Policing is often related to the maintenance of public order, but most of the times, public order policing refers to crowd events. Why is that? People have the assumption that crowds could be a threat to order. Crowds are often associated with public disorder, and this also reflects on the ways in which crowds are policed. Many people think that the cause of violence lies with the crowd, not with the interaction between police and crowd. They don’t look at the possibility that the police can contribute to the conflict and because of this, there are also no strategies developed that might minimise this possibility. Strategies focus on how to contain a crowd and the crowd is treated like a problem. However, this approach results in two problems: the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy (thinking that someone is hostile will lead to you acting if that person was hostile and this will lead to the person acting hostile in response) and the missing out of an opportunity. In the latter it’s meant that police could interact with the crowd in ways that reduce conflict and improve bonds between each other. Crowd policing could have a positive effect on general policing. The writers of this article want to show that having a good understanding of crowd psychology can lead to develop forms of policing that promote reconciliation (instead of conflict).

Principles

The classic view of crowd psychology is one that sees crowds as irrational, aggressive and primitive entities. Some psychologists from the first half of the 20^th century stated that crowds are homicidal in their tendencies and that one could expect anything from crowds. A crowd may seem peaceful, but violence can erupt at any time. This also means that crowd members must be treated with suspicion. However, other psychologists at that time thought that this approach to seeing crowds was controversial. Allport couldn’t see the reversion to primitive entities and he started a new movement: explaining crowds in terms of the traits of the people who are drawn to the crowd. Violent crowds are not violent because the people in crowds are transformed in the mass, but because violent people are drawn to events where they can express their true feelings. The classic approach could be seen as the mad mob approach and this newer approach could be seen as the hooligan approach. Both approaches do share the view that crowds are inherently mindless. They also share the view that crowds are aggressive, their actions are meaningless and the responsibility lies completely within the crowd.

Psychology has changed and the ways of thinking about a crowd have also changed. Over the last 40 years, the social identity research has become the most dominant approach when it comes to ingroup psychology. This approach has also tried to show that the view of the classic approach to crowds isn’t the correct one. More specifically, the social identity approach rejects the idea that people have one single personal identity. According to the approach, people have different identities and all these identities are salient in different contexts. Sometimes we think of ourselves as unique individuals, while at other times we think of ourselves as part of certain groups. When we think of ourselves as part of groups, we also think about what makes us unique compared to other groups. This way of thinking is in terms of our social identities. According to Turner, group behaviour is only possible if people shift from their personal identity to a social identity.

There are certain points that need to be made for the argument of Turner. First, a distinction should be made between a psychological group of people and a physical group. The physical group is often called an aggregate and it refers to a couple of people who are present at the same location. The psychological group refers to a couple of people who think of themselves as belonging to the same social category. An aggregate can contain one or more psychological groups and these groups can shift after certain events occur. The second point that needs to be made is that one’s relationship changes with a person when they don’t think of that person as an individual anymore, but as the member of a group. People who belong to the same group as you will probably be treated with respect and trust by you. Members of the outgroup probably not so much. Once you define yourself in terms of a group membership, the well-being of the group and the reputation of the group will become your own well-being and reputation. The third point that needs to be made is that people may do things in groups that they probably would not do on their own. However, this doesn’t immediately refer to bad things, because a person can be more generous to others when in a group. Also, people don’t lose control over their actions when they are in a group, but they just conform to the beliefs that are associated with that group identity. So the classic view thinks that people lose their identity and also their control, but the new view beliefs that people shift identity and therefore also shift the behavioural control in groups. It depends on the group on what further actions will be taken.

Much literature shows that crow actions are not random and there is also not a lack of control in groups. Crowds reflect the beliefs of the groups involved. This means the violent crowds are violent because that belief system is relevant for the community of the crowd. Crowds and groups are often seen as the same thing, but there is one difference between these two. The difference is that groups have formal discussions and meetings about group norms. Crowds don’t have that. It’s difficult to discuss something during a riot. Crowds also don’t have an authority structure. Another difference is that in groups, the physical presence of other groups isn’t needed to make the social identity of the own group salient. In crowds, face to face contact between the crowd and another party often takes place.

Crowd conflict and dynamics

The writers of this article think that the relationship between the groupings in the crowd depends on the interaction between the crowd and outsiders. They base this statement on three arguments:

• The fate of crowd members is determined by what the outside world (government, police) allows them to do. This will have an immediate effect on the group formation in crowd settings. So, if a crowd exists of different subgroups and the police treats all the members of the group the same (e.g. throw a gas-bomb in the crowd), then this will create a common experience for all the people in the crowd and they will feel like one group.

• When the outgroup imposes a certain fate on the crowd which goes against the ingroup conceptions of legitimacy, then the crowd will act as one with anger and hostility towards the outgroup. The events that pre-occur to this violence differ between groups (because different groups also have different concepts of legitimacy).

• Not all crowd members will get into direct conflict with the outgroup after a perceived outgroup illegitimacy. There is a whole spectrum of behaviour between violence and non-violence and the outgroup has an influence on all the points along this spectrum.

