Manifesting Knowledge

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It is a type of philosophy that addresses knowledge in all of its divergent forms – from geographical, to ethical, scientific, mathematical or cultural thought. The focus of this article is propositional knowledge. Epistemologists claim to be expert on this theory. A proposition is a statement that attempts to prove the truth of what is asserted. For example, that the sky is blue, that one plus one equals two, etcetera. Propositional knowledge suggests that humans possess intellectual abilities. However, propositional knowledge must be contrasted from ability knowledge. The latter is based on skill. For example, a person may know how to run and speak the language of his or her mother tongue, but he or she would now be expected to have the ability to assert propositions about how to run or how to speak the language. The expectation lies in that person’s ability to manifest his or her knowledge by showing that they can physically run and realistically speak in a conversation.

Truth and belief

The epistemologist would claim that having knowledge involves believing in the truth of something and a person would express his or her knowledge by outwardly supporting his or her belief. For example, in order to ‘know’ that Brisbane is the capital of Queensland, a person must believe this is true. In order for this proposition to be legitimised, it must be true in fact. This is best understood by considering the truth requirement of knowledge as separate from the belief requirement.

Truth excludes false propositions. People can believe in things that are not in fact true. If they believe in something and subsequently find out that this something is not true – then they would have to accept that they never initially had genuine knowledge. If the truth requirement were removed from attaining proper knowledge, then people could believe in and assert false propositions. Such an eventuation should be avoided: to associate a person with knowledge is to presuppose that such a person knows the truth of what is being asserted, nothing false.

Two considerations arise from the belief requirement of knowledge. First, in order to know something, someone must believe it. How could one be deserving of credit for having knowledge of a proposition that he or she does not believe? In order for someone to have their own knowledge, they must believe in the proposition. The legitimacy of the proposition would otherwise be of no credit to the person asserting it. Second, in order to have legitimate knowledge, that something must be true. Indeed, belief can be contrasted from knowledge in the sense that one may believe in something without necessarily knowing it. In order for a person to know something, it must be true. Truthfulness, in this context, must be understood as being objective and intuitive. That is, merely because someone believes that a proposition is true – does not necessarily mean that it is in fact true. Truthfulness depends on objective fact – how things are; rather than what they are perceived to be.

Knowledge is something more than true belief

A person will be taken to have ‘gotten things right’ if they believe in something that is true. When someone believes something to be the case, which is in fact the case, they will ‘have things right’. However, epistemologists do not end their investigations of knowledge at this inquiry. Mere true belief will not really create a true account of knowledge if a person possesses such knowledge by accident. Credit cannot be due to people who accidently have true beliefs. People can believe that something will occur in the future, without really knowing whether their belief is consistent with a true account of future events. If a person’s belief about a future event turns out to be true – this must be seen as a matter of luck, chance or rightful prediction – but not knowledge. Knowledge is a genuine achievement that someone can take credit for. It is not the result of a person’s prediction, chance or luck.

To consider achievements in another context, someone could be lucky on one occasion but not on another. A person may win a race because the other runners were slow, cook a nice cake because the cake mix was of high quality or be a good swimmer because it’s hot outside. Such cases are not examples of good runners, skilled cooks or professional swimmers. They are not cases of true achievements. Rather, these cases depend on the surrounding conditions: it is the circumstances of the case that will determine whether or not the actor will win by luck or achieve by chance. They are not examples of true skill, ability or knowledge as each person in the examples would not necessarily be able to repeat their successes. In order for a person to attain true knowledge, it must be a result of his or her own efforts and skill rather than being the subject of chance.

Epistemologists are tasked with the challenge of discerning what needs to be added to mere ‘true belief’ in order to surmount to an account of knowledge. Epistemologists approach this task by viewing knowledge as a genuine achievement on the part of an individual – for which credit is due. This must always exclude luck. In light of the complexity in distinguishing luck from knowledge, the pursuit of obtaining a definition of knowledge almost always leads to difficulty. For example, much difficulty is involved in analysing the faculty of the senses and the minds of human beings in relation to how knowledge is acquired and retained. Nevertheless, if epistemologists accept this, that a definition of knowledge is by nature problematic, this allows them to prepare for and deal with such problems: so as to enable the problems to form part of the definition of knowledge being developed, rather than to disturb the definition. Moreover, accepting difficulty allows epistemologists to take on challenge and to provide plausible solutions.