Bulletpoint Consciousness - An Introduction (ch7 to ch9)

What do 'the self' and 'the multiple self' mean? CH.7

    Questions about the nature of consciousness are closely tied to questions about the nature of the self, because it seems as if someone experiencing it is needed to bring about experiences. There are two ideas about the self in psychology: (1) there is such a thing as a self that has all kinds of experiences and decisions, and (2) it seems as if there is a self, but in reality this is not the case. From the first vision the egotheories arise and from the second vision the bundling theories originated.

    In people with a multiple personality, it seems that several selves live in them. The most famous example of a person with multiple personality disorder is described by Prince who treated Mrs. Beauchamp. Prince was clearly a supporter of the ego-theories. He believed not only in the 'true Mrs. Beauchamp', but also in various other different selves who were different states of consciousness with a separate will.

    Around 1960, operations were performed in which the passage(s) between both hemispheres was cut to reduce symptoms of epilepsy. A person in whom this operation was performed is called a 'split brain patient'. Gazzaniga initially believed that there is a 'double conscious system' in split brain patients. So there would be two different forms of consciousness among these people. MacKay believes, however, that there is no evidence for this assumption. He distinguished between executive and supervising parts of the brain. Supporters of the bundle theory argue that the discussion of split brain patients has one consciousness or two is unnecessary, because according to them there is no 'separate' self.
 

Which theories about the self are there? CH.8

    Central to James' theory about consciousness and self is the continuity and unity of the self. James sees continuity of the self only as a potential: the thought as a temporary administrator of other thoughts. He distinguished between the empirical self and the pure ego. The empirical self contains three aspects: (1) the material self, (2) the social self, and (3) subjective experiences.

    Damasio distinguishes between the 'proto-self', the 'core-self' and the 'autobiographical self'. Damasio believes that this itself is not a separate entity, but has to do with your life story.

   According to Hofstadter, the brain is full of loops, consisting of many levels of loop-like self-descriptions. Strawson described what he called the pearl vision ('pearl view'). He believes that there are many mental ones that alternate themselves at different times, just like pearls on a chain. According to this view, selves really exist, but they are not separate entities.

When is there a question of free will? CH.9

    The basic question about free will is whether we are free to make our actions and decisions. There are two major problems here, namely determinism (if this universe runs through deterministic laws, then everything that happens should be inevitable) and moral responsibility if I am not free to choose my actions, how can I be morally or responsible? for these actions?).

    If we perform a voluntary operation, the frontal lobes are activated. Damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) can lead to a lack of spontaneous activity and to stereotypic actions. Research also shows that the DLPFC is associated with the subjective experience of decision making.

    Since 1960 it is clear that the 'readiness potential' (RP) precedes voluntary movements. Research on this seems to show that consciousness is too late to be the cause of the movement. Libet argued that unconscious brain processes are the cause of a voluntary movement, but the consciousness can (just before the voluntary movement is carried out) stop it or not. However, this assumption has received much criticism, for example the doubt about the method.

    Wegner states that a free choice must meet three criteria: (1) the thought must precede the action, (2) the thought must correspond with the action, and (3) the thought must have no other causes (except free will).