Consciousness - An Introduction (ch25)

 What's the view from within? - Chapter 25

Science and methods

The research into consciousness is sometimes divided into two categories:

1. the objective third person approach, and       

2. the subjective first person approach.

Sometimes a third approach is added: the second person approach (also called intersubjective approach). A distinction is made between first versus third person science and first versus third person methods .

It is difficult to call the first person approach scientific, because this approach looks at how people perceive things subjectively. This can not be measured objectively and it is also not reproducible. In addition, objectivity is important in science, so that personal bias can not influence results. Finally, it can be said that there is no such thing as a first person approach, because at the moment you say something, your description will already be data for the third person's science. So there can not actually be any first-person data.

All these reasons show that the first person approach to consciousness is not a good way of science . First person methods can be used. Subjective experiences can thus be published. They do not count as scientific evidence.

Chalmers and Dennett

Dennett thinks he is the leader of the A team and that Chalmers is the leader of the B team. Chalmers sees science about consciousness as something different from all other forms of science. This is because there must be a connection between data from the third person and data from the first person. Third person data is about brain processes, behaviors and what people say, while the first person has data about the conscious experience itself. Chalmers starts from the assumption that the first person exists. He believes there are good methods for collecting third person data, but we should have better methods for collecting first person data.

Science should try to connect the first person data to the third person data. An example is that we have to find out which subjective experiences ( first person data ) go together with brain processes ( third person data ). Chalmers states that a ' fundamental theory of consciousness' must be designed, in which these connections between first and third person data must be recorded. Chalmers believes that a conscious experience does not fully correspond to brain processes. In short: first person data is not the same as third person data.

Searle, Nagel, Levine and Pinker also belong to the B-team. Searle believes that many neurons first fire in the brain and that we then feel an experience (eg pain). The objective event , according to Searle, thus causes the subjective experience. Searle says that you know in a way of your own pain that no one can fully understand. Searle believes that subjective facts exist and can not be reduced to objective events.

Dennett (from the A-team) thinks that a subjective experience is more than an objective event (namely a brain process), but that we can not know for sure. He states that the B team thinks that we can know and observe our inner states and that we can not have a wrong opinion about them. The A-team states that we only have access to experiences that seem to be true , but that we can not know whether they are actually true.

Chalmers distinguishes between three types: A, B and C. People with an A-view are often functionalists or eliminativists. People with a B-view are often also materialists, but reject the idea of ​​logical supremacy of the physical. People with a type C view deny materialism and include different types of dualism. According to Chalmers, the gap between A and B is greater than between B and C.

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is about the inner world that people experience. We can also use phenomenology as a method. In this practice, phenomenology has two meanings: broadly speaking, it refers to the systematic investigation of phenomenological experiences. More specifically, it refers to tradition as based on Husserl's philosophy.

Husserl states that no meaningful distinction can be made between the external world and the internal world of experiences. He believes that polite experiences are more important than scientific ideas. He states that people have to memorize their learned ideas and previous beliefs; especially those who deal with the relationship between the external world and individual experiences. He called this process epoché . In this way we could study experiences directly. He wanted ' eidetic reduction' achieve: a way to capture the fundamental characteristics of human experiences. He wanted to go back to the basics of all things to better understand consciousness. Not many people believe that the process of epoché provides equally reliable knowledge as the natural sciences.

Phenomenology still exists and is used to investigate emotional states. Yet phenomenology does not seem to be a first-person method, but a third-person method. Experiences that people say to have are analyzed by others. In addition, it seems unrealistic to expect people to put all their previous experiences and learned ideas aside.

Neurophenomenology

The term neurophenomenology was used by Varela to indicate the search for a modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience. Varela agrees with Searle and believes that first person experiences can not be reduced to third person descriptions, but he proposes a new way to deal with this. He states that the difficult problem that Chalmers speaks about can not be solved by only looking at how subjective experiences correspond to brain processes. He thinks we need to rediscover the superiority of polite experiences. According to him, neurophenomenology is about experiences and how they correspond with knowledge from cognitive science.He states that findings from the first person approach must be part of neurobiological theories.

Attention should therefore be paid to subjective experiences of people. Thompson and Zahavi argue for joint research between phenomenology and neuroscience. This could for example be useful in the area of ​​self-awareness.

Varela provided a simple diagram to understand the place of neurophenomenology in science. This diagram consists of the four directions in which theories can be about consciousness. These directions are:

1. functionalism;          

2. reductionism;          

3. mysterianism;         

4. phenomenology.

Functionalism is at the top of the diagram because, according to Varela, this view is the most popular in cognitive science. This theory is purely based on third person data and validation. Mysterianists are opposed to this and argue that the difficult problem is unsolvable. Reductionists aim to reduce experience to neuroscience. Opposite is the phenomenology that illuminates the first person theories. The diagram is a tool to indicate the relationships between the different theories and to highlight the role of first person approaches in the science of consciousness.

A recurring model

Some people deny the difference between first person and third person methods. Velmans states that all sciences depend on observations and experiences of scientists. In principle, therefore, there is never a perfect form of objectivity. He talks about a thought experiment to clarify his point. Imagine: you look at a light and a researcher studies your reactions and brain activity. You have first person experiences, while the researcher has third person experiences (about you). Suppose you then turn your head towards the researcher and that the researcher will look at the light. In this case, the private experience of looking at the light becomes a public experience and an objective stimulus.

Velmans therefore says that there is no distinction between subjective and objective matters. He proposes a recurring model (' reflexive model of consciousness' ). He states that his model can ensure that all problems associated with consciousness can be resolved. He thinks we all have individual private experiences and he also agrees that there are objects and events in the outside world that people agree on. If researchers investigate mental states, they are busy with intersubjectivity. The experiences they examine are repeatable, because everyone can have them.

Therefore, according to him, the distinction between first and third person methods should disappear. He states that when your first or third person performs techniques, you will then observe or experience the results. So people experience the same things when they look at a certain object and therefore the distinction between first and third person methods can better be dropped.

Heterophenomenology

Heterophenomenology is about studying things that other people experience. Dennett argues that heterophenomenology means that phenomenological descriptions of subjective experiences are understood. This can be done in three steps.

1. First of all, the data must be collected. This can be done by means of brain scans, by asking people to press buttons when they see something or by asking them to describe their emotions .                           

2. Second, the data must be interpreted. This has to be done if we want to use the data.          

3. Finally, we take the ' intentional stance' . This means that we see a subject as a rational being that has its own convictions, a will and desires. Dennett says that this is a method that has been used so far in science. The question is whether heterophenomenology studies not only what people say and, in doing so, does not pay attention to the experiences themselves.         

Resources: Blackmore; Susan. (2010). Consciousness, Second Edition An Introduction. Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor & Francis.