Consciousness- An Introduction (ch8)

Which theories about the self are there? - Chapter 8

So far, we have divided the theories about the self into two categories: ego theories that bring a kind of permanent continuity and bundle theories that do not. Egotheories make it difficult to design testable hypotheses and bundle theories have no explanation for the fact that people feel that they have a self. Egotheories have something like the idea of ​​a Cartesian theater, in which the self perceives all sorts of things. It is difficult to deny that the self exists. We do have the feeling that we have a self.

James

James has written a lot about consciousness and self. His work is mainly about how the self feels. We feel that we have a personal identity. Central to this is continuity and unity of the self. We also feel that our thoughts are ours and are close to us; in this we distinguish and differ from others. He distinguishes between what he calls:

1. the empirical self or objective person ('me') and

2. subjective thoughts or the pure ego ('I').

The empirical self is easy to deal with and contains three aspects:

1. the material self; consistsing of the body, clothes, belongings, family and friends,

2. the social self; which is about someone's reputation and what image others have of that person and how he esponds to them,

3. subjective experiences, which are the source of attention and effort.

James states that the pure ego ('I') is difficult to describe. According to some, the pure ego stands for the mind and according to others is invented. The latter group therefore believes that the self does not exist. James rejects both ideas and goes for a middle way.

James sees continuity of the self only as a potential: the thought is a temporary administrator of other thoughts. James' theory is not able to give an explanation to for how and why the existence of temporary human language is connected with the functioning of our minds. James states that his theory is between the ego theories and bundle theories.

Neuroscientific models

Dennett states that the filling in of visual gaps does not occur because there is no self where that could happen. Ramachandran , however, proved with his experiments that the filling in of visual gaps does occur in some situations. It seems that the filling in of visual gaps is not done for someone (ie for the self), but for something else, namely for another brain system. Ramachandran talks about the executive system that MacKay also talks about. MacKay also specifically looks at control processes in the pre-frontal areas. Ramachandran gives more attention to the limbic system. The processes that best correspond with the idea of ​​the self have to do with the combination of motivation, emotion and actions. This combination is triggered by incoming sensory perceptions (qualia). We use this qualia to operate the limbic system. Our conscious experiences are therefore the input for the limbic system.

Ramachandran states that a self located in the brain does not exist, but he does not explain how input from outside can be experienced. In addition, he does not explain how qualia can be used as input.

Damasio distinguishes between the 'proto-self', the 'core-self' and the 'autobiographical self'. The proto-self consists of a set of neural patterns that store the state of an organism at any moment. The most basic form of consciousness is core-consciousness, which occurs not only in humans but also in animals. This form of consciousness does not depend on memory or on language skills. This form of consciousness gives an organism the feeling that it exists in the here and now. The 'core-self' is connected to this. The 'autobiographical self' depends on personal memories and continues to develop as someone grows older. This form of the self can also occur in animals in a less developed form.

Damasio states that consciousness is a feeling and that feelings are neural patterns. However, he can not explain where subjectivity comes from. In the GWT theory (Global Workspace Theory) of Baars we experience a self because some information in our heads is in the spotlight and therefore gets the attention. According to Baars, there would be a 'self-system' that influences what will be in the spotlight. Baars uses the distinction that James makes between 'me' and 'I' in order to distinguish the self-concept from the more fundamental 'self-system'. This self-system is fundamental, because consciousness should interact with it. The consciousness and the self are always connected to each other in this way. This theory does not see the self as an illusion.

Loops, tunnels and pearl vision

According to Hofstadter, the brain is full of loops, consisting of many levels of loop-like self-descriptions. Together they form a conscious self. At this level, the self is no illusion. At a lower level we arrive at neural activity. The 'I' then falls apart. Viewed on this level, the self is an illusion. The 'theory of strange loops' is a bundle theory.

Metzinger introduces the 'phenomenal self-model' (PSM). Through a pattern of neural activity, parts of the world are integrated into an inner image of yourself as a whole. In Metzinger's theory, the self is the content of the PSM. According to him, conscious experiences are not an image of reality, but a tunnel through reality. The PSM theory is also a bundle theory.

Pearl view

Strawson described what he called the pearl vision ('pearl view'). He believes that there are many mental selves that alternate themselves at different times, just like pearls on a chain. According to this view, selves really exist, but they are not separate entities.

The selves represent different patterns of neural activity or states of activation that come and go. He states that the selves perceive experiences (Subjects of Experience that are Single Mental Things, SESMET). According to Strawson, each self can take a number of seconds, but also much longer, but if one disappears, then another person comes in its place. For a self, a personality or long-term memory would not be necessary. So there is no question of one permanent self. Strawson's theory is clearly not a ego theory. However, it seems that the theory is not a bundle theory either, since Strawson admits that we feel that the pearl itself has a sense of unity. He, like supporters of bundle theories, does not claim that experiencing the self is merely a bundle of sensations and perceptions. However, the theory can not explain why we feel that there is a self that is permanent.

No audience in the Cartesian theater

Dennett states that there is no Cartesian theater and that there is no show or audience in that theater. Why then do we feel that there is such a theater? Dennett states that people think very much in terms of everything-or-nothing when it comes to a self.

So we do or do not have a self. He states that these are outcomes of evolution and that they are built piece by piece during our lives. Patients with a split brain are not necessarily one themselves. Two or more must be able to exist. He is in favor of the idea that there is no self and is therefore a supporter of the bundle theories. Dennett sees the narrative as an illusion. Several selves come and go. The story in it is constructed by minds, but the protagonist is missing. The idea of ​​a single source, of unity and continuity, is a false idea created by real words.

Resources: Blackmore; Susan. (2010). Consciousness, Second Edition An Introduction. Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor & Francis.