetic theory contains the identification of temperature with the meaning of the kinetic energy of the molecules of the system. The equality of the average kinetic energy and rotational energy was involved in Perrin's research into the average rotation of Brown's particles.

Conclusion

In this book, Chalmers states that he does not believe that structured realism is the correct answer to the question of anti-realism. His vision is based on a strong sense of confirmation of work in science but also on the precise theme of the correspondence theory of truth, adopted by the realists. Moreover, Chalmers' vision is based on the sense in which composites are no less real than the entities that make them up. He summarizes these subjects as:

1. Strongly confirmed theories have never been completely thrown away;

2. The only thing we have is an approach to the truth;

3. There are different levels of reality.