Philosophy of Science: The structure of scientific revolutions

The structure of scientific revolutions

The first chapter of Structure addresses two different approaches to the historical traditions of science. The main aim of the older tradition was to come to a deeper understanding of modern/contemporary science. This was done by focusing on the process of growth of science and how it develops from one piece of knowledge to another. In effect, a cumulative image was created to show how science grows from the old to the new. The second type of historiography required, for the purposes of authenticity, is that the standards of evaluation of older sciences must be understood in their own terms and not from the view of modernity. The purpose of Kuhn’s book on Structure was to discern a new picture of science by making known the implications of the new historiographies.

Science has many different and competing disciplines. Analysing the history of science reveals that there are diverging schools of thought, and no agreement between scientists about the foundations of all scientific fields.  Propositions or solutions to research problems attract the attention of other scientific schools of thought if the solution is new in form and has potential for further work and development. Model solutions of this type are called paradigms and are featured in the research area of normal science. Normal science takes its character from a broad agreement among practitioners in the same field of scientific research. Reaching solutions in normal science is like solving a puzzle. Each game is subject to guidance by rules and regulations; but no game can work as a test or confirmation of such rules and regulations. Accordingly, in piecing together a puzzle, the rules of puzzle solving are not actually tested or confirmed. Nor are the rules of normal science confirmed when calculating certain properties to reach a solution in that field of science.

Normal science is usually faced with ordinary anomalies. Whether the research is classified as normal or extraordinary depends on the context of the anomalies and whether they are significant. The validity of guiding regulations of normal science may be challenged when the anomalies become significant. In such cases, the practice of science becomes extraordinary rather than normal. This evidences a special circumstance where research regulations can be challenged, tested and either confirmed or falsified.  A scientific revolution occurs when pre-existing regulations are overthrown at the cost of accepting new theories in the scientific community. Kuhn describes this process as the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science. This illustrates that changing scientific concepts almost always involves rejecting old scientific concepts. Revolutions are, in other words, transformations in the world of science. To this end, though, it is uncertain whether the world of science actually changes, or whether the world stays the same but revolutionary change takes place in it. This uncertainty has given rise to the concept of incommensurability, which Kuhn did not make entirely clear in Structure but which he nevertheless attempted to subsequently clarify.

Explaining and rethinking the concept of scientific progression is the key to incommensurability. This concept stands for the proposition that, due to the differences in science after revolutions, progress in science is not cumulative. It is not a process of testing truth or goal-oriented. One stage does not lead to another stage, as the previous stage may be completely nullified by the latter. Scientific development thus entails no set goal or permanent truth upon which it is based. This type of development in science is capable of reformation – but not increase or specialisation.

Given that Kuhn’s theory of scientific development is mostly historically significant, it is relevant to the question of why Structure gained philosophical significance. The simplest answer is that, in the early sixties, Kuhn’s theory ran contrary to other philosophical convictions about science. For example, the concept of reductionism, states that theories may be reduced to more specific theories is basically invalidated by the change of scientific theories through revolutions. An entirely new scientific definition is adopted, rather than a reduced definition. Accordingly, Kuhn’s theory also runs contrary to Popper’s theory of falsification. Kuhn does not propose that scientific development involves falsification, testability or confirmation – but rather transformation through revolution.

Kuhn’s theory is inconsistent with Bacon and Descartes’ philosophy that scientific method guides science through rules and regulations that are strictly followed. Kuhn proposes, to the contrary, that problem solutions are the guide to scientific research in the phase of normal science. New problems are identified against the background of solved ones and the potential for further research is exploited through implicit analogies. Structure also provoked philosophical interest because Kuhn proposed that communities are the principal agents of science rather than individuals. This is not compatible with the traditional notion that individual scientists were the principal actors. The most rational procedure of scientific development revolved around confirmation theories and scientific testing – not disagreement about scientific consensus. However, Kuhn created a feasible function for a community of scientists – for individuals who disagree about certain scientific matters. Kuhn’s theory allows scientists to adopt the same theory for different good reasons. Rather than being a one-person game, Kuhn perceived science to be a social phenomenon.