When you look at all three arguments, you can see that the classic crowd psychology approach is counterproductive. If the outgroup beliefs that all crowd members are dangerous, they will:

1. Treat all crowd members in the same way and this will increase the unity amongst the members

2. React in the wrong way to violence of one or a couple of crowd members by punishing all members and in that way violating the ingroup conceptions of legitimacy. This will unity the crowd and make them hostile towards the outgroup

3. Increase the influence of hostile crowd members who want conflict. This will undermine self-policing in the crowd

The three points above show what is understood as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The police needs to understand the processes in a crowd and this will allow them to deal better with crowds. This will hopefully result in minimal conflict.

Practices

The writers of this article have come up with some general guidelines for policing crowds. The first guideline looks at the information. police look mostly at criminal intelligence of members with a known a history of violence. But if you look at this in isolation, you can’t understand how the violence of a few people becomes collective. Police need to understand the social identities of crowd members. In order for public policing, you need to have information about the social identities. The second guideline is that the focus of police strategies during crowd events should be to maximise the facilitation of crowd aims. Most groups in a crowd have legal aims and fair intentions, and only a few groups in the crowd might want to act in ways that are not allowed. By facilitating the peaceful majority, violence from them will be avoided. However, all of this is only possible when the police has information about the priorities of the groups in a crowd. The third guideline is about the centrality of communication with crowd members. Police action that is taken for the interest of crowds will only be effective if the crowd sees these actions as in their best interest. A good communication strategy is needed. So, before an event, strategies need to be planned and the collective aims should be communicated to all participants. During the event, it’s important to develop a way to address the crowd members in case something goes wrong. Uncertainty is never good and often starts conflicts. The fourth strategy is to maintain a differentiated approach with the crowd. It is important to not see all crowd members as the same and to treat them all with respect. If conflict arises, police must make sure to let it not drag on.

Examples

The writers state that their approach is beginning to be applied in practice and they give two examples of this in the text.

Example 1

One of the fastest growing forms of protest in the United Kingdom has been the anti-globalisation movement. For the last 20 years, there have been annual demonstrations in London. The police was kind of challenged by these protests, because they were different than the traditional marches the police was familiar with. One of the differences was that the protest doesn’t have clear leadership and a specific aim. The anti-globalisation protest brings together different groups with different aims and different targets. Any building in London could be seen as a target. The police used to make use of the so-called corralling tactic, which means that they surrounded the protesters and didn’t allow them to leave. This tactic became controversial as it brought about much anger. Crowd members became angry because all members were corralled, irrespective of who they were. This means that innocent people were treated as guilty people. Because of the corralling, the members had the same experiences and a shared perception of police illegitimacy. These things led to conflict escalation. The police force asked the writers of this article for help. The writers told that the officers had to see the tactic from the perspective of the participants. Also, the writers told them that it was crucial to communicate to the crowd why they were being contained and how actions from a minority of the crowd led to this. The third thing they told was that procedures of selective filtering should be developed, so people with specific needs could exit the containment area. This should also be communicated towards the crowd. Once the special needs members have left, it should be communicated by the police that they would like the other members to also leave, but that it can only occur under safe conditions. The writers’ advices has been taken up by the police and the police has applied the advice on a number of occasions. It seems to be effective.

Example 2

The most systematic application of the writers’ approach occurred at the 2004 European Soccer Championship in Portugal. The writers worked together with the Portuguese Public Security Police (PSP) to produce a model of policing practice. The model was used in every area the PSP was active at. The model has also been evaluated by sixteen observers and English fans filled in questions about their perceptions, behaviours and feelings. The model consisted of four levels of policing interventions:

1. Paired officers in normal uniforms, spread throughout the crowd. Their function was to establish an enabling police presence. The officers were supposed to be friendly and open and they would also interact with the crowd and support the aim of Euro 2004. This allowed the officers to also keep an eye out for arising conflicts or tensions.

2. These larger groups of officers were active were disorder escalated. They wore standard uniforms and moved in on groups to talk to them in a non-confrontational manner. They talked about shared norms, how these norms were violated and the consequences that could arise from the norm violation. When this failed, it was up to officers of level 3 to sooth things.

3. Officers at this levels had protective gear and drawn batons, but they would try to seek their target as precisely as possible.

4. If the third level failed, then the PSP’s riot squad from the fourth level showed up. They had full protective equipment and water cannons.

The approach appeared to be highly affective and there were few conflicts. Even more surprising, there were instances of self-policing among fans. Some people mentioned that one group of England fans attempted to assault the police, while the other English fans confronted the first group and prevented the attack.

This all suggests that a positive attitude towards the crowd is effective in reducing the number of incidents. It also appears that the facilitative relationship is effective in promoting self-policing amongst fans. Police-crowd interactions also determine the longer relationships between the police and crowds. The big question is, could these findings be extended to other settings? The writers think that it should be possible, but that one needs to keep in mind that one crowd isn’t the other crowd. As mentioned before, the police needs to have information and intelligence of the social identities of the groups involved in the crowd. So the police should know what the groups’ aims and notions of legitimacy are